

SIGMUND FREUD

1856-1939

INSTITUTE OF
PSYCHO ANALYSIS

SIGMUND FREUD: THE MAN AND HIS WORK

BY ERNST SIMMEL (LOS ANGELES)

Sigmund Freud died at midnight on September 23, 1939. This date and the date May 6, 1856, are landmarks in the history of mankind, for within this span of eighty-three years there lived a man whose life was his work and whose work was nothing less than the discovery of *man* in men.

Three years ago on the occasion of Freud's eightieth birthday, I ventured the opinion that Freud will one day be recognized as a liberator of mankind. All who are familiar with his life and work feel the spirit of immortality that surrounds the figure of Freud. Mankind needs and will need Freud's work for hundreds of years to come in order eventually to be liberated from the only fundamental obstacle to its progress: from bondage to the human unconscious. The power that the unconscious exerts upon man is irrational, regressive. Freud fearlessly penetrated this dangerous, uncanny realm of the mind, a region that heretofore only mysticism had attempted to approach. He made of psychology a natural science through which he uncovered the unconscious sources and vicissitudes of our instincts, the driving emotional forces of human nature. He gave man the means of acquiring knowledge of himself and thereby of understanding his fellow men. This knowledge will enable man to master the elementary instinctual forces of human nature and to direct his energies towards a constructive end and so make life livable for all. On his long road of development from animalism to his present state of civilization with its highly developed sciences and techniques, man has never achieved this mastery; for the most important features of this civilization have been acquired by man's repressing his antag-

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onistic instinctual forces into the unconscious whence they dominate him, deflect his intellect from reality and try to coerce him back to anachronistic infantile and archaic patterns of behavior.

We recognize with dread that the epoch in which we live, with its admiration for dictatorships, with its willingness to allow fear and hatred to regulate human relations, is strongly under the influence of the irrational unconscious and is slipping back, regressing, to the primitive and dark ages of humanity. But this same epoch can console itself with the knowledge that it produced Freud. He has bestowed upon us the natural science of human passions and only with the help of this new science can man hope to regain the full power of his intellect and find a way out of his conflicting material interests. The death of Sigmund Freud will not prevent his work from leading mankind to its maturity.

Freud was never a prophet, never a reformer, and he had no wish so to be considered. He never propagandized psychoanalysis. Psychoanalysis expanded in accordance with an inner law of its growth and the increasing need for it by medicine and by all the fields pertaining to human psychology. Only once did Freud from a feeling of social responsibility appeal to public opinion, not for the sake of psychoanalysis, but for the sake of those who were in need of it and too poor to get it. In 1918 at the International Psychoanalytic Congress in Budapest while the World War was still in progress, he advocated the foundation of psychoanalytic institutes connected with psychoanalytic free clinics. Characteristically he did not appeal to the civic authorities of the community, but to the authoritative inner psychological force of society—its conscience. His words were:

‘But one day the conscience of society will awaken, and we shall realize that the poor man has the same claim to mental treatment that he now has to surgical aid. And we shall also come to see that the neuroses menace the health of the people no less than does tuberculosis, and that, like

tuberculosis, the neuroses cannot be left to the ineffectual care of the individual himself. When that time comes, institutes and consultation centers will be established and staffed with psychoanalytically trained physicians, so that men who would otherwise give way to drink, women who might break down as a result of overwhelming deprivations, and children whose choice would be limited to delinquency or neurosis, may be strengthened through psychoanalysis to resist such unhealthy tendencies and . . . become capable of social achievements . . .'

It is not my purpose to recapitulate Freud's immense achievements. Out of his successful treatment of previously incurable neuroses has grown a 'pathology of the civilized community'. All the sciences related to human psychology have a new orientation through the discovery of the unconscious. This is confirmed by representatives from the fields of general psychology, of biology, sociology, anthropology, criminology and above all, of child psychology and pedagogy. It is the children who have profited most because it is they who are being liberated through psychoanalysis from the misunderstanding of their educators. In pedagogy, psychoanalysis celebrates its greatest practical triumph. Pedagogy based on psychoanalytic principles is prophylaxis. It protects the individual from many sicknesses and many mental disorders which would otherwise develop in later life, and it protects the community from the asocial or antisocial attitude of such unhealthy members.

Today, in reconciling ourselves to the fact that the man who created all this is dead, we feel the need of knowing his human personality more intimately—the man behind his work. Nineteen hundred and twenty-two, in Berlin, was the last time he appeared in person at a Psychoanalytic Congress. There he expounded the findings of his most recent research, the apogee of his psychoanalytic metapsychology, 'the ego, the superego and the id'. One year later he was stricken with cancer of the palate.

Freud never read a paper. He always spoke without a

manuscript, without notes. He is famous for the amazing clarity of his writing but he was no less a master of the spoken word. He used the German language not only as a vehicle for conveying his treasures of thought; in his hands it became a work of art. He never said the same thing twice nor did he indulge in the beauty of words for the sake of rhetoric alone. The simplicity of his phraseology was its beauty. He could be understood by every one of his listeners capable of intelligent thinking. He used no gestures to emphasize to his listeners what he had to say. As the interpreter of his own work, Freud was a man of consummate inner poise and monumental external composure; moreover, in appearance he was not lacking in personal charm. His face with its deep furrow between the brows often broke into a good-humored smile when he lectured because he would intersperse amusing similes to reward his listeners for following his new and bold lines of thought. Though Freud's personality was extremely effective, he never used it to advance his discoveries. As a man, he retreated behind his work.

On only two occasions did Freud present psychoanalysis to a wider audience than to his inner circle of pupils. The first was in America in 1909 when Stanley Hall, president of Clark University in Worcester, invited him to deliver five lectures on psychoanalysis at the celebration of the twentieth anniversary of the founding of this institution. The second time was in 1915 when he was appointed professor at the University of Vienna and gave a series of lectures there. Apart from these two occasions, Freud never presented the theory of psychoanalysis publicly. He was fully aware of the significance of his work but he considered his person absolutely uninteresting to the public. Because he abhorred all publicity, outsiders were able to learn relatively little about his personal life.

It is characteristic that the autobiography he wrote at the request of Professor Grote is in essence not an autobiography but a biography of psychoanalysis. It describes the historical sequence of its inner growth and its slow but steady acceptance by many of its opponents. This history of psychoanalysis con-

tains little about the personal life of Sigmund Freud. When he introduced some personal data it was printed in smaller type. The author warned, as it were, the reader to skip these side remarks and to concentrate on psychoanalysis and its development; nevertheless this biography reveals the greatness of Freud's character.

At the age of seventeen when he left high school in Vienna, his interest centered on natural science and the nature of man in particular. He decided to study medicine. Two great men godfathered his decision: Darwin and Goethe. At that time Darwin was the outstanding revolutionary in the natural sciences. He had torn down the barriers between the human and the animal kingdoms, and in the face of tremendous opposition had shown that the processes of nature are continuous, that man developed from the animal. Goethe in his rôle of a great natural scientist directly influenced the young Freud when he attended a public reading of Goethe's essay, *On Nature*. I quote a few lines of the Goethe essay which then so much impressed Freud, to show the affinity that existed between these two great men:

'Nature has neither language nor speech, but she creates tongues and hearts through which she feels and speaks . . . Her laws are unchangeable—she has few springs of action, but they never wear out; they are always operative, always manifold . . . Even the most unnatural things are natural . . . Whoever does not see nature everywhere, does not see her at all . . . Her crown is love; and only through love can we understand her.'

Thus young Freud entered the University of Vienna imbued with the spirit of two great scientists. As to what his first impression at the University of Vienna was, let him speak for himself:

'When I entered the University, I found that I was expected to feel myself inferior and an alien because I was a Jew. I refused absolutely to do so. These first impressions at the University, however, had one consequence which was later to prove important; for at an early age I was made

aware of what it means to be in the opposition and to be put under the ban by the "compact majority". The foundations were thus laid for a certain degree of independence of judgment.'

Freud's reaction to his first impact with anti-Semitism at the very start of his scientific career is characteristic of his inner self-assurance. *'I was expected to feel myself inferior. I refused absolutely to do so.'* No emotional outburst, no complaint about the injustice of the world; simply, 'You want me to feel inferior. I refuse to do so.' Freud's faculty of seeing things objectively, of detaching his personal feelings from them (even in conflicts with his opponents) was strengthened by his intellectual attitude of forming judgments deductively from observation of facts. So he went on to discover the natural science of human emotions, and towards the end of his life, himself a victim of race hatred, he unveiled to the world the deepest causes of that age-old mass delusion.

When we look back along the path Freud traveled from his studies in medicine to the creation of psychoanalysis, we recognize with amazement the intuitive sureness with which he collected all the knowledge necessary to deduce an objective method with which to study and to treat so subjective a thing as the human mind. When he was twenty-six years old, he started to study the anatomy and physiology of the central nervous system. Freud the Darwinist, who later discovered the basic biogenetic law of human mental development, began with a study of the animal brain. Under the guidance of the great physiologist, Brueckner, he studied the spinal cord of one of the lower orders of fishes. Gradually he went on to an examination of the normal and the pathological structure of the human brain and spinal cord on which he published a series of very valuable papers, among them some comprehensive monographs on cerebral paralysis in children. Appointed lecturer at the University of Vienna Medical School, he was an instructor in neuropathology, and at the same time became a practising neurologist.

In private practice he felt the full weight of individual responsibility to the great number of sick people who came to him for help. A young professor with an already established reputation for diagnosing in minute detail organic lesions of the central nervous system, he discovered to his astonishment that he could not find any such lesions in most of his cases. He concluded not that the patient was wrong, but that his own medical knowledge was inadequate for understanding mental disorders not based on anatomical pathology. His inquiring mind made him look about for some field in which experience had already been gained in the physiology and pathology of the mind independent of its somatic substratum. Hypnosis existed but was ridiculed by the medical profession as charlatanism. But French scientists used it: in Paris the great Charcot, the discoverer of the syndrome hysteria, and Bernheim and Liébault in Nancy.

Freud put the whole arsenal of his apparatus for hydrotherapy and electrotherapy in storage and went to Paris. Later he studied in Nancy. Here he got his first insight into the fact that there is an unconscious and that operating in this unconscious layer of the mind are processes which can influence the entire mental and physical personality. He soon recognized that hypnotic suggestions were verbal vehicles for ideas which, implanted in the unconscious of the individual, directed one's thinking and acting beyond conscious control. How this new knowledge led him to psychoanalysis is well known.

Back in Vienna, Freud went to the only physician there who was interested in hypnosis and who had already had some experience in applying it: Joseph Breuer. Through collaboration with him, Freud learned that suggestive ideas which are effective in the unconscious of the patient do not necessarily have their origin in what is told him directly, but that these ideas may have been conveyed to the patient in his distant past, in childhood. The neurotic forgot them but they remained alive in his unconscious. Freud learned further that these forgotten experiences were not always conveyed by other persons;

the individual himself had in many instances imagined them or had spoken them only to himself and then forgotten them because his conscious mind had rejected them.

Freud always acknowledged his great indebtedness to his friend Breuer for what he had learned through their collaboration. Characteristically, the break between the two explorers of the mind came when Freud discovered the function of the human affects always associated with human thoughts. Breuer, a slave to conventional beliefs, rejected with disgust the assertion that hysterical symptoms are conditioned by an unconscious sexual conflict. Freud reluctantly sacrificed their friendship. Without making this sacrifice, the discovery of psychoanalysis would have been impossible; and in the later development of psychoanalysis, he had to part with other friends for similar reasons. He broke sharply with Jung, Adler, Stekel and Rank not because they objected to his conclusions, but because they introduced pseudopsychanalytic concepts which were bound to destroy the basic fact of psychoanalysis: that there is an unconscious where the instincts are associated with infantile ideational material repressed in early childhood. Without bitterness, Freud recognized that emotional resistances within these men caused them to try to revise his findings in order to adapt them to the emotional resistances of the general public. It was loyalty to his work that led him to sever ties of friendship with some of his early followers.

After his disagreement with Breuer, he stood completely alone for the first twelve years of his psychoanalytic research. It was during this period that he felt the full gravity of being considered 'inferior' by the 'compact majority' of his colleagues. Goethe remained his guiding spiritual star in his loneliness, encouraging him to go on with his researches because 'even the most unnatural things are natural,' and 'whoever does not see nature everywhere, does not see her at all'.

Meanwhile Freud had discovered that the sexual perversions of adults were regressions to childhood sexuality. Children in their mental development were found to repeat the mental development of the species, passing through phases of barbarism

and incestuous love. Their egos develop in conflicts of hatred and love for their parents. The neuroses of adults proved to represent unconscious unresolvable conflicts because they were repetitions of childhood conflicts. The medical world laughed in derision. Finally with the publication of the *Interpretation of Dreams*, Freud lost completely for the time being his reputation as an earnest scientist.

Freud waited patiently until this wave of resistance began to subside. In 1905 the first enthusiastic followers came to him from Bleuler's psychiatric clinic in Switzerland where Freud's publications had been studied and applied in practical experiments on patients. From then on Freud devoted a great deal of his time to his pupils, stimulated them to independent research, thus helping to develop the new science. In 1912 he founded the International Psychoanalytic Association, an organization whose purpose was to encourage contact between psychoanalysts of all nations, to intensify their work, and at the same time to draw a line of demarcation between psychoanalysis and all the pseudopschoanalytical cults that were wildly springing up all over the world. The International Psychoanalytical Association was the only international scientific organization not split asunder by the World War. It now has groups of members in Europe, in America, in Asia, and in Africa.

Because a few of Freud's disciples deserted him, he was sometimes accused of not being able to tolerate criticism from his followers. That is not true. The fact is that Freud seldom needed criticism because he was his own severest critic just as he had been his own didactic psychoanalyst. Think of the immensity of this man! He unlocked the unconscious of men with the same key with which he unlocked his own unconscious. He dared to demonstrate this by revealing his own unconscious to the world thus proclaiming his belief with Goethe that in human nature 'even the unnatural is natural'. He published the analysis of his own dreams revealing hidden unconscious murderous impulses directed against his own beloved son who at that time was serving with the army in the World War. Is it credible that this man who taught us to differentiate between

external reality and our own inner reality would have had to reject the criticism of colleagues from personal sensitiveness? I remember once meeting Freud when he was reading a book sent him by one of his most heated opponents. Freud pointed to a passage in the book and said to me with a smile: 'Look, this man states that I am wicked. . . . Pure plagiarism! I published that myself long ago.' Is not the whole inner development of psychoanalysis a logical consequence of Freud's ceaseless self-criticism? Every piece of new material which his therapeutic work yielded, immediately stimulated him to retest the theories he had deduced from previous findings. An extraordinary faculty of freeing himself from the temptations of narcissistic rationalization enabled Freud to see reality as it is. This faculty gave him the strength to cast aside theoretical conceptions whenever his observations of new facts demanded it, and thus enabled him to avoid the danger of misinterpreting new findings in terms of previously cherished theories.

I resist the temptation to outline all the various steps in the development of psychoanalysis. Consider however the revision of the theory of the ubiquity of the pleasure principle, of the new conception of the repetition compulsion that was evolved from this. Consider the immense effect of the revision in 1926 of his fundamental concept of anxiety, and how through this revision he found an important new link between the mental and the somatic components of the personality, between mental anxiety and physical pain, and how this new concept of anxiety solved the problem of the reciprocal emotional relationship between individual and environment. Consider his last revision—the revision of the instinct theory. By postulating the destructive tendencies of a death instinct within us, he established the basis for a scientific psychopathology of hate. By postulating an antagonism between eros and death instinct, he went beyond the problem of human pathology and approached the universal psychobiological problem: what is life?

In his last book, *Moses and Monotheism*, published only a few months before his death, Freud completed what he had begun in two previous works, *Civilization and Its Discontents*

and *The Future of an Illusion*. In these books he looked upon the whole world as a patient to whom he held out the prospect of a cure from mass illusions through knowledge; for only through knowledge can destructive forces be converted into constructive ones, mass hatred into social spirit.

Until the very end of his life, Freud was a scientific revolutionary. But the picture of him as a man that we should try to keep in our memory would be incomplete were we not to think of him as we knew him during his last sixteen years. These years after he had been stricken with cancer and was definitely aware that he might die any day revealed the man's true greatness. After his first operation and while he was still on his sick-bed, he went to work. He began to assemble all of his papers for the comprehensive twelve volume *Gesammelte Schriften*. Soon afterwards he resumed his usual routine of seeing patients and completed the monumental work mentioned above. All his work now centered around the idea: 'My time is limited. I must prepare my friends to carry on my work.' For that reason he decided to accept pupils only for didactic analysis in order to teach them his methods of treatment and research.

The grandeur of Freud's achievements during the latter years can only be judged when one knows that after his operation he had to wear an artificial palate in order to eat or to speak, and that during the last sixteen years, he had to undergo many subsequent major and minor operations and was never free from pain. He would never alleviate his suffering with morphine because he felt that he needed his full intellectual capacity for his work. The father of six children, it was a great comfort to him that his family life was a happy one. But his greatest assets were his iron self-discipline, the strict organization of his daily life—and his humor.

Three times during those years Freud spent a few months in Berlin for treatment by a specialist. He lived at the Psycho-analytic Sanitarium in Berlin of which I was the director. I then learned about Freud at first hand what I had previously known only through quick impressions or from hearsay. Some

have maintained that Freud's personality contained some pardonable human weaknesses of character. I can only state that I did not discover any. Perhaps the white light of his many great character traits blinded me. I discovered in him qualities that I had never suspected. I learned that he was a great historian and that he had collected many valuable antiques—relics of ancient times, a rare collection that he cherished and loved. I discovered how he actually combined his scientific interest in nature with his love for it. He was an outstanding expert on mushrooms and collected them. Above all he loved animals and little children. I have often seen him in their company. An incident I chanced to witness I shall never forget for it revealed Freud's complete and unified personality; a man for whom theory and practice, precept and life were one.

Once while walking about the grounds of the Sanitarium we came to a place where a large police dog was chained. I knew him to be vicious and he was released only at night to watch the premises. I warned Freud not to go near him.

'Please keep away from him Professor. He's very vicious.'

Freud gave me a gently admonishing smile, calmly stepped up to the dog and released him. And while the huge dog gratefully leapt upon the fragile form of the Professor who patted his newest follower Freud said to me:

'If you had been chained up all your life you'd be vicious too.'

That act was characteristic of the man who discovered the antagonism between eros and the destructive impulse in man and who gave us the hope that with the help of scientific knowledge, eros may one day emerge the victor.

Freud, himself so much an object of man's cruelty to man, knew well through personal experience that the road to a victory of eros is still a long one; for in human beings, instinct and knowledge are no longer one as they were in that dog. Men's minds are in chains. Some of them call their suppressed cruelty race hatred and have not recognized that Freud is to free them. Towards the end of Freud's life, the demand was made again that he feel 'inferior'. The eighty-three year old

Freud reacted exactly as had the seventeen year old student: he refused to do so. He remained calm and dignified when the Nazis drove him from Vienna, the city that had prided itself on the fact that Freud, one of her honorary citizens, had lived there for seventy-eight years. When the Nazis broke into his home and robbed him of a large sum of money, he dismissed the incident with a jest: 'In my entire professional career, as a doctor, I never received so much money for a single call'.

More painful to him was the fact that the Nazis also 'visited' the International Psychoanalytical Publishing Company and destroyed all the psychoanalytic books and plates they found there. This publishing concern was his own creation. He had organized it to enable his pupils to publish psychoanalytic books independently of the commercial book market. Freud never received any profit from his published works. He invested all the royalties from his books in this publishing house for the benefit of his pupils.

Bringing Freud's personality closer to us does not make it easier for us to say good-bye to him. To bid farewell to Freud the man is not easy. But even here Freud, the scientist, helps us. He gave us a knowledge of the psychological laws that govern the relationship of followers to their leader; he gave us a knowledge of the psychological laws operative in mourning and in melancholia; he gave us the axiom that 'knowing' makes illusions superfluous.

Freud wrote that mankind will not face the fact of death. Individuals refuse to accept the fact that they or those whom they love can die. Only enemies can die. '*Si vis vitam, para mortem*', he wrote in 1915 during the World War. That means: 'Conduct your life with its finiteness always in view and you will then be able to create and enjoy all its potentialities'. In accordance with this principle, Freud lived a life full of creative power, full of joy and also in readiness to bear pain if it served the principle.

In losing Freud we lose our leader. Now that he is dead we undergo a mental process of identification with him. In

this way we take over his scientific spirit. And in doing so we continue his work, we go on developing psychoanalysis on the basis of empiric experience and are ready to alter theories when new facts demand it. We will not go astray in this endeavor if we hold on to the unconscious as our basic concept without being perturbed by its explosive manifestations either in our objects of research or in our own personalities.

Freud was not confident that his followers would succeed in identifying themselves with him as a person and remain faithful to his work. So during the last sixteen years of his life, he put into practice his own discovery that identification is displaceable from a person to an idea. He stayed away from meetings of his pupils not merely because of his illness. He intimated that his psychoanalytic friends must learn in time to deflect fully their interest from him and to concentrate solely on his work. Freud dismisses us after carefully having prepared us to bear his loss. Now we may go on doing our therapeutic and research work; yet whatever we may find, whatever we may discover, whatever vistas our eyes may see, we owe only to the fact that we are standing on his shoulders.

REMINISCENCES OF FREUD

BY A. A. BRILL (NEW YORK)

Although he had been ill for over fifteen years, the death of Sigmund Freud in September 1939 was a great shock when the sad news came. Once, on my parting from him, he said, 'This is the last time I shall see you'. I replied saying, 'No, you will live as long as your mother did'. She lived ninety-five years. Despite his chronic illness and his age—he was eighty-three years old—I could not believe his death was imminent.

Through his death the world has lost one of its foremost figures, science has lost one of its most earnest workers, and his pupils are bereft of a great teacher, a spiritual father. Our only consolation is that he has left us a great heritage: his *Gesammelte Schriften*, his great work, through which we can still commune with him.

To attempt an evaluation of Freud's life and personality is no simple task for one who was in close contact with him for thirty-two years. His life was beset with many trials but with no small measure of satisfaction. It was certainly a very busy and full life. Most of his years were punctuated with hardships and annoyances; but being a realist, he learned to adapt himself to all circumstances. He never complained in adversity, he accepted his lot with fortitude. Nor was he overjoyed when finally he achieved recognition. I was with him on a few occasions when he was sorely troubled. I was deeply moved, but when I looked at him his face mirrored the unclouded clearness and the exalted serenity of the true sage. One must not however picture him as imperturbably placid. He was not always calm. He had often to contend with great difficulties and annoyances, and he reacted appropriately. He once said to me, 'I can scold and fight as well as anyone'. But even in his most trying disappointments he never lost his temper.

I cannot help recalling that he was deeply disappointed in some of his pupils, and in the treatment accorded him by the academic world which failed to understand him. There was,

however, one bright spot which shone resplendently throughout his life. He was an ideal husband and father. Those who had the pleasure of being admitted to his family circle were deeply impressed by the placid and genial home environment. His relation to his children was ideal. I happened to be present when his daughter, then a very young girl, asked him whether she might read his book, Leonardo da Vinci, which had appeared only a few days before. He looked at her benignly and said, 'Certainly you may read it'. I was somewhat taken aback by his unequivocal response. I had just finished reading the book and wondered whether such a young girl should become engrossed in the problems treated in it. That was in 1910, after I had been a psychoanalyst only about two-and-a-half years and had not yet assimilated the meaning of the 'family romance'.

Those who know his works and have followed the vicissitudes of the development of psychoanalysis are familiar with his later struggles and disappointments. The anti-Semitic problem was vividly impressed upon him at a very early age and recurred throughout his life. He refers to it often in his *Traumdeutung* and *Selbstdarstellung*, but he reacted to it always in the same manner. When he was forced to leave his beloved Vienna where he had lived for seventy-eight years and go into exile, he was calm and stoical.

The New York Psychoanalytic Society was founded in 1911 for the study and promulgation of psychoanalysis, and the Institute, the first of its kind in this country, was founded in 1931 on the same principles, namely, to disseminate and promote Freud's teachings. We could always turn to him for instruction and advice; he was always ready to help any of his pupils. With many of us he was in close touch until he died, and we particularly shall miss him.

During thirty-two years of my psychoanalytic life he was always ready to advise and encourage me. He was reluctant to sympathize if one were not ready to carry his own burden. In the beginning of my leadership here I complained to him that the burden of it was quite heavy. I naturally expected

him to sympathize with me. He looked at me and said: 'Well, you are young; you should not complain, but act'. Thereafter we frequently discussed personally and by correspondence every difficult and important situation, but I never again asked him for sympathy. In his relations with his pupils he did not hesitate to speak with psychoanalytic frankness when the occasion demanded, but he was a dear and true friend with whom it was a joy to spend an evening. It is perhaps trite to mention that the author of *Wit and its Relation to the Unconscious* was a very witty man, and one of the most pleasant impressions that he left with me was his incomparable sense of humor.

Let me mention some of his scientific accomplishments. He began as a researcher in physiology and neurology, or rather in biology. (Nowadays very few neurologists or psychiatrists begin their histological investigations on the spinal cord of the *Ammocoetes-Petromyzon*.) He had a long and thorough preparation in neurology. He was proud to report that he was the first in Vienna to diagnose a case of acute polyneuritis which was later confirmed by autopsy. His neurological works (Cerebral Diplegia in Childhood; Aphasia and Infantile Cerebral Paralysis) were very highly regarded when they appeared, and are still considered classics.¹ It is interesting to note that in his *Infantile Cerebral Paralysis* (Volume III of Nothnagel's *Spezielle Pathologie und Therapie*) he quotes the works of two American neurologists, James J. Putnam and Bernard Sachs, who later played some part in the psychoanalytic movement of this country—one, I might say, on the positive side. I had the pleasure of introducing Dr. Putnam and Professor William James to Professor Freud at the Clark University celebration. We are all acquainted with Dr. Putnam's psychoanalytic works and have fully appreciated his active and sincere support. On the other hand, Dr. Sachs, who was a fellow student of Freud in Vienna, became the most influential opponent of psychoanalysis soon after I introduced it here. Yet,

¹ Cf. Smith Ely Jelliffe: *Sigmund Freud as a Neurologist*, *Jour. of Nerv. and Ment. Dis.*, LXXXV, 1937, No. 6.

it was Bernard Sachs who proposed Freud for honorary membership in the New York Neurological Society on the occasion of his eightieth birthday.

Freud continued his interest in neurology for a number of years after he and Breuer published their Preliminary Communications on the Psychic Mechanisms of Hysterical Phenomena.² Thus his contribution to the Nothnagel textbook appeared in 1897, after he had written his paper, On the Etiology of Hysteria (1896). It was only natural that the more absorbed he became in psychoanalytic mechanisms the less attention he paid to neurology, but despite the fact that he later espoused the cause of lay-analysis, he never lost sight of the patient's organic make-up. In 1910, Dr. F. Peterson referred a patient to me for analysis. His diagnosis was 'neurasthenia' and the patient informed me that he had been treated by other neurologists without getting any help. His main symptom was headaches which appeared on physical or mental exertion. He had other symptoms characteristic of neurasthenia which he claimed were alleviated by medication, but the only temporary relief for his headaches was obtained through the application of copper plates which had been recommended by Dr. Charles L. Dana. After seeing me a few times he informed me that he had to go abroad for a few weeks on pressing business, and when I heard that he was to visit Vienna, I suggested that he consult Professor Freud. A few weeks later I received a letter in which Professor Freud told me that the patient was not a case for analytic therapy; that he suffered from 'chronic internal hydrocephalus'. I was very much impressed by this diagnosis because no one here had thought there was anything organic to account for the patient's complaints.

In his autobiography Freud tells us how he happened to go to Paris, to Charcot's clinic in 1885. He stayed there about a year. Anyone who knows something of Charcot's works and has followed Freud's scientific career can readily see the pro-

² This work was received by the Editor of the *Neurologisches Zentralblatt* in December, 1892, and was published in January, 1893.

found influence that Charcot exerted on him. Freud often quotes him, especially in his early works, and we know the part that hypnotism played in the cathartic method. Breuer himself was influenced by Charcot's popularization of hypnotism. It was really hypnotism and, I might say, accident that resulted in the famous Anna O. case which Breuer related to Freud before he went to Charcot. Freud became one of Charcot's favorite pupils as well as his German translator.

What he learned in Charcot's clinic interested him immensely. He became impressed by the facts that through hypnosis Charcot could remove and produce hysterical symptoms, that hysteria was a real disease which was not confined to the female sex, that there were also male hysterics. He tells us that Charcot called hysteria the most enigmatic of all nervous diseases which he wished to solve; for before Charcot came on the scene, hysterics were called 'liars' and 'deceivers' whom no one would take seriously.

Freud tells us that he was fascinated by a picture which hung in the lecture hall at the Salpêtrière. It is the famous painting which shows citizen Pinel causing the removal of the chains from the insane. Freud goes on to say that Charcot continued this liberation of the mentally afflicted in the case of hysteria. He made respectable patients out of putative swindlers. If you read the literature of those times, you will find that this was no easy task since the old timers, the conservatives, sneered not only at the patients but at the doctors who treated them by hypnotism.

Freud continued the liberation started by Pinel and followed by his master, Charcot. Freud went further than his predecessors. He outdid his master by removing from hysteria the stigma of the *famille neuropathique* imposed on it by Charcot. According to Charcot heredity is the only cause of hysteria; *ergo*, hysteria is a form of *dégénéré* that cannot be eradicated. I need hardly mention that the concept of *dégénéré* has no place in Freud's psychoanalysis. He began with the individual and showed us that there is logic and reason in the most peculiar mental manifestations. Aches, paralyses, obsessions,

hallucinations, delusions, that had hitherto baffled physicians and mankind became perfectly clear through analysis. The dualism of soma and psyche vanishes as soon as we know the whole being. It was inevitable that Freud should have gone from the adult individual to his childhood, and thence to the childhood of the race. Dream interpretation led directly to the meaning of myths, fairy tales and primeval history. There is a psychic unity, a sort of monism, which courses through his works and which culminates in his *Moses and Monotheism*. Freud here takes his place with Darwin, Lamarck, Hering, Butler, Haeckel, Semon, Bleuler and others. He states for the first time that acquired characteristics in the form of memory remnants are inherited: 'I have no qualms in saying that men have always known—in this particular way—that once upon a time they had a primeval father and killed him'.

On the happy occasion when we celebrated his seventy-fifth birthday, I said that I was so readily attracted to Freud because his thoughts or, if I may say so, his system reminded me of Spinoza³ to whom I became attached by a very strong bond long before I heard of Freud. After reading *Moses and Monotheism*, I was again reminded of Spinoza and impressed by the fact that throughout all his works Freud consistently and clearly follows almost the same mode of thought as Spinoza. I cannot avoid comparing Spinoza's *substantia* with Freud's *libido*. One might say that *mutatis mutandis* there is a marked resemblance between them which can be seen if one recalls Freud's definition of instinct as given in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, and then follows the course of libido development as presented in his subsequent works ending with *Moses and Monotheism*. Taking *Moses* as his starting point, he shows paleopsychologically not only some of the remnants of primeval history that have become incorporated into our modern life, but also the course of the libido as it manifests itself phylo- and onto-genetically from the beginning of organic existence. It is quite obvious why he illustrates his views through the Jews and their religion. To Freud, as to Spinoza, who looks at

³ Cf. The Psychoanalytic Review, XVIII, July, 1931.

everything *sub specie aeternitatis*, his coreligionaries, the Jews, merely represent a *mode* of the *substantia*. It so happens that the Jews not only furnish records of what took place five or six thousand years ago, but their religion and traditions contain much material from primeval times, preserved by them in pristine form. Through monotheistic religion, which seems to have developed on the scheme of a traumatic neurosis, one can best follow the course of libido through the ages. The trials and tribulations which Freud had to endure as a Jew kept the fate of his people vividly before his eyes.

Freud has left us a great patrimony which we must and shall guard. I have no doubt that in the course of time some of Freud's views may be modified, but I am sure that the luster of the man, the glory of his great achievements, will remain permanently a scientific mile post no matter what the future may bring.

FREUD AND HIS PUPILS: A Footnote to the History of the Psychoanalytic Movement

BY HELENE DEUTSCH (BOSTON)

People like Freud have difficulty in preserving an incognito. To keep distinct the work and the personality of its creator seems impossible. In its instinctive desire to keep alive the former, the world strives through the medium of the personal to obtain a better grasp of the magnificence of Freud's achievements and thus, as it were, to bring them down to its level. Such an attempt turns in part upon the testimony of witnesses, in part—particularly in the case of the biographers of the future—upon a process of reconstruction. Most biographers—as is the habit of the majority of them—will be swayed by some more or less unconscious bias of their own: through an effort at popularization, some will falsify both work and master by superficiality; with others, fear of the truth will produce a hostile interpretation; still others—and these are the most dangerous—will be moved by an excess of adoration to present a cult in place of keeping to reality.

In his *Autobiography*, Freud himself has set barriers to further efforts at biography and to the analytic interpretation of his actions, in saying: 'Here I may permit myself to bring my autobiographical remarks to a close. Of such other matters as my personal relations, my struggles, my disappointments and successes, the general public is not entitled to know more. In any event, I have been more candid and more sincere in certain of my writings than those who describe their lives for contemporaries and posterity are wont to be.'

This brief account is in no way a contravention of Freud's wish. It is, rather, a small contribution to the history of the psychoanalytic movement, a backward glance towards a bit of the past of the Vienna group which, closest to Freud, had its own changes and chances.

My membership in this group through a period of more than twenty years will not impair, I trust, the objectivity of my

account. This testimony of an eye-witness, refracted as it must be through that witness's own affects, naturally cannot plead complete freedom from the subjective limitation of 'as I saw it'. The freshness of an experience always clouds its objective clarity; distance in time, on the other hand, has the disadvantage of fading of the material from memory; in either case one must subject the 'historical facts' to the test of scrutiny. In the remarks that follow, a modest attempt will be made to apply this scrutiny to Freud's relationship to his first pupils as a group rather than as individuals, and to their relationship to him.

To this circle Freud was not alone the great teacher; he was the luminous star on the dark road of a new science, a dominating force that brought order into a milieu of struggle. For at that time the battle waged was both an outward and an inner one: externally it was fought with and for Freud against the scientific and professional milieu from which one had sprung; internally it was fought over Freud himself, for his favor and recognition. It is the latter which makes understandable many of Freud's later difficulties with his pupils.

Let us review for a moment the earliest beginnings of this group, the psychological conditions that gave it birth. Freud's *History of the Psychoanalytic Movement* and the *Autobiography* furnish a graphic description of this period of his activity. There he stood alone in his heroic fight for truth! In his first attempts to acquaint the scientific world with his findings he met with 'only incredulity and contradiction'. 'For more than a decade after my separation from Breuer I had no followers. I stood completely isolated.'

To this first heroic period of his creative activity one may well give the title, *The Birth of a Genius*. Until that time Freud had been a supremely gifted man with a great future and doubtless too with certain difficulties within himself. Now, with his inspired psychological discoveries, he was to endure the tragedy of one who, a scientific pioneer and a discoverer of new truths, is condemned to be an alien completely misunderstood by his contemporaries.

This period of splendid isolation seems to me the truest and most impressive epoch of Freud's career. He says in his Autobiography: 'I understood that henceforth I belonged among those "who have disturbed the sleep of the world" (Hebbel), and that I must not count on objectivity or consideration'. And further: 'It was a beautiful, heroic period; the splendid isolation was not devoid of advantages and charm'.

Again and again in the course of the years, we who knew directly or from tradition Freud's fight for his ideas were reminded of Ibsen's *An Enemy of the People*, wherein the hero who fights for the purity of the water supply finds himself despised and forsaken by the representatives of officialdom, and culminates his fight with the discovery that 'the strongest man in the world is he who stands most alone'.

Freud once made the remark in a small circle of his pupils that absolute happiness falls to the lot only of an absolute Narcissus, free from all dependences. Without this narcissism not even the strongest can bear isolation in the long run. Ibsen's hero asks for a man who, 'free and high-minded, would dare take over my task when I am dead'; then surrendering the imposing castle of splendid isolation, he says: 'To begin with, I must have at least twelve lads; don't you know a couple of street urchins—any regular ragamuffins? Bring me a few of them; I shall experiment with the street curs for once in a way; sometimes there are excellent heads amongst them'.¹

When Freud gathered his first few adherents about him, he must certainly have put the question to his scientific destiny, 'Where is the man who, free and high-minded, would dare . . . ?' And he took the lads as they came, not so much for experimentation as out of sheer necessity, to break through the splendid isolation which in all likelihood had become a prison house to him.

This development of analysis is in keeping with its profoundest nature: it is *de facto* the achievement of an inspired seer and discoverer, no matter how much Freud himself hid this

¹ Quotations from *An Enemy of the People* are given in the William Archer translation.—TRANSLATOR'S NOTE.

fact behind the empiricism of his findings. What he saw empirically remained invisible to others, not demonstrable and consequently nonexistent. But Freud was above all a scientist, and the great artist and seer Freud put his discoveries to the test of empiricism. All who could observe Freud at his work knew with what conscientiousness he pursued this empiricism, how he insisted upon finding proof again and ever again before being willing to give expression to a new discovery. 'I learned to restrain speculative tendencies, and, following the never-forgotten advice of Charcot, I looked at the same things over and over again until they began to give their own testimony.'

It was particularly from this empirical attitude that there arose the need of followers and collaborators. But there were also other motives. The genius in Freud had to suffer solitariness and renounce recognition. He gives up his struggle for an orthodox career, renounces—probably in great bitterness—the recognition of universities; but Freud the man can bear the splendid isolation no longer. This conflict between the solitariness of genius and the human need of recognition while still alive from a receptive public, is like the reflection of the double nature of psychoanalysis spoken of above: on the one hand, the creation of an artist, on the other, the empirical data of a scientist. Freud himself discredits the former in a facetious remark—to which, however, he lends seriousness by his attitude—when he says of his lecture tour in America: 'The short sojourn in the New World flattered my vanity. In Europe I felt myself rather outlawed; there I found myself received as an equal by the best of them. It was like the realization of an incredible daydream when I stepped up to the lecturer's chair in Worcester to give my five lectures on psychoanalysis. So then! Psychoanalysis was no longer a phantasm; it had become a valuable piece of reality.' One notes here, in his indirect likening of it to illusion, Freud's rejection of isolation and the strong need he felt to give to his ideas the full value of reality through their recognition and acceptance by the world at large. It was out of this need that the psychoanalytic group had to come into being. But it goes without saying that this did not settle the

matter of Freud's solitariness; it only changed it, as it were, into a spatially enlarged, socialized solitariness, the value of which, however, was to become for Freud threefold: above all, the appeasement of the social conscience which in the long run does not permit isolation; second, it subserved the illusion that the world at large had sent out the first harbingers of acceptance of his teachings; and finally, the powerful and substantial motive that psychoanalysis, being from its very beginning an empirical science, needed with its expansion collectors, assemblers and sifters of its empirical material.

On contemporary observers certain human weaknesses of Freud made a particularly strong impression because he displayed them openly yet without ever making concessions to them in his scientific work. Despite his disdain for official position, Freud was very happy whenever he received recognition from such a source, or when a successful colleague of acknowledged scientific rank found his way to analysis. Here again his unwillingness to make concessions expressed itself—so strongly indeed, that in such cases he was tempted to make it a condition that the person in question should give up his official position for the sake of collaboration with the psychoanalytic group. One sometimes felt inclined to interpret this as an act of affective vengeance on the part of Freud against officialdom. Its actual basis, however, lay in his own personal experience, in that during those early days of analysis there was no possibility whatever of reconciling a career with the burden of Freud's teachings while, *per contra*, one could not be a trustworthy collaborator under the restrictions inherent in official position.

Freud's need for an assentient echo from the outer world expresses itself particularly in his relationship to his first small group of pupils. In the fervor of his work, in the overcoming of his own doubts which he expresses so often and with such humility in his writings, he had to have peace in his scientific house. His pupils were to be above all passive understanding listeners; no 'yes men' but projection objects through whom he

reviewed—sometimes to correct or to retract them—his own ideas.

Freud has often been reproached for this very obvious demand on the part of a creative man. What is accorded as a matter of course to every mediocrity who is an officially appointed chief of a clinic or of any scientific field of activity was to be subjected in Freud's case to a particularly devastating criticism. The conditions, it is true, under which Freud formed his circle were exceptional and difficult: on the one hand, his overwhelming intellectual superiority; on the other, the lack of recognition which necessitated a special selection of pupils from a group possessing very special and definite ideas of what to expect. For he who attached himself to Freud at that time knew that he was going into exile, that he would have to renounce his career and the usual gratification of professional ambition. One might therefore expect these first pupils to have been revolutionists of the spirit who stood out from that average to which Freud remained unintelligible—a select and courageous advance guard. Such an expectation could be realized only in individual instances. Surveying in retrospect the original Vienna circle which gathered about Freud, and seeking the motives which induced its members to approach psychoanalysis, it should particularly be borne in mind that it was only the few who could do so out of purely scientific interest or out of a clinical experience which corroborated Freud's findings. Many came out of an intuitive inner urge; others were impelled by their own neurosis, or were driven by contrariety or by an identification of their own lack of recognition with Freud's lot. To achieve such an identification was very uplifting for it created in the person concerned the illusion of feeling himself to be something he was not: a misunderstood genius.

All, however, created the same atmosphere about the master, an atmosphere of absolute and infallible authority on his part. It was never any fault of Freud's that they cast him in this rôle and that they—so rumor has it—became mere 'yes men'.

Quite the contrary; Freud had no love for 'yes men' and so it fell out that the very ones who proved to be the most loyal and the most reliable adherents were not the recipients of a warmer sympathy on his part. He loved those who were critical, who were independent, who were of interest for their brilliance, who were original.

Gradually it came about that to many in this group the objective truth of Freud's researches was of less importance than the gratification of the emotional need to be esteemed and appreciated by him. This emotional factor of subordinating one's intellectual freedom to the personal element became the source of the severest conflicts within the confines of this affect-laden circle. Each wished to be the favorite, and each demanded love and preference as compensation for having made the sacrifice of isolation.

The rigid scientific criticism and objectivity to which Freud subjected his own work and that of the others preserved the group from sectarianism. But under the affective conditions just mentioned, he could not prevent the occurrence of emotional tensions and discharges which also had their influence on the development of the psychoanalytic movement. To the weaker personalities their identification with the great man was of considerable advantage. The attention which an insignificant person attracts to himself through his connection with a genius contributes to the increase of his own narcissism. Narcissistic conceit, however, exaggerates into grandiosity and caricature, and thereby devaluates the true worth of the cause which it represents. Freud with the impressive modesty of a great savant has often emphasized the weaknesses and defects of analysis: 'Psychoanalysis has never pretended to be a panacea, or claimed to perform miracles'. Never does he set forth his theses dogmatically but always with the scepticism of the genuine seeker after truth: 'If I am not mistaken', 'if the future confirms it', etc. Those pupils have not trodden in Freud's footsteps who presumptuously claim that analysis is capable of curing all neuroses, remolding character, and revolutionizing the age-old laws of nature and of the cosmic order.

Freud has suffered many disappointments in his pupils. The attempt has been made to explain this fact analytically as a 'tragic' inevitability. It is indeed striking that experiencing disappointments should be displaced from the beloved teachers of Freud (as related in his Autobiography) to his beloved pupils. Analytic interpretations would be platitudinous here and would besides contribute little to psychological understanding. Direct observation seems to admit of a less profound but likewise a more illuminating explanation. Everybody around Freud wanted to be loved by him, but his intellectual accomplishment meant infinitely more to him than the people around him. As an inspired pathfinder he felt justified in regarding his co-workers as a means towards his own impersonal objective accomplishment; and with this end in mind, probably every impulse towards originality, when it subserved other than *objective* purposes, annoyed him and made him impatient. Freud was too far ahead of his time to leave much room for anything really new in his own generation. It seems to be characteristic of every discoverer of genius that his influence on contemporary thought is not only fructifying but inhibitory as well.

The striving for independence was of course particularly strong in those pupils who felt disappointed in their personal emotional relationship to Freud or threatened by their own ambivalence. While the less gifted expressed their ambivalence in a reactively increased dependence and in the overvaluation of the practical value of analysis mentioned above, the more gifted denied this dependence in a more direct but still scientific form and separated themselves from the group in either a noisy and hostile or in a more veiled and passive manner. This conjoining of the affective and personal with the rational and scientific, this more or less unconscious process of displacement, was the provocation for Freud's often emphasized intolerance. Anyone in a position to observe Freud directly can testify to the tolerance, the patience and the respect which he showed for the opinions of others if they were of a purely factual character, even when they did not coincide with his

own ideas. But towards affective motivations concealed behind intellectual and scientific claims, especially when these motives involved his own personality, he was particularly severe and relentless.

It must be admitted—or to put it more mildly, it may be supposed—that in Freud as well, back of the factual criticism of the factual, affective motivations and displacements played a part and lent to this intolerance a peculiar intensity. At all events, upon the discovery of such unconscious attitudes towards himself on the part of his pupils, his clearsightedness often failed him.

One often hears it said that Freud was afraid of plagiarism, especially on the part of his pupils, and his autobiographical writings seem to bear this out. Of this fact I may offer the following explanation based on personal observation: in his method of working, Freud was always scrupulously intent upon having an empirical control set up. His gift of observation made him see and grasp things quickly. He was wont to subject his findings to strict proof and empirical confirmation before he gave them out in either written or spoken form. Manuscripts lay in his desk for months, even years, and only after long and repeatedly confirmed observation did he publish them in the cautious, modest form characteristic of him. In his contacts with his pupils it might easily happen that the allusion to some surprising finding, to some new idea, had an immediately stimulating effect before it could attain the ripeness which Freud himself would have wished to give it. This frequently gave rise to the danger of unconscious plagiarism on the part of the others, and induced Freud to be cautious and self-protective in this regard.

The small circle around Freud grew with the years, and those who entered it later could now lay claim to professional and scientific motives. Furthermore the aims of the group changed with its growth. Its program became broader and more social; it was no longer an atmosphere of absolute isolation and of conflictual attachment to the spiritual leader which dominated

it. The founding of the teaching Institute and the Polyclinic, the training of pedagogues, the intensified interest in child analysis, the influx of foreign students, all changed completely the character of the group at whose head Freud had fought his first battles.

One thing remained, however, which gave to the Vienna group up to its final days a wholly personal stamp: tradition. This tradition continued to be preserved for several years—perhaps the pleasantest and most serene ones—through the personal contact with Freud in those monthly meetings in which Freud communicated to the small select group his new ideas or amplified and corrected his older ones. He did not succeed in creating in us the illusion that it was we who gave and he who received, although he made the effort to do so, opening every meeting with the words: 'Now let me hear what you have to tell me'. And we brought him our big problems and our little findings, always to see the real purpose of our coming wonderfully fulfilled when Freud took up the discussion. It is to be hoped that these *Gespräche mit Freud*, eagerly committed to writing by a few, will one day be published. Here I want to say but one thing: again and again, despite his greater tendency towards speculation in those years of his creativeness, Freud directed us back to empiricism and cautioned us against speculation. 'For a short while,' he said, 'I allowed myself to leave the sheltered bay of direct experience for speculation. I regret it greatly, for the consequences of so doing do not seem of the best.'

History repeats itself. And so did the history of the Vienna group with its ever active tradition repeat itself. Out from a large circle with new problems there crystallized again a small group of younger pupils in active contact with Freud—exactly as thirty years before—who experienced directly in their devotion the uniqueness of this great mind, formulated his ideas into principles, and set themselves the task of preserving the heritage of Freud's teaching in its purest and most dignified formulation and of continuing it by ever enlarging it.

History repeats itself; and sometimes, although seldom enough, it draws upon earlier experiences and corrects the old mistakes. But a tragic fate, unfortunately, has prevented us actually from realizing this expectation. Freud said: 'The interests of the various members emanate from the common source and tend in different directions. Some place principal emphasis upon the clarification and extension of psychological knowledge, others are interested in furthering its connections with internal medicine and psychiatry.' Freud was aware that in its practical application analysis must undergo dilution. This is but the natural fate of every great ideology: it loses its noblest characteristic, its splendid isolation, and acquires practical value only in its dilution, alteration, adaptation. This is necessarily the destiny too of analysis because as an empirical science it serves practical ends wherein the immediate result must be of permanent value. Thus of the genius-given gift of Freud humanity will acquire its fullest social value only when it becomes by this dilution a common property, even indeed divorced from the name of its creator.

The loyal band of the chosen few of two generations has undertaken the noble task of preserving the original kernel of Freud's teaching in its best and truly freudian sense. Sometimes his pupils' adhesion to the orthodoxy of his teaching seems like stubbornness and folly. How the two tendencies will become interwoven and be reconciled with each other only the future will show. Even if the more conservative and loyal followers seem at times to be out of touch with reality, they nevertheless discharged by their piety the debt we owe for our common spiritual existence. Not for a long time will theirs be a merely antiquarian task even though it may seem so amid the vexations of the present time.

In defense of those who have disclaimed this immediate task, let it be said that it makes a great difference whether one has grown out of the intimacy with Freud into independence as a loving heir, or whether one owes his independence to an emotional conflict.

Translated by HENRY ALDEN BUNKER

RECOLLECTIONS OF BERGGASSE 19

BY FRANZ ALEXANDER (CHICAGO)

Sigmund Freud was unquestionably one of the most controversial figures of our time. Attempts to evaluate his contributions to psychiatry, to medical philosophy and to the social sciences already fill volumes. Now, after his death, the process of assimilation of his teachings continues and the final judgment rests with the future.

The intention here is not to evaluate his work but rather to recall a few impressions of him which may give a more vivid picture of this great man.

It was my good fortune to have known Freud and to have been in close contact with him from the time I became a psychoanalyst until I left Europe ten years ago. Since then I have seen him only on three occasions, the last time in the summer of 1935.

In 1920 when I became the first student to register at the Psychoanalytic Institute in Berlin, teaching of psychoanalysis was not organized and standardized as it is today. In fact, the founding of the Berlin Institute was the first step toward organized teaching. Up to that time teaching of psychoanalysis was like medieval medicine when students gathered around famous teachers. Teaching was a highly personal matter between students and teachers who knew each of their students well and took personal interest in their progress. A well organized curriculum and teaching staff, credits given for attendance, a number of obligatory and elective courses were unknown. To some degree in our small psychoanalytic institutes this personal relationship between teacher and student still obtains. In those earlier days Freud himself was the center of all psychoanalytic teaching. He knew almost all the promising young analysts in Europe and took great personal interest

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in them. To go to Berggasse 19 in Vienna to have a talk with Freud was a common procedure both for teachers and students of psychoanalysis. It was not only natural to do this but it was more or less expected. I remember Freud once talking to me with some indignation about a European analyst who had made valuable contributions to psychoanalysis: 'Imagine, he has never once paid me a visit to make my personal acquaintance'. He shook his head and muttered something about 'ambivalence'. He proved to be right: this follower later gave ample evidence of his hostility to Freud.

During my first visit with him I was fully aware of the fact that I was facing one of the greatest minds of all times. A great man is a lucky combination of hereditary qualities and later experiences. How one recognizes this quality of genius is indefinable, but it is unmistakable. Certainly the aura surrounding a great man is not based on his intellectual capacity alone. A combination of genuineness and courage contributes to this impression, as well as other intangibles which cannot be stated precisely.

Freud's whole personality emanated this combination of fundamental genuineness, directness and courage, in the person of a jovial Viennese physician with all the charm, urbanity and worldliness that was characteristic of the burghers of that ancient residence of the Hapsburgs. In fact, this latter appearance was so pronounced that it might have been deceptive in making Freud appear merely a well settled, cultured and conservative physician, a home-loving husband and father. However it required only a brief contact with him to discern the towering figure of a great man, devoted to one great cause. The shadow of centuries fell over his study and one felt that one was facing an intellectual mountain peak of which only a few in each age are connected with each other by invisible ranges. The story is told—perhaps it is an invention—that even the Nazi Storm Troopers who brutally invaded his home soon began to treat him respectfully with the awe which great men instil even in the most primitive people.

Freud's speech, even during the most informal conversation,

was like his style of writing—clear, to the point, and devoid of redundancy. There was no tenseness in his manner, no attempt to impress. He propounded the most significant ideas in a light conversational, casual tone. He liked to illustrate a point with anecdotes and jokes, was an excellent raconteur, and even serious topics were robbed of the artificial austerity with which they are so frequently invested.

Freud had strong convictions but he never became dogmatic and when uncertain he always admitted it. This made conversation with him delightful, especially the discussion of problems which puzzled him. To a suggestion he would respond with a question or with a 'perhaps', spinning the idea further and waiting for the other to take up the thread again and offer some new suggestion. One had the feeling that one and Freud were working out something together.

One unforgettable visit with him was an occasion on which his daughter Anna was also present. We talked almost two hours and this conversation provided me with a lasting stimulation. At that time I had just read Maeterlinck's book on termites and was very much intrigued by the weird facts of the termite society which validly can be considered to be a transition between a more loosely constructed society like the human (in which the social members are still more or less individuals), and a biological organism in which the cells could not continue their individual existence alone without coëxisting with each other. While talking with Freud about the relation of psychoanalysis to sociology and biology I mentioned the termite state as an example of an organization where the members of the unit have abandoned their freedom to a degree unknown in human societies, and asked him whether he thought human society would develop gradually towards such a highly planned and organized system. This conversation took place before Hitlerism, at a time when in Europe only Russia and Italy had totalitarian organizations. Freud's answer was one of those quick, lightening replies which put the problem in its broadest perspectives. In my opinion this faculty showed his genius more than anything else.

He said, and I remember his words almost verbatim,

'Well Doctor, the human organism consists of cells which gave up their individual freedom and selfishness to such a degree that the human being as a whole can afford to retain its individuality. After all,' he continued, 'why do cells organize themselves into higher units? Only in order to survive, to become more effective in defending themselves against external dangers. Termites are the weakest creatures of the earth; they have not even a protecting hard shell like ants; no wonder they seek to survive by coöperation, and sacrifice their freedom for the sake of sheer existence. But man, the crown of creation, the master who dominates the world, why should he give up his freedom to such an extent as the weak helpless termites do? Who is man's enemy against whom he must organize himself in such a rigid fashion?'

To which I replied:

'Nobody except other men. We see that in war, countries organize themselves more rigidly and approach a termite state.'

Freud shrugged his shoulders:

'Well, that is true, but still I do not think that for man it will ever become necessary to give up his individuality so completely as the pitiful termites do.'

It is obvious that in my reasoning I had followed the current concept of evolution, that smaller units gradually merge into higher systems. According to this principle man, a cell-state, sometime in the future should form a superstate, a social superorganism. Freud immediately introduced into this argument the salient dynamic issue, namely that organization is not an aim in itself but takes place only under pressure as a necessary measure for the sake of survival. The question is whether or not for men this necessity will ever arise. Certainly it is thinkable that if man could settle the problems of his existence rationally and peacefully with his fellow men, he could save his individuality and freedom at least as long as no new type of a powerful biological creature appears on the scene and

forces him in self-defense to organize and degrade himself to the status of a termite.

It may appear a contradiction that Freud who developed such daring abstractions as that of the life and death instincts and the theory of the primal horde, was fundamentally a very realistic and practical thinker. He had an unusual sense for essentials and when he indulged in deductions, he never disregarded those immovable corner stones of experience which must always be taken into account. In other words, he was not only original, brilliant and penetrating but wise. He used his wisdom frequently to bring his pupils down to earth from esoteric heights or premature theories.

For many years once every month, Freud invited a selected number of his pupils to an evening discussion. On one of these evenings I was asked to present the case of a delinquent young man whom I had studied in a prison. It was the case of an obsessed automobilist, a young waiter, who under the pressure of a compulsion took long taxicab rides although he knew in advance that he would not be able to pay for them. I had neatly worked out the unconscious motivations of this peculiar but self-destructive hobby and used it for the demonstration of an instinct ridden personality so common among criminals.

Freud listened attentively and at the end made some quite complimentary remarks about the analytic interpretation of the case, but then he added:

'Only I do not see how this case can throw light upon the essential problem of criminality. If your patient had been the son of a millionaire, he might have become a record-breaker and as such a national hero. Only because of his social position and because he was a poor waiter, he could not give expression to his compulsion or hobby in a legal way.'

This simple statement more than anything else demonstrated to me the fact that criminal psychology alone can solve the problem of crime just as little as the knowledge of human

aggressiveness alone can ever explain war. Whenever I read smart criticisms of Freud accusing him of neglecting sociological factors, I have to smile remembering this evening in Freud's home.

The history of the psychoanalytic movement shows several occasions when Freud seemed to have been harsh and unforgiving. I saw him become impatient and intolerant only when intellectual integrity was at stake. The search for truth had the sanctity for him that it has for every real scientist. He could not tolerate it when people for personal advantages or even only for comfort's sake changed their intellectual convictions or abused their reasoning power for ulterior motives. He could not stand the twisting around of an argument only to defend an untenable position. On such occasions he became harsh and sarcastic and knew no mercy. Once I told him about hearing in a medical group one of the usual pseudo rational arguments attacking his teachings and saw the shade of anger flash across his face, followed by a contemptuous waving of his hands. Lack of intellectual integrity was the one human weakness to which he could not reconcile himself. The other was the competitive jealousy of his pupils. The discoverer of the œdipus complex was extremely sensitive towards the œdipus tendencies of his sons. I heard from one of the older Viennese psychoanalysts that Freud on one occasion, referring to one of the younger members of the Viennese group, said: 'I cannot stand the parricidal look in his eyes'.

It is often said that Freud was inaccessible to the suggestions and innovations of his pupils when they touched on the fundamental principles of his teachings. My own impression is that he was not intolerant about original ideas if they were genuine. What he could not tolerate was the kind of pseudo originality which serves only the desperate, competitive urge to excel. On the other hand, it seems that he had to follow the pathway of his own intellectual development and instinctively defended himself against outside influences. In one place he writes that he did not want to be hurried in his thinking by other people

and had to follow the immanent course of his own ideas. Adler undoubtedly recognized earlier than Freud the significance of hostile impulses, but when Freud—much later—understood their rôle in neurosis and personality structure, he drew a much deeper and more adequate picture.

I never felt that Freud was inaccessible to suggestions which did not correspond exactly to his ideas. However I must say that whatever I contributed to psychoanalysis was along lines which he had initiated. After I had worked out the psychology of conscience and its rôle in neurosis and dream, Freud after some hesitation accepted my formulations. When I stated to him the differences of our views concerning nightmares, to my surprise he told me that there was no difference between our conceptions. I am afraid he may have overlooked the differences.

Psychoanalysis is in a state of rapid development and some of our present conceptions have come gradually to depart considerably from the original formulations of Freud. I consider it entirely out of place to try to point out the significance of this progress by emphasizing the defects of earlier freudian concepts. Our work is based on those solid foundations which Freud laid down.

Some of the modern purifiers of psychoanalysis, no matter how sound some of their ideas may be, fail to see in proper light the relation of their contributions to Freud's ideas. They are inclined to describe the development of their concepts as a revolution against orthodox freudism. What they do not see is that this progress is nothing but the natural evolution of their ideas from those of Freud's. Every type of science goes through the same type of evolution, yet no modern physicist would describe the development of physics from Newton's mechanics through the electromagnetic field theory of Maxwell to the modern theory of relativity by trying to minimize the achievements of previous periods. It is a disheartening view that in our field some of the workers cannot take the same constructive attitude toward past accomplishment which is uni-

versal in all other fields of natural science. Obviously these followers of Freud are blinded by their emotions, not so much in the conceiving of their ideas but in the proper evaluation of their significance.

In this respect they could learn much from Freud, who (another sign of his wisdom) never overvalued the significance of his own work. This is best seen in his attitude toward psychoanalytic therapy. He was keenly aware of the limitations of therapy which are due to the rigidity and weakness of human nature. Therefore he never expected too much and was conscious that whatever slight but real and permanent change psychoanalysis may bring about in an adult personality must be considered a real victory of the therapeutic technique, an entirely novel accomplishment of man, a step towards the much advocated but never really achieved mastery of self. These therapeutic changes in the personality although less spectacular than the accomplishments of physics in the technical mastery of nature really are more miraculous.

I often witnessed his wisdom in regard to therapy. He was apt to be sceptical about real changes and did not believe in the naïve idea of anyone being completely analyzed. As a young analyst I often heard in our Psychoanalytic Society of the necessity of making the patient entirely independent of his analyst at the end of the treatment. The ideal goal of the psychoanalytic treatment is, of course, that the patient who during the treatment necessarily becomes emotionally dependent upon his physician, should become able after his treatment is completed to dispense with the analyst's help and give up entirely the infantile dependent attitude he felt toward his physician during the treatment. Since I never could believe in complete things in connection with human endeavors I once consulted Freud about this matter. I was not surprised to hear from him that according to his experience in the majority of successful cases the success is based to a considerable degree on the continued faithful attitude of the patient to his analyst even though he may never see his physician again. The ego of most

severely neurotic people is too weak to endure the complete abandonment of this dependence upon the physician he said; if it were not weak, the patient would not have become a neurotic. The patient carries around in his fantasy the image of the analyst and continues to have towards this fantasied person a similar trusting and dependent attitude as he had had towards the analyst.

Therefore I was quite surprised that in his book, *The Future of an Illusion*, he took a much more optimistic attitude towards mankind as a whole, demanding that it give up its faithful dependence on God. Obviously Freud was emotionally involved in the problem of religion. The greatest rationalist of the nineteenth century, he had just as little use for it as his great eighteenth century predecessor, Voltaire. I wonder whether Freud changed his views on this question, witnessing the appalling events of recent years which show that if you try to rob man of his heavenly God he will turn to worship human gods of much smaller caliber.

In his therapeutic technique Freud was less rigid and orthodox than most of his pupils. Although he was aware of the danger of the technique becoming ritualistic in the hands of the average man he nevertheless did not encourage laxity, knowing that the majority needs rigid rules. A highly individual handling of cases requires a degree of independent judgment which is beyond the capacity of most physicians.

Although there is no precise evidence for it, I believe that times produce the type of great man and the type of knowledge which is needed at the moment. The greatness of a man consists in this faculty to anticipate these needs earlier than others. He is like a sensitive instrument which registers what is invisible to others. Freud's rôle in medicine has been described as a reaction against a too mechanistic trend which pervaded medicine with the introduction of laboratory methods. But his real significance is that in a time when man's whole interest was directed toward an increased mastery of the external world, he tried to understand man and man's relation to man. We

are witnessing today the alarming fact that without this understanding, technical advancement becomes mainly a tool of mutual destruction. Psychoanalysis by its deeper knowledge of man's destructive impulses may be the antidote against the one-sided technical development which threatens to destroy civilization. It may lead to a more constructive social life in which man, by recognizing it, will control his unconscious destructiveness and use his scientific mastery of nature more for mutual help than destruction.

A BRIEF VISIT WITH FREUD

BY MARTIN W. PECK (BOSTON)

While in Europe during the summer of 1937 my wife and I were happily able to make an arrangement to visit Professor Freud. At the time he was convalescing from a mild inter-current illness and, although not well enough to take up his usual work, he was somewhat restless at his confinement and eager for any diversion. The family was then living in the pleasant suburb of Grinzing.

Professor Freud was resting on the porch when we arrived. He looked, as he was, an old man and ill, but there was nothing in his manner or mental activity to justify this impression. He was cordial and alert; his steady and keen eye seemed to miss nothing; he spoke rapidly in excellent English. He found pleasure in the fact that his dog Luni, formerly owned by Helene Deutsch, paid friendly attention to Mrs. Peck, and professed to see in this a contribution to international good feeling. He listened with complete attention to what he considered of interest, dismissing other matters somewhat brusquely.

The conversation, more or less guided by Anna Freud, became a discussion of psychoanalysis. His own position of authority and leadership Freud brushed aside as inconsequential. The essence of his comment was that in America medical application of psychoanalysis was the rule, and contributions to its structure were the exception. He used the term 'medical fixation' for the American scene, and regretted the alliance between psychiatry and psychoanalysis. He made frequent reference to the 'core of psychoanalysis' and expressed his belief that this core should be kept separate from other disciplines for a long time to come. He stated with deep conviction that 'psychoanalysis is a part of psychology and for its proper development, it should be kept free from biology, philosophy,—and also psychiatry'.

I expressed the opinion that everyone was in agreement

concerning the value of the earlier isolation policy, but that now—in America at least—it seemed the time had come for closer coöperation with medicine; that legal considerations and other indigenous conditions made the situation at home rather different from that of Europe. Freud replied that there was implicit in this argument a false assumption that the validity of psychoanalytic findings and theories was definitely established, while actually they were still in their beginning, and needed a great deal of development and repeated verification and confirmation. He suggested that in its attitude toward Europe, America was still fighting the Revolutionary War.

Before departing, I told Freud that our Boston group would welcome some word from him which I could deliver in person. At first he was inclined to take my request lightly and proffered his felicitations and good wishes, but he soon became serious and said very earnestly that I could inform the Boston group that in his opinion it would be to their advantage 'to add to the American self-sufficiency a few drops of the European spirit'. When I replied that it would be my added pleasure to present to my colleagues as well as I could the substance of our talk, Freud said most amiably that it would be a very nice thing to do, but that it would accomplish no good whatever.

A FEW COMMENTS ON 'MOSES AND MONOTHEISM'

BY HELEN V. MCLEAN (CHICAGO)

Because of its vividness and the interesting problems raised by Freud's discussion, this his last work¹ will probably for many years to come be as fruitful in provoking discussion as was Totem and Taboo. Several critical discussions of this book have already appeared.

The first question which I shall raise may seem unrelated to the subject matter of the book; yet perhaps in answering it, light may be shed on the psychological validity of the assumptions made by Freud. The question is simply: why was Freud so much interested in Moses? One concludes that Freud had a feeling of identification with Moses.

To understand this identification, one must go back to the years 1910 to 1913. During these years Freud was involved in a struggle with several of his best pupils—Adler, Jung and Stekel. These men, unable to accept the thorny path of their leader, were bowing down to the false gods of evasion, distortion and half-truths. The final break with the most able of these associates, Jung, came in 1913. In 1914 the article, *The Moses of Michelangelo*, was published anonymously².

For many years the Michelangelo statue of Moses apparently had fascinated Freud, but he failed to find a satisfactory explanation of this powerful figure. His sudden understanding and insight into the emotional moment portrayed by Michelangelo came because his own emotional situation was identical.

Moses has come down from the mountain with the Tablets under his arm. Seated, he sees and hears his chosen people bowing down to the golden calf. Turning his head, he starts up in rage from his chair; his right hand lets go of the

Read at the Seminar on Review of Psychoanalytic Literature, at the Chicago Institute for Psychoanalysis, December 2, 1939.

¹ Freud: *Moses and Monotheism*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1939.

² *Imago*, III, 1914.

Tablets and seizes his long beard. The Tablets are about to fall. Should he give vent to his ire the Tablets will crash to the ground. The conflict is between the expression of his intense rage and the preservation of the Tablets. He decides to save the Tablets, and in stone Michelangelo portrayed the very moment of this renunciation of anger in favor of a divine mission.

This approximates closely to what had been happening to Freud. He too was a man capable of great anger and he must have been tempted like Moses to neglect the tablets of scientific truth. His anonymous publication of the article in the *Imago* may have been either an unconscious or a conscious indirect confession of his wrath and his renunciation of it. Thus his comment about Michelangelo's Moses is directly applicable to Freud himself.

'In this way he has added something new and more than human to the figure of Moses: so that the giant frame with its tremendous physical power becomes only a concrete expression of the highest mental achievement that is possible in a man, that of struggling successfully against an inward passion for the sake of a cause to which he has devoted himself.'

After Freud had reached his eighties he returned to his interest in Moses. Freud was a Jew. His racial pride was great as was also his scorn of the non-Jew. Why then should he be intent to prove that the greatest man of his race was not a Jew? His thesis that Moses was an Egyptian rests on shaky historical evidence as Freud himself repeatedly affirms; yet his conclusions about Moses may be correct. For the second time in his life his position was similar to that of Moses, the religious leader.

For over fifty years Freud questioned and caused others to question man's many illusions about himself and his motives. Religion was included as one of man's illusions. By analyzing religion he attacked what his race through centuries has cherished as its chief glory and mission. In Moses and Monotheism he deprives the Jewish race of its mightiest man. Freud would seem to be hurting his own people who at the

time of the writing of the book already had an unbearable load of suffering. He seems most unpardonably to be kicking a race when it is down.

Anyone who so reads the book, reads with his eyes alone. Reading the *Moses* certainly gives the very great intellectual pleasure of seeing the immediate working of a superb intelligence. But even more, the book stimulates and arouses the deepest feelings which can be justly designated 'spiritual' in essence.

The doctrine of *Moses* was a belief in one supreme being and among the precepts of the Mosaic religion was a prohibition against making an image of God. Freud says:

'It is the prohibition against making an image of God, which means the compulsion to worship an invisible God. . . . If this prohibition was accepted, however, it was bound to exercise a profound influence. For it signified subordinating sense perception to an abstract idea; it was a triumph of spirituality over the senses; more precisely, an instinctual renunciation accompanied by its psychologically necessary consequences.'

Freud mentions other renunciations which have had such an important effect on human culture; first, the earliest one, renunciation of the sense of omnipotence of thought which was 'the expression of the pride mankind took in the development of language, which had brought in its train such an extraordinary increase in the intellectual faculties. There opened then the new realm of spirituality where conceptions, memories, and deductions became of decisive importance, in contrast to the lower psychical activity which concerned itself with the immediate perceptions of the sense organs. It was certainly one of the most important stages on the way to becoming human'; secondly, the change from matriarchal to patriarchal society was 'a step forward in culture since maternity is proved by the senses, whereas paternity is a surmise based on a deduction and a premise'.

The doctrine of a supreme spiritual being became the cherished heritage of the chosen people. By means of this

step forward in spirituality, the Jewish people survived two thousand years of persecution.

' . . . it has helped to build a dike against brutality and the inclination to violence which are usually found where athletic development becomes the ideal of the people. The harmonious development of spiritual and bodily activity, as achieved by the Greeks, was denied to the Jews. In this conflict their decision was at least made in favour of what is culturally the more important.'

It is in this section of the book I believe that Freud reveals the essence of his identification with Moses. Freud knew at eighty years his own worth and greatness. He had neither the pretensions nor the false modesty of a lesser man. He might have identified himself with some other great historical figure, yet he unconsciously chose Moses as his historical prototype. Moses may have been of another race than the chosen people but by their ultimate acceptance of his doctrine and by their ability to make an all important instinctual renunciation, the Jews identified themselves with their father God—Moses. Freud, a Jew, is asking mankind to renounce its infantile dependence on an all powerful father God and make a step forward in spiritual growth.

In *The Future of an Illusion* written in 1928, he betrays little regret that truth compels him to destroy religious illusion, one of the most comforting props mankind has had. The tragic events which had overtaken his race since 1928 deepened his identification with it, and there is expressed regret in *Moses and Monotheism* that the comfort of illusion cannot exist for the truthful scientist.

Moses was perhaps killed by his followers—and Freud, his successor, lived to see in his own country the destruction of all he valued; the dike which he had erected against brutality and violence seemed to be swept away. But just as the Mosaic religion did not die with the murder of Moses and compromise at Quedes, so in this book Freud is certain of the ultimate survival of those scientific truths which were his mission to transmit to the human race. This book is Freud's credo; an

expression of his belief in man's powers for intellectual and emotional development.

The Jews perhaps killed and certainly wished to kill Moses. Centuries later they killed Jesus, the son who was to atone for and take on himself the guilt of the father murder, thus freeing from guilt the other sons who identified with him. The crime of the Jewish race is their failure to admit the father murder and do atonement for it. This Freud says is one of the deep sources of anti-Semitism. Freud in all scientific honesty admits the impulse towards father murder. He traces its origin to the primal horde. From this first father murder came the beginning of religion and cultural life. Anthropologists are still busily denying that Freud's thesis of the primal horde has any historical truth. Perhaps historically viewed, the anthropologists are correct and Freud is wrong. Psychologically, however, the renunciation by the sons of the wish to kill the father, and the identification with the loved father was probably a first step in the social and moral development of man.

Freud's crime is unlike that of the Jews because he makes no denial. He exposes with merciless honesty. His crime resembles that of Moses for he demands the almost impossible of man: that man relinquish his false pride and see himself as he is. Men resent any ideal that puts them under undue psychical strain. History gives sufficient evidence that expiation, atonement, and regression to simpler beliefs, are preferable. A monotheistic, spiritual father religion easily regresses to a son-mother religion with superstitious idolatry; democracy yields to fascism, and prejudice and dogma replace the scientific search for truth. In every individual, genitality is maintained with difficulty, and in society the tendency to regress to primitive infantile social forms is always recurring.

Freud in attempting to explain the survival of the Mosaic religion after the compromise at Quades draws first an analogy to the glorious past of a people which, handed down as tradition from generation to generation, finally finds expression in epic poetry. The second comparison is with the dynamics of the psychoneuroses (infantile trauma, repression during the latency

period, return of the repressed in neurotic symptom). One may question whether Freud is justified in drawing an analogy between the dynamics of an individual and of society. The meager available knowledge about mass psychology seems to indicate different dynamic laws than the well-known principles of the psychology of the individual. This comparison of the return of the repressed in neuroses and the return of the Mosaic religion after many generations in which the Jehovah-Ballim religion had been triumphant leads Freud to a tentative acceptance of an *inherited* unconscious memory. He rejects Jung's oceanic 'collective unconscious', but his concept is similar. In this argument Freud reveals very clearly a strong biological orientation which makes him ignore the psychosociological facts that might explain the phenomenon. Also his conclusion brings him into a biological dilemma since the inheritance of acquired characteristics is decidedly a moot question. Here again Freud shows himself to be true son of the traditions of the nineteenth century. He betrays his own distrust of psychological evidence alone. His need of a historical fact to support psychological data is evident both in Moses and Monotheism and in Totem and Taboo, as it is also in many other of his contributions. Insistence on historical validity may as in Moses come in conflict with accepted biological evidence.

After the triumph of Jehovah over the Mosaic God, at least two of the precepts of the defeated religion remained: (1) circumcision; (2) the fact that the Jews were still a chosen people. In addition, the Levites, the Egyptian followers of Moses, must have handed down by word of mouth the aristocratic monotheistic ideal which had made them leave their native land. If the Levites were Egyptians their resentment at the death of their compatriot leader and the overthrow of his religion would have been intense. I do not know whether there is evidence which connects the prophets in any way with the Levites. Such an association would almost certainly have exposed the prophets to the Mosaic tradition. The majority of the Jews probably accepted the Jehovah religion unquestioningly. I doubt if they had any unconscious memory traces of the high

spiritual religion of Moses. A tradition so spiritual in essence would be really comprehended by only a few of Moses' followers and chosen people, but in these individuals the memory of such an emotional experience would be cherished and passed on to their children or disciples. The prophets were obviously men obsessed by tremendous guilt and also possessed by great powers of sublimation. And because each Jewish child repeated in his own development a wish to murder his actual father (God), the denunciations of the prophets would produce an ever increasing sense of guilt and a desire in the people to be rid of such guilt. The prophet was the accusing father. The acceptance of his spiritual message with renunciation of the primitive Jehovah religion would represent renunciation for the sake of being loved by and identified with such a superior being.

THE INFLUENCE OF PSYCHOANALYSIS ON NEUROLOGY

BY SMITH ELY JELLIFFE (NEW YORK)

The influence of psychoanalysis on neurology is not very definitely defined. The meaning of psychoanalysis is fairly precise: it is a conception of altering the functioning of the mental operations which, as Nunberg has most clearly stated, aims to increase the mobility of the libido, bring about an enlarged ego synthesis and modify the tyranny of the superego. Only one of these terms, the ego, has any specific connotations in the usually accepted meaning of the term neurology.

Psychoanalysis has definite dynamic psychobiological significance, whereas the generalizations of neurology in their older frame of reference stand for problems of anatomical structure, neurophysiological function and more narrowly of sensorimotor behavior, chiefly envisaged as a complex of reflex activities.

These are distinctly different frames of reference which rarely touch each other, especially in their original conceptualization. Notwithstanding this aloofness which of old constituted an unbridgable gap, neurology has had to give way to the newcomer if any adaptive correlations could function. Psychoanalysis grew up within the psychiatric discipline; neurology was and is still a child of the anatomical emergence of neuron structure and sensorimotor function, a sort of antechamber to the *how* of behavior, rather than an ingress into the *why* of life's revelations.

It is not without great significance that the original studies of Freud dealt with a type of neurological formulation, yet at the same time were accompanied by questions of more than purely morphological significance.

Should we turn to Freud's initiation into the field we find him describing the structure of a lowly type of organism which of itself presented an emergent evolutionary aspect. How did the extra spinal ganglion cells of *Ammocoetes* find their

way within the later arriving spinal ganglia and what did this convergence-emergence ambivalent factor signify? Even as a student of nineteen the functional as well as the structural factors of this lowly animal offered to him speculative and theoretical problems of note along these evolutionary lines.

Deeply impressed as he was as a youth with the Darwinian concepts and then with those far reaching suggestions of Hughlings Jackson on evolution and dissolution he sensed the dynamic functional significance of the inseparability of the structural-functional synthesis on which his majestic sweep of intuition first began to sense the total reaction and more particularly that ancestrally phyletic part which gave the denial to Cartesian conceptions of the ego.

Neurology, in its narrower sense remained faithful to its friend of old—Cartesian psychology. Psychoanalysis came as a sword to cleave this ancient coalition and to give new life to an enfranchised body of neurology. Many there are who prefer the swaddling clothes of the ancient concepts. Words after all are but shadowy essences that notwithstanding their tenuousness can tyrannize over man's thinking. To me psychoanalysis has liberated neurology from some of its invested and fixed patterns of thinking. It has rendered vital much that was static and formal within the neurological frame of reference and has made comprehensible and alive much that neurology was content to codify.

THE INFLUENCE OF PSYCHOANALYSIS ON PSYCHIATRY

BY PAUL SCHILDER (NEW YORK)

Freud's first contribution to psychoanalytic psychiatry was contained in an article written in 1896. The case was one of paranoid schizophrenia with mechanisms similar to the mechanisms of hysteria. The therapeutic result was incomplete. Subsequently Freud's interest was for a long time directed towards other problems. In the meantime after 1902 the attention of Bleuler and Jung was more and more drawn to psychoanalysis and they found 'Freud's mechanisms' not only in neurotic conditions but also in psychoses, especially in dementia præcox. Jung's *Diagnostische Assocationsstudien* began to appear in the *Zeitschrift für Neurologie und Psychiatrie* in 1904. They contain many references to the psychoses. In 1907 appeared Jung's *Psychology of Dementia Præcox*, the first systematic attempt to interpret psychoanalytically the psychology of dementia præcox. In 1911 several papers of Ferenczi applied psychoanalytic thinking to paranoia and the psychoses, and Freud himself published his psychoanalytic remarks on the autobiography of Schreber. Bleuler's work on schizophrenia appeared in 1911 and Jung's *Wandlungen und Symbole der Libido* was published in 1911 and 1912.¹ From that time the psychoanalytic literature has shown a deep and continued interest in the problem of schizophrenia.

Freud's first paper on manic-depressive psychosis, *Trauer und Melancholie*, appeared in 1917. A study by Abraham (1911) had preceded Freud's articles. Abraham's investigations of the earliest pregenital levels of libido and of the developmental history of libido (1924) contained his further contributions to the subject. Freud returned to this topic in *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego* (1921). There are

¹ Jung, Carl G.: *Psychology of the Unconscious; A Study of the Transformations and Symbolisms of the Libido; a Contribution to the History of the Evolution of Thought*. New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1926.

numerous contributions to the psychoanalytic psychology of manic-depressive psychoses from this time on. Freud made only casual remarks about other types of psychosis in his papers on the general connotation of neurosis and psychosis. In one he wrote that the state of mental confusion is a conflict between the ego and reality.

The psychoanalytic literature on psychoses, with the exception of manic-depressive states and schizophrenia, has been rather scanty. Ferenczi and Hollós, and the author have written on general paresis. Epilepsy has been studied by Maeder (1909) and Clark (1917). In 1925 I tried to give a general outline of the relation between psychoanalysis and psychiatry. Rickman published *A Survey: The Development of the Psychoanalytic Theory of the Psychoses 1894-1926* (1926, 1927).

The preceding notes are intended merely as bibliographic help in approaching the problem of what changes Freud's contributions have wrought in psychiatry. At the time that Freud started his studies of psychoses, psychosis was considered only from an organic standpoint. The personality of the mentally sick person was not considered as a subject of any particular interest; furthermore it was not believed that the psychotic manifestations could be expressions of the personality.

The psychiatric world was fascinated by the problem of clinical classification. Kraepelin had shuffled and reshuffled clinical entities and was strongly opposed by the school of Westphal-Ziehen and A. E. Hoche. Finally there emerged with the second edition of Kraepelin's book the psychiatric opinion that there are only two essential types of psychoses: those which end in deterioration (later called dementia præcox) and those which do not end in deterioration (later called manic-depressive psychosis). Kraepelin adhered to the psychology of Wundt. Accordingly he assumed that the supposed organic processes in dementia præcox and manic-depressive psychosis influence either the apperceptive and will functions or the emotions. The problem of personality did not exist for him. Under the influence of Stransky he believed that in dementia præcox not

only apperception, will, and emotions deteriorated but that there was also a dissociation of emotion from thought content present, the so called intrapsychic ataxia. Manic-depressive psychoses were considered to be based on quantitative exaggerations of moods and affects. This concept culminated in the clinical entity called 'mixed states' in which part functions of elation and part functions of depression were supposed to be present at the same time. This is real mosaic-psychology. Personality problems of psychotics who suffered from better-known organic afflictions were likewise neglected. The symptomatology of psychoses was considered the result of the disturbance of the mosaic of brain functions and brain cells, comparable to the effect of sitting down by chance on the keyboard of a piano and thereby provoking a senseless noise.

It is the merit of Freud and psychoanalysis to have introduced a psychological point of view which is fundamentally different. Human beings are no longer observed as a more or less artificial hodgepodge of sensations, feelings, representations, with perhaps some sprinkling of apperception and will (thinking has no specific place in Wundt's scheme) but as personalities in life situations. Freud had the temerity to assert that even a human being afflicted with a psychosis is still a personality with life problems. Although Freud did not write about the organic psychoses, his casual remarks show that he was of the opinion that the application of the libido theory and a psychoanalytic interpretation is very well possible even in organic brain disease. Consider for instance his remarks in his history of the psychoanalytic movement (p. 949):

'So far as I know, Bleuler, even today, adheres to an organic causation for the forms of dementia præcox, and Jung, whose book on this malady appeared in 1907, upheld the toxic theory of the same at the Congress at Salzburg in 1908, which though not excluding it, goes far beyond the libido theory.'

While this statement is somewhat ambiguous since it seems to make a differentiation between psychoanalytic and psy-

chological understandability of symptoms and the question of organic or non-organic, it closely approaches a principle which I would formulate as follows: whatever may happen to an organism and its brain it remains an organism in a life situation with a continuity of life problems.

I believe this also to be the deeper meaning of Freud's basic idea of the interpretation of dreams. Dreams have a meaning because they are experiences in the continuity of the life history of a person. One cannot deny that there are organic factors in sleep and dreams. (It is rather amusing that one has in these days to defend the attitude that there is anything organic in organisms.)

Bleuler thought there were two series of phenomena in schizophrenia, organic processes which have nothing to do with psychology, and other processes that are the reactions of the personality changed by the organic process. Ferenczi and Hollós made the same mistake when they considered an organic nucleus in general paresis to be unapproachable by their theories. A second principle of psychoanalytic psychiatry and of psychopathology in general may be formulated, stating that the possibility of understanding a symptom as the expression of psychological tendencies does not prove that this symptom is psychogenic in character.

In so called psychosomatics similar mistakes are common. By this I do not mean to say that organic symptoms cannot be the consequences of psychological conflicts; however it is not always easy to prove such connections nor to understand their true meaning. Especially in schizophrenia and manic-depressive psychosis does the evidence speak against psychogenesis as the decisive causative factor. Freud never made any optimistic statements concerning the curability of dementia præcox and said nothing definite against the possibility that organic factors might be operative. As to manic-depressive psychosis he was inclined to differentiate between a psychogenic and a spontaneous type. 'In the spontaneous kind it may be supposed that the ego ideal is inclined to display a peculiar strictness, which then results automatically in its

temporary suspension.' (Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego, p. 109.)

The first principle (the continuity of the life problem) has had a deep and lasting influence upon psychiatry. No one ventures today even in the most reactionary quarters to consider psychosis merely as senseless conglomerations of symptoms unrelated to personality. Among German psychiatrists Kretschmer was a leader in this trend. He contributed to overcoming the mechanical Kraepelinian and even more rigid Hocheian psychiatry. In France, despite the efforts of Claude, a psychology of the total personality is only beginning to be accepted.²

From these general remarks we may turn to the more specific problems of psychoanalytic psychiatry. We have agreed that psychotic patients should be considered from the point of view that they are human beings with conflicts. However we all have conflicts. What is the specificity of the conflicts of the psychotic?

Freud justly always tried to find specific mechanisms in different types of neuroses and psychoses. The different types were correlated with definite stages of psychosexual development or, in broader formulation, with specific phases in the development of the child. In a given neurosis or psychosis the individual regresses under the stress of a current conflict to an earlier stage in his development. This regression is prepared for by a definite weakness due either to constitution or to early experiences or by a combination of both. This being prepared to be revived constitutes a so called point of fixation. The development of the child is envisaged by Freud to progress through well-defined stages. It is sufficient to mention the narcissistic, the oral, the anal phase and the phallic phase centering around the œdipus complex and the genitals. These in Freud's opinion were psychobiological stages of development. The arrest of energies, the flowing back of energies to points of fixation, the breaking through of energies at the point

² Cf. Schilder's review of Baruk's psychiatry in the *J. Nerv. and Ment. Dis.*, XC, 1939, pp. 416-423.

of fixation were seen by Freud as biological and physiological processes. This is essentially what is called the libido theory.

There are two propositions of Freud that are of fundamental importance: first, that there are psychological stages of development in childhood characterized by specific sexual attitudes; second, in neuroses and especially in psychoses the individual regresses, at least partially, to these various earlier stages of development. It is the great merit of Freud to have discerned these developments not only in their psychological aspects but from their biological and physiological aspects as well.

Although there are historical forerunners of Freud's concept of regression (especially Meynert) it is in its entirety an original conception of great importance. One might justly say that no modern psychiatrist should dare to approach this subject without accepting these fundamental concepts.

It is generally accepted that the regression in psychoses is particularly deep and that in schizophrenia a regression takes place to the narcissistic stage. Unfortunately the term narcissism is loaded with ambiguities. The narcissistic stage of development is considered a stage in which libido is directed exclusively towards one's own body. However this concept of a phase in which there is only body and no world is self-contradictory. Freud was never clear about the use of the term narcissistic phase. Narcissism is, according to him, the final synthesis of isolated autoerotisms. Psychoanalytic literature generally considers primary narcissism the most primitive stage of libidinal development, consisting of the concentration of libido on one's own body.

It would be preferable to describe a stage of incomplete differentiation of body and world in which the connotation of the body is in no way more distinct than the connotation of the world. There cannot be much doubt that we deal in schizophrenia really with a return to such a lack of differentiation between body and world. This regression does not take place in all spheres of experience. There are forces counteracting the regression and trying to maintain or regain a better

appreciation of the world. It is, furthermore, of importance to note that regression and symptom formation are not merely determined by the point of fixation deepest in individual development but also by accessory points of fixation corresponding to experiences in somewhat later stages of development. Oral, anal, and homosexual trends thus come to expression. Ego and superego mechanisms, partially preserved, interfere continually with the free expression of primitive sexual tendencies. I do not doubt that the superego in the course of regression also undergoes severe changes, returning to a primitive, less unified organization.

It is very difficult to argue about terms that are as badly defined as the psychoanalytic term ego, even if one leaves Rado's latest formulation out of the discussion. According to Freud the ego is an organization which has to make peace between the different strivings. It is also the organ which through sensual impressions and by consciousness has access to motor action. Sensual perception and motility are in schizophrenics certainly not disturbed in the same way as in general paresis which should be considered as a disturbance of ego functioning. Sometimes ego in the psychoanalytic sense means almost the same as total personality; sometimes it means the organ of conscious action and the sensory-motor system; and sometimes it refers to the part of the personality which under the influence of the superego conforms with society and directs one's behavior in a given situation. If Alexander, therefore, asserts that the ego function in schizophrenia is impaired he does not say very much. It seems much more to be true that the ego in schizophrenia is either overpowered by id conflicts or it tries assiduously to dam back the stream of libido about to break through at lower levels of development. Nunberg has described in this connection a hyperfunction of the ego in certain paranoic conditions.

At any rate, we owe it basically to the work of Freud, Bleuler, Jung and Meyer that the schizophrenic is seen as a human being with conflicts. In comparison with Meyer's formulation, psychoanalysis is at an advantage in that it is not satisfied as

Meyer, Campbell, and their followers are, to assign banal current and past conflicts as sufficient causes for schizophrenic psychoses. Psychoanalysis places the emphasis on elucidating the developmental history of the individual afflicted with schizophrenia.

Being interested merely in fundamental principles, it will be easier to formulate the basic problems of manic-depressive psychosis. There is the general opinion that the point of fixation lies in the oral sphere. It cannot be denied that in manics as well as in depressives oral tendencies are very strong, as far as we can judge, from earliest childhood. But quite in the same way as in schizophrenia, it is hardly possible to find precise early experiences or from a sufficiently early time to be made specifically responsible as points of fixation. Abraham correctly emphasized early relations to love objects not exclusively in the oral sphere. If one studies a sufficiently large material one becomes somewhat sceptical about the exclusive importance of oral aggressions in manic-depressive psychoses. One finds an aggressiveness of enormous strength related to all parts of the body, and the cannibalistic fantasy is perhaps of no greater importance than other destructive impulses. The researches of Melanie Klein into destructive impulses of early infancy experienced actively and passively in relation to every body aperture and every part of the musculature seem to offer an appropriate basis for the understanding of manic-depressives as well as of certain schizophrenics. It is only possible in exceptional cases to point to the actual instance responsible for the increase in motives of destructions and dismembering. Freud combined the theory of pregenital sexuality in depressions with the assumption of a particular severity of the superego; a strong and unified superego however presupposes a strong œdipus complex. The regression in pathological depressions must, therefore, be of a very specific and partial character. The severity of the superego reflects the general tendency to destructiveness which finally is directed against the ego. According to Freud the self-reproaches against one's own person are due to the fact that the love object has been taken

into the ego by identification. However, the love object is not only in the ego but certainly also in the superego and probably also in the id. Identifications are always reflected in all three psychic systems. I doubt, furthermore, that the self-reproaches of depressives are often primarily directed against love objects. The contention of Freud that those predisposed to depression choose their love objects narcissistically has never been substantiated. To be sure, they once felt attacked and their aggression is a counter-aggression. They have good reason to blame themselves for their terrible hostilities.

Freud has conclusively demonstrated the severe changes of the superego in the manic-depressive psychosis. It is a cruel superego and finally the individual gets tired of blaming himself and starts to love himself. All problems seem to disappear at this moment; nevertheless he has not forgotten that he had been hurt and that he has suffered. Much of the content of the manic phase consists of complaints, of past misery and persecution. The individual has emerged victoriously.

In every phase of the elation the manic patient is aware of the human value of those around him. When the depressive patient attacks he is aware that he deals with a person. The manic-depressive patient is capable of loving and of being loved.

The basic points in the psychology of manic-depressive psychosis are rather well established. The value of psychoanalytic therapy has been emphatically stated by Freud and Abraham. Patients who are not cured by psychoanalysis derive at least considerable benefit. A considerable number of cases remain refractory to psychoanalytic treatment.

Freud considers mental confusion as a conflict between ego and reality. It is more correct to formulate that in states of confusion the individual has lost an ego apparatus and is therefore not able to maintain full contact with reality although he strives to do so with all his inner force. Helplessness and perplexity result. When the ego apparatus for the finer elaborations of perceptions is deficient, forms appear in perception and in representations which correspond to the condensation

and symbolization of the dream. This is not the sphere of very personal problems which is affected in dreams and in schizophrenia.

One suspects that some confusional states might be understood in relation to earlier childhood experiences. However it is difficult to elucidate this problem without introducing a new fundamental conception. In schizophrenia the individual is concerned with his innermost problems; the disease attacks the center of the personality (the id). In the manic-depressive psychoses the problems dealt with are somewhat less personal; they lie closer to the superego, are further away from the nucleus of the personality. In mental confusion, structures are affected which are still less personal and belong to the perceptive part of the ego in its final elaboration. I may add that in agnosia, aphasia and apraxia we find the problem in layers still further in the periphery of the personality.

In agnosia and aphasia we see the perceptive function of the ego apparatus disturbed. Pötzl and I have repeatedly demonstrated how remarkably similar are the products which appear instead of the proper functions of language and gnosis, to products that emerge from the system of the unconscious. These phenomena take place in a sphere which belong to the periphery of the ego circle. What we usually call 'system of unconscious' and mechanisms of the unconscious does not involve functions distant from the nucleus of personality, but this nucleus itself. In these nuclear phenomena we are usually able to point to the repressive forces responsible for the incompleteness of psychological development, which thus remain in the unconscious and infantile sphere. In other words, we know the motives of repression. We do not know the motives which hinder the completion of language development in aphasias. We do not know the difficulties which lead to the same arrests of development in the peripheral ego sphere of thinking (dementia). I do not believe the developmental arrest or regression in the periphery of the ego to be due to a psychological function which we can understand with our present methods of approach.

From this point of view we classify dementias (mental deficiency included), agnosias and aphasias and mental confusion, and organic toxic phenomena in general, as a disturbance of ego perception. Schizophrenia is classified as libidinal regression, manic-depressive psychosis as partial regression and particularly as reaction formation in the superego due to the well-developed œdipus complex.

One sees that one comes in this way to a psychoanalytic classification of psychosis which is also acceptable from the point of view of clinical psychiatry. It is my opinion that misunderstandings might be avoided if one kept in mind that what is true in the one branch of science has to be true in another branch of science. Freud himself unfortunately was always against the diffusion of psychoanalytic knowledge into psychiatry and psychology. His attitude was understandable when there was general hostility to psychoanalysis in psychiatric circles.

It is not difficult from a similar point of view to understand the epileptic psychoses with their particular type of confusion and signs akin to aphasia; alcoholism with its particular libidinal regression, superego formation, and organic confusion. It will not help in either of these groups to speak merely about 'psychosis'. In each, one has to find the specific mechanism in the field of the perceptive ego and in the field of libido.

If one follows such a classification one will probably be averse to the classification of mental disorder which Glover has developed. He defines as an ego system or ego nucleus any psychic system that represents a positive libidinal relation to objects or part objects, that can discharge reactive tension, and in one or the other of these ways reduce anxieties. He places strong emphasis on projection and introjection. He is however not far from a fundamental error often to be found in psychoanalytic theory: that the world appears to be an individual only as the result of systems of projections and introjections. Such a theory is always based upon a neglect of the function of the perceptive ego systems as characterized above. One is

reminded of the error of Schopenhauer who considered the world not as perception but as representation or image.

Closely related to this error is the overrating of anxiety and guilt: 'Anxiety is the alpha and guilt the omega of human development'. In *Civilization and its Discontents* Freud tried to prove that guilt is fundamentally anxiety. Anxiety is only one of the important emotional reactions of human beings to current and past difficulties. There are insecurities which can hardly be classified as anxiety. There is incompleteness of experience which urges to completion; there is dizziness and there are tensions; furthermore, there are strivings which are positive, based upon interest in the world and its variety. It is at best one-sided to stress that human activities are merely due to the wish to escape from terror and destruction. If one does not appreciate that human beings live in a world which they perceive and in relation to which they act, one will always be inclined to underrate genuine interest in the world, and will underrate the positive side of emotions. Our perception of the world is not merely due to projection and identification. Anxiety is only one of our manifold reactions.

The neglect of the external world (perception) and the overrating of the body as if it were independent of the outward world is deeply imbedded in psychoanalytic thinking. Systems which deny the importance of the world will always emphasize displeasure, fear and anxiety. The recent emphasis on ego problems corresponds to an intent to overcome this deep-seated difficulty in the structure of psychoanalysis. The attempts at reconstruction have not been radical enough in my opinion.

In the organic psychoses we find changes which remain in the periphery of the ego. We have some understanding of these changes from the point of view of the psychology of the total personality. The indestructable center of the personality is aware of the change. A case of general paresis, for instance, is aware of the impairment of his thinking and judgment and reacts to this incompleteness with grief and despair. Patients

who suffer from organic impairments in thinking and perception experience helplessness, perplexity, fear, grief and also anxiety. It is not true, however, that anxiety is predominant in these cases as Grotjahn wrongly asserts following the pattern of analytic thinking. Pierce Clark has shown the considerable libidinal problems to be found in amentia (mental deficiency). The change in the motor impulses occurring in encephalitis is only fully understandable if we use the psychoanalytic approach (cf. Jelliffe).

One might say that it is of no great importance whether one understands the psychology of organic processes or not. However, they reveal important aspects of human experience and we need to know the full range of human experience in order to be ready to fulfil our tasks as psychologists and analysts. It seems to me that the psychoanalytic approach to organic problems in the field of brain disease is of fundamental importance for organic neurology and neurophysiology. The influence of this work is even at the present time considerable. The approach to organic cortical syndromes as well as to subcortical syndromes has profited by psychoanalytic understanding. Our approach to the neurologically sick and crippled has become psychologically more efficient.

One should not generalize about the psychology of psychosis. The psychology of different types of psychosis shows fundamental differences. However there is no question that psychoanalysis has changed fundamentally the attitude of the psychiatrist in his approach to patients and the problem of psychosis. Only on the basis of this approach will organic therapy reap its full benefits. This is probably even true in cases with severe organic changes.

Only through psychoanalysis has the mentally sick person emerged as a revealing source of deep human problems. Freud and psychoanalysis have not only given to the psychotic his place in the system of humanity but have also elevated humanity by increasing its insight into one of its most fundamental manifestations.

FREUD'S INFLUENCE ON PSYCHIATRY IN AMERICA

BY GLENN MYERS (LOS ANGELES)

Thirty years ago, a senior in medical school, I failed to learn much about mental diseases either from textbooks or from lectures and demonstrations in a state hospital. The textbook we used was an imposing volume of nine hundred and sixteen pages, of which six hundred fifty were devoted to Nervous Diseases and two hundred sixty-six to Mental Diseases. A chapter of one hundred sixty-six pages among the former was headed 'Diseases of the Nervous System without known Anatomical Basis' and dealt with Trophoneuroses, Infection Neuroses, Motor Neuroses, Fatigue Neuroses (example, writer's cramp), Psychoneuroses (neurasthenia, psychasthenia, hysteria, epilepsy, migraine, tics), and Neuroses following Traumatism. The implication was that in time an anatomical explanation would be found for all the conditions named therein. Only the psychoses were included in the part devoted to Mental Diseases, in chapters on Mania, Melancholia, Circular Insanity, a very brief chapter on Manic-Depressive Insanity after Kraepelin, Epileptic Insanity, Dementia—primary and secondary—Dementia Præcox (four-and-a-half pages), General Paresis, Paranoia, Idiocy, Imbecility, and Feeble-mindedness (fifty pages). From the standpoint of present psychiatric knowledge, the classification needs no comment. Looking through the pages and the index I fail to find any mention of Sigmund Freud (edition of 1909). I do find A Review of Recent Problems of Psychiatry, prepared by Adolf Meyer then Director of the Pathological Institute of the New York State Hospitals, dealing particularly with Kraepelin, Ziehen and Wernicke which provides a comprehensive résumé of the psychiatric thinking of the time.

Following graduation from medical school and internship in general hospital, I spent one year as interne in a state hospital. The development of American psychiatry has been intimately

connected with the development of our state hospital systems. They were for long almost the only places in which to gain psychiatric experience. I found the state hospital where I interned, clean and well operated. Patients were under the care of physicians and nursing attendants but the clinical work was confined to general medical and surgical care and there were no real psychiatric examinations, treatment interviews, or records. A system of cards was filled in largely by question and answer upon admission and disposition of each patient with little comment in the intervening period. The physical examinations were fairly well done. Questions about the mental status such as 'Delusions?', 'Hallucinations?', were generally answered *yes* or *no* upon conclusions drawn from personal observation and the opinions of the nursing attendants, rather than based upon anamnestic data or actual mental examinations. My defective understanding of mental illness was not greatly improved through this experience, and such initiative as I had for study rather quickly gave way to indolent contentment with the easy hospital life. Ward rounds were made twice daily and I learned to shake hands regularly with all the patients, both to promote friendliness and to observe the interesting variation in attitudes that was apparent in their response to my proffered hand.

While it seems that the faulty clinical perspective was in general typical of the state hospital systems over the country, I learned that there were exceptions and was fortunate in securing an appointment to an eastern state hospital which was said to be the best place in America to learn psychiatry. Upon arrival there, it was at once apparent to me that a large psychiatric staff under the direction of a capable clinical director was earnestly engaged in the psychiatric study and treatment of the patients. Adolf Meyer had established systematized examination procedures, treatment interviews, clinical records, and a classification of mental disorders not differing greatly from the classification now approved by the American Psychiatric Association. I learned that there were books on psychiatry previously unknown to me, and I began to read avidly. The

psychiatric interests and discussions of the staff were stimulating. Gradually I began to gain better understanding of the mechanisms of mental illness, and to evaluate various influences upon the development of psychiatric progress. I learned that psychiatry after having been sterile for hundreds of years, had made progress along anatomico-pathological lines. Much had been learned about the structure and functions of the brain. Mental disorder had been regarded to depend exclusively upon organic brain disease, whether or not the latter was demonstrable. Psychiatric concepts of heredity were fatalistic. Toward the end of the nineteenth century, Kraepelin had introduced stimulating concepts about manic-depressive psychosis and dementia præcox, and a greatly improved classification of mental disorders. Very importantly, he emphasized the value of chronological studies of the lives of patients in preference to mere consideration of the manifest symptoms. About two decades later Bleuler evolved his concepts of autistic thinking, of split personality, and preferred the term schizophrenia to dementia præcox. Meyer had done much to bring the applications of his own thinking and that of Kraepelin and others to Worcester State Hospital in Massachusetts and to the New York State Psychiatric Institute. Hoch had made important contributions to psychiatric thinking, as had Campbell and others. Clinical direction by Kirby brought practical applications and teaching to the staff.

What would have been the probable continued progress in American psychiatry without Freud? I have no doubt that progress would have been made, particularly following the teachings of Meyer and Hoch. Better understanding of mental diseases would have advanced steadily, effecting better hospital and private care of patients, more conspicuously in those districts where there were progressive psychiatric workers and teachers. In short, it seems to me there should have evolved good understanding on a conscious level of the interrelationship between the total personality of the patient and his total environment. It seems reasonable to conclude however that the spread of even such influences over the country would have

been much slower had it not been for the stimulation of interest created by Freud's discoveries.

Freud's discoveries met with intense opposition in Europe because they emphasized the sexual etiology of hysteria. After his American visit to Clark University in 1909, similar reactions became manifest in this country. In 1910, one heard much discussion of Freud among the members of psychiatric hospital staffs and at medical meetings such as those held at the New York Academy of Medicine. Some of the hospital staff members were at once sympathetically interested in evaluating his thinking, others more casually interested, while a goodly number expressed the virtuous, Victorian, vehement explosions that soon became familiar from those who said that Freud was an obscene digger in sexual filth. Various older psychiatrists acted as if Freud had made a personal attack upon them and their psychiatric opinions and proceeded to make themselves audible on every possible occasion.

Freud had reported exactly what he found but it was unfortunate, considering the opposition it produced, that his first discoveries were so baldly sexual. They brought cries of righteous indignation from the prudish-minded against this tabooed subject. In fact the cries were so vehement and prolonged that they tended to obscure comprehension of Freud's further significant discoveries. There remain to the present persons, psychiatrists not excepted, who regard Freud to be crudely obscene and have permitted themselves to know no more of his work than that he claimed sex as a basis of mental illness. Yet it is clear, as should be expected, that freudian concepts have become more and more a part of the accepted theory, practice and language of psychiatry. The noisy opposition helped perhaps to stimulate first curiosity, then study and thought, which in turn helped friendly consideration and later acceptance of the truth of the disputed theories. Few psychiatrists remain who have not deliberately and intentionally, or unconsciously and unintentionally, built freudian theories into their thinking and opinions. There were, from the first, persons scientifically interested, such as Brill and the

others who formed the New York Psychoanalytic Society. The younger generation has tended to accept the various freudian discoveries as matter of fact, in as much as they were early incorporated into its thinking.

The infant is subject to molding by its environment from the time of birth. The term 'environment' is used in its broadest sense. The first half dozen years are probably the most important years of life because then, without discrimination or choice by the subject, are laid the foundations of a personality out of which the adult personality develops. The course of psychosexual development during infancy and childhood is normally an orderly one, through stages such as those designated oral, anal, phallic and genital. With due evaluation of organic influences, later mental illness is generally dependent primarily upon deviations from the normal orderly course of psychosexual development.

An understanding of the structure of the mind in terms of ego, id, and superego, their relationships to one another and to reality, are all, in my opinion, essential to a satisfying understanding of mental illness or, for that matter, the normal mind. As a practicing psychiatrist I would be unable to think psychiatrically without an understanding of Freud's discoveries of the unconscious, of repression, regression, fixation, narcissism, the polymorphous-perverse sexuality of the child, bisexuality, unconscious homosexuality, the œdipus complex, symbolism and dreams, the pleasure principle, identification, projection. These concepts and mechanisms among others are, I believe, the important armamentarium for understanding and treating the neuroses and psychoses. Only on the basis of such understanding can one begin to comprehend anxiety, the purposefulness of delusions and hallucinations, the meaning of paranoia. Whether or not other psychiatrists think exactly as I do psychiatrically, I am satisfied that they need to use Freud's concepts and principles.

Freud has been responsible for giving psychiatry deeper psychological understanding. His discoveries have greatly enlarged our concepts of mind. The brain is no longer regarded to be

the sole seat of the mind. All our senses are a part of our mental functioning, as are our relationships to our environments.

We still have much to learn about psychosis. We know that what has been called psychosis, is really not the disease entity, but symptoms of it, and that psychosis is something else within the patient which produces such symptoms. Hendrick¹ in elaborating upon a statement by Freud, has expressed the opinion that 'Psychoses are not, like neuroses, primarily adaptations to sexual conflict. They are adaptations to defects in the integration and efficiency of those functions essential to real relations with people for both pleasurable and egoistic reasons, and of those functions essential to the control of excessive infantile needs by either normal or neurotic mechanisms.' We are at times closer to understanding why a person becomes psychotic and even why a certain type of psychosis is developed and not another type, but more often we do not know either. Each psychotic person has a complex of forces within himself which in various proportions and combinations is peculiar to him and not in conformity to any abstract concept, and which furthermore is in flux and becomes relatively static only in extreme regression and deterioration. We are a long way from being satisfied with classifying a patient under main headings and subheadings like a specimen in botany or zoology; for if one knows his patient sufficiently well, the patient will not fit into any such classification.

Such deeper understanding through freudian psychology is by no means always essential to treatment, but is essential for understanding the mental complexities of the patient. The application in treatment of psychoanalysis, formal or modified, is most effective in selected cases of neurosis. Its application thus far in the treatment of psychosis has been limited, but it has been used in a modified form with some success. We no longer feel so helpless in attempting to lend assistance to the psychotic patient. We ever attempt to understand the purpose-

¹ Hendrick, Ives: *The Contributions of Psychoanalysis to the Study of Psychosis*. J. A. M. A., CXIII, 1939, pp. 918-925.

fulness of his symptoms, his attitudes towards himself and his environment, and to assist him to better adaptations.

Too many psychiatrists think they understand freudian psychology when in reality their knowledge is quite limited. They glibly use words borrowed from freudian psychology without appreciation of the basic structure of psychoanalysis. Such comprehension comes only through much study and, ideally, didactic analysis of the student. All psychiatrists need such understanding and it behooves them to acquire it as completely as they can. On the other hand, too few psychoanalysts have had sufficient psychiatric training. They should have such training and furthermore, they should not isolate themselves as much as they have done in consequence of the privacy of their work. Psychoanalysis must maintain its close relationship to psychiatry, of which in fact it is a part, not a separate entity.

Freud has had a tremendously beneficial effect upon American psychiatry, through providing a new and dynamic psychology, a new method of research, and a new therapy. His psychology has favorably influenced all ramifications of psychiatric interest and has opened new fields. It has provided a dynamic method for teaching psychiatry to medical students and nurses. It has favorably influenced clinical work in psychiatric hospitals and in private practice. It has found a useful application in all specialties of medicine. Through the discovery of man's psychosexual development it has opened the way for a prophylaxis of mental disease.

FREUD IN AMERICAN LITERATURE

BY BERNARD DE VOTO (CAMBRIDGE)

Statements about the influence of any psychological theory on literature must be made cautiously. The indirect influences are apt to be more important than the direct ones, and the evidence for either is mixed, complex, and easily overinterpreted. On the one hand, the artistic intelligence is one of the least analytical in the world, and any artist who tries to begin with theory and move from that to the creation of imaginary characters or to the imaginative portrayal of emotion may end by deceiving himself as well as the critic who tries to follow him. On the other hand, artists are also peculiarly sensitive to the ideas, theories, hypotheses, dogmas, and intellectual currents of their time. No matter how unanalytical they may be they are always to some extent mirrors, frequently distorting mirrors, which reflect the thinking of their scientific and philosophical contemporaries. Moreover, the best of them may be psychological innovators on their own behalf and may make valuable contributions not only to the layman's understanding but to the clinical psychologist's as well.

So long as imaginative literature has existed it has been aware that unconscious forces have a determining effect on behavior. Freud took the name of his first great generalization from a poetic drama written in the fifth century before Christ. In a recent issue of *American Imago* Dr. Sachs treats *Measure for Measure* as a coherent study of unconscious motivation, and he is by no means the first analyst to find good hunting in Shakespeare's plays. In fact one of the pleasantest surprises to the student of literature who ventures into this field is the readiness of psychoanalysts to accept the imaginary behavior of fictional characters as data for clinical study. Yet nothing like a literary theory of the unconscious has ever been formulated. There were no psychologists in the Athens of Sophocles and though there were psychologists, of a kind, in Shakespeare's England, they had no hypothesis about the unconscious. It may

well be, in fact, that Shakespeare was trying to apply popular treatises on melancholy and the humors, the contemporary equivalent of David Seabury's books, in the Hamlet which Ernest Jones is able to discuss in purely freudian terms. Which, perhaps, demonstrates that the intuitions of genius have priority over the theories used to rationalize them.

Before the middle of the nineteenth century literature manifested this awareness only in sporadic instances. Occasional, isolated men of remarkably intuitive intelligence, like William Blake or Herman Melville, produced literature in which freudians may feel completely at home, but there was nothing like a concerted movement. During the second half of that century, however, the current of world thought that produced Freud in science brought literature steadily nearer the psychology of the unconscious. Increasing interest in conscious motives made the novel, in particular, increasingly introspective; such introspection developed new techniques of portraying conscious states and moved toward the unconscious forces that determine them. Before the century ended consciousness and motivation had become the primary interest of the novel. The work of such men as Dostoevsky and Henry James portrayed psychic states, and even employed techniques which were on the very brink of the freudian hypotheses. At the same time the symbolists, most of whom were poets, were pressing close to Freud along a different avenue. Finally, as Dr. Zilboorg has recently shown in these pages, literature in the person of Proust achieved what amounts to an independent statement of the *œdipus* relation.

These are phenomena of intuition and, if you like, of the indefinable energy called *Zeitgeist*. They reveal nothing like the conscious application of a psychological theory, or even a conceptual awareness of unconscious processes. Henry James's novels, for instance, contain a number of homosexual relationships which both his timidity and his sense of amenity would have forbidden him to portray if he had had an analytical understanding of them. Similarly, in his last novels there are many passages which exquisitely depict the flow, shift, com-

bination, and transformation of psychic states whose unconscious determination the reader equipped with the freudian instruments may understand from data present in the books; but James had no formulated conception of the principles they obey.

Well, what happens when literature consciously takes up a psychological theory? Freud reached American literature through the semi-literary, the vaguely bohemian coterie which are always eager for innovation and think of themselves as in revolt against the established forms and modes of literature. On such people the first impact of Freud was tremendous. It was the period of the little magazine, roughly from 1912 to 1920. Anyone who had the cash or credit to support the venture could become both an artist and an editor by printing his own work in a sixteen-page folder called *Broom*, *Glebe*, *Manifesto*, or *Village Lute*. Hundreds of these ephemera flickered across the literary scene, and three-quarters of the poetry, drama, and fiction they printed was freudian in inspiration and at least intended to be freudian in content.

Unhappily, the semi-literary have scant competence at their trade and an understanding of Freud requires more labor than they were willing to give to it and more intelligence than most of them had. Few spectacles are more affecting than the struggles of a literary person trying to master either the original or a translation of *Traumdeutung*. It was more comfortable to get one's Freud from conversation with those who professed to know and from popular, that is to say simplified, treatises. Incalculably more influential than Freud's books at this period were such homeopathic compilations as André Tridon's which became desk manuals for coterie literature. The little magazines translated them into what purported to be a literature of the unconscious. A good half of this was the simple registration of psychic states; the other half was about equally divided between experiments in what was thought of as sexual symbolism and studies in such subjects as homosexuality and sadism which the literary had learned about from Tridon. It is full of Tridon's easy steps for little feet: stories about dreams whose

point is that water symbolizes birth, a brave insistence on fire-arms and walking sticks as phallic symbols, butchers and surgeons whose activity is explained as sublimated sadism, farm girls standing beside melting manure piles and meditating on subjects approved by Tridon though not as yet in the technique which James Joyce was to provide. Practically all of it is dreadfully bad literature, and its relationship to Freud is approximately that of Science and Health to Plato.

This was, in short, hardly more than one of the fads that periodically rage through the antechambers and subbasements of literature, strikingly like the recent preoccupation of similar people with Marx. Nevertheless it had important results for more important literature. It played an honorable part in the struggle to liberate American literature from pruderies and other social restrictions that had long hampered it. This battle was fought on many fronts, and it may well be that the freedom to write about sex, which was linked with other freedoms, would have been won without the intervention of Freud. But the literary exploitation of Freud was a heavy reinforcement at a decisive moment and materially assisted the coming of age of our literature. Equally significant was the fact that it stimulated better artists to work freely in a greater variety of psychic states. It accelerated the growing subjectivity of the novel, and both novelists and their readers learned to find complexities in the emotions that fiction had seldom been aware of before. A secondary result was not so beneficial. The discovery that mental states are complex had taught the coteries to write as if the mere registration of such states was enough in itself. There followed a kind of technical disintegration: it was possible for people who could not master the structural necessities of fiction to ignore them. As the fad waned, this formlessness was to become the principal occupation of coterie literature which burrowed deeper into what it thought of as the unconscious. The path led to such eccentricities as dadaism and surrealism, the determination of Eugene Jolas to develop a literature meaningful only in dreams, and the art of the totally incomprehensible which is exemplified by Joyce's

Finnegan's Wake. More important literature, after temporarily relaxing much of its craft discipline, had to learn painfully that the mere documentation of consciousness was no more satisfactory than the mere documentation of anything else, and that this new kind of material had to be shaped with an artistic purpose into artistic form.

To this end new techniques were necessary, and the most important of them were supplied in 1922 when Joyce's *Ulysses* became widely known. Seldom in literary history has a book so powerfully influenced writers. It was not only a new kind of novel, it exhibited many new ways of writing fiction; both the kind and the methods were heavily charged with Freud; and novelists everywhere enthusiastically took them up. *Ulysses* represents the complete subjectification of fiction. The exterior world exists in it only through its impact on the consciousness of the characters, and the stuff of the novel consists of the processes by which consciousness adapts and accommodates that impact in obedience to dictates of the unconscious. The most spectacular of its methods, and the one most immediately imitated, was the 'interior soliloquy' or free association. In a sense this was only a further development of the 'stream of consciousness' which James and others had already used in fiction, but Joyce had learned from Freud (whether directly or indirectly it is difficult to make out) that the stream of consciousness has patterns and that the patterns are determined by unconscious forces. For the first time in literature—since the work of Proust was not yet known—here was a novel in which fiction consisted exclusively of the workings of the mind and in which those workings were displayed through the interactions of various levels of consciousness. No matter what other influences converged on it (and Joyce himself has alleged a wide variety, from an insignificant French novel to the cosmology of Thomas Aquinas) it is in complete harmony with Freud's psychology.

American literature, like most others, at once filled with imitations. A number of reputations in our fiction, Natalie Colby's for instance, rest on the fact that their possessors have

written novels in which the actual lapse of time is very short, in which experience and memory alike consist of an interior soliloquy, and in which the whole context is subjective. Yet this too was a fad, and the more durable influence of *Ulysses* has proved to be its less spectacular methods. For besides the method of free association the book developed many other subjective instruments. Fiction now habitually uses them to differentiate various degrees of perception, various stages in the formulation of thought, and various kinds of symbolism in emotion and behavior. They have already become the common possession of novelists everywhere, no longer to be used as the sole method of a book but as additional tools fitted to specific needs. As a kind of novel *Ulysses* has less importance than seemed likely when it appeared; little can be done with the kind that Joyce has not done; beyond it there seems to be only the anarchy of Finnegans Wake which however interesting as clinical material, has little importance as literature. But the publication of *Ulysses* is one of the landmarks of literary history, and through its influence Freud has permanently widened the area of fiction and permanently added to its techniques.

There has been less application of Freud in American poetry. Specific freudian experiments like Conrad Aiken's which exploit unconscious material with little transformation have not been common, popular, or even first-rate. More common but literary rather than psychological in origin have been involved experiments in symbolism following the lead of T. S. Eliot. Such poetry may be described as an attempt to make the whole content of a poem symbolical in the exact freudian sense, draining it of all conscious meaning except what the symbols imply. Unhappily, to succeed such poetry must not only forge perfect symbols but also find readers who are well versed in symbolism. Since the first is extremely difficult and the second comparatively rare, the principal result was the brief flourishing of a school aptly called 'the cult of unintelligibility'. More intelligible is the poetry of Robinson Jeffers in which bloody, violent, and despairing fantasies are exploited

in ways that could not have been understood before Freud. Jeffers's achievement is sometimes remarkable though his psychological insight, especially his understanding of Freud, is sometimes less than profound. And such work serves to reveal a paradox: much more than any other kind of writer, a poet works directly with the raw stuff of fantasy, and when a theory, any theory, even one that explains or implements fantasy comes between him and the stuff he works with, poetry suffers. Younger poets are now freely using the symbolisms to which earlier experimenters accustomed us but seem to have rejected most of the other experiments. It may be that Freud's ultimate effect on poetry will be to provide understanding readers, not practising poets.

Nor has America developed any of the rich theatrical and cinematic literature that freudianism created abroad. A widespread but journalistic and superficial allusiveness that amounts to little more than slang, an occasional unimportant essay in expressionism, an occasional treatment of a simple theme as in *The Silver Cord*, a few farces, a skilful artisanship in the construction of ballets and revues—that is about all one finds. There has been little serious effort to use the psychology of the unconscious as many European dramatists have used it. Eugene O'Neill did indeed try, in two laborious and almost endless plays, to make drama out of what he understood Freud to mean. But what is dramatic in them is not freudian, and what is freudian in them is grotesquely misunderstood, simplified, and misapplied. Mr. O'Neill demonstrated his incapacity to use the ideas he was laboring with; it may be that his failure has dissuaded more competent intelligences from trying to work that vein. At any rate he has had no followers in the American theater.

The truth is that a similar shallow misunderstanding of the principles it was dealing with has marked much of the use literature has made of the freudian psychology. Thus in the early 1920's many literary critics, equipped with a few simple predigested ideas, set out to reveal new subtleties and final truths in our literary history. Other enthusiasts who were no

better prepared began to rewrite biography with the same intention. The all but insuperable difficulties that make trained analysts go slowly and tentatively in either criticism or biography did not deter the literary, and for some years there was a wild circus of interpretation. No phenomenon of history or private life was safe from the exploring amateur. Ignoring such factors as ground rent and the principles of engineering, some critics explained the skyscrapers of downtown New York as the need of architects to build phallic symbols. Ignoring the social and economic forces of revolution, one of them explained the Declaration of Independence as an expression of Thomas Jefferson's hatred of his father. Mrs. Browning's spaniel signified her desire to murder Robert Browning, Ulysses S. Grant was a mere zoöphile, the drabdest stanzas of Longfellow turned out to be amazing disclosures of aberrations hitherto suspected by no one. And so on—nothing was too preposterous to be received with awe and even thanksgiving, and when Mr. Simeon Strunsky undertook to burlesque the movement he found that his Scandal in Euclid which uncovered the œdipus complex in the *pons asinorum*, was taken with complete seriousness in the reviews. Much of this activity was converted to the service of controversy and special pleading in other fields, much of it existed as simple sensationalism, and very little of it had any value at all.

When the fashion waned and the literary took up other enthusiasms, one result was, unhappily, that the freudian instruments had been brought into disrepute. Which is too bad. It cannot be doubted that, skilfully and conservatively used by competent persons, they can be made extremely important in criticism. Many areas of literature which have so far resisted critical inquiry can be illuminated. The study of literature as dream and fantasy, the study of artistic genesis, the study of the artist's relations to his work, the study of artistic determinism and of what is generally called imagination—these and related investigations promise valuable results but hardly more than a beginning has been made. The first essential is a much greater knowledge of the psychology they

are trying to use than critics have so far possessed; almost equally essential is a realization of the difficulties of the undertaking, the limits beyond which it cannot go, and the at best tentative nature of the results possible. Psychoanalytical certainty is all but impossible in either criticism or biography. The dynamics of analysis are left out and clinical verification cannot be obtained—facts which have been forgotten even by some analysts who have invaded the field.

The suggestion above that much of Freud's influence in American literature has been effected by people who misunderstood Freud is supported even by fiction, in which that influence has unquestionably been greatest. Throughout the last generation understanding and application of Freud have steadily widened in American fiction, in step with the same leavening elsewhere in the cultural mass. Its extent could not easily be overestimated, and yet much that passes as freudian in fiction must still be a matter of mirth or horror to analysts. Part of that astonishment is probably unjustified. It is the nature of literary people to overbid their own formal knowledge; a pinch of theory has always sufficed for them. Sometimes the truth of a theory or the competence with which it is used may have little bearing on the real value of literature: a criticism of Theodore Dreiser's novels based on Dreiser's ineptness at the Darwinian theory he tries to apply in them would be almost irrelevant. True, psychology is more central than Darwinism in the purposes of fiction, but though psychologists and novelists may work with common materials, they work with them to different ends, and the goal of the novelist may sometimes make the psychologist's criticism irrelevant. It is possible for a novelist's intuitive understanding of emotion and behavior to triumph over a misunderstanding of psychological theory and even over false theory. In effect, it sometimes may not matter whether a novelist thinks he is applying Freud or Mary Baker Eddy, or whether he misapplies either, so long as in the end he writes a novel which is true to human experience—when the proper use of psychology will be to appraise the results, not the purpose. Furthermore, literature is larger

than its psychological constituent. And finally, there will always be some degree of paradox and even of falsity in any artist's deliberately trying to make his work conform to a theory of psychology. Artistic creation is itself a phenomenon of dynamic psychology, and interfering with it by overcharging its critical, analytical, and self-conscious elements may impair the product.

Nevertheless the influence of Freud on literature, already greater than that of any other scientist, seems certain to increase. Unquestionably, two results already established will be permanent. One is technical: literature has been enriched by the development of methods derived from the practice of psychoanalysis for the portrayal of states of consciousness, psychological symbolism, unconscious motivation, and other phases of emotion and behavior. Beyond that and more important though mostly an indirect influence, is the understanding of experience. Much of Freud has already worked into everyone's thinking; writers understand themselves and others better than before, and they are remaking literature as experience has been interpreted for them. No one can appraise that change as yet, but it is revolutionary. It will continue at least as fast as a knowledge of Freud permeates the cultural whole. Whether writers can accelerate it by studying psychoanalysis is uncertain, and it is the nature of literature to move in many ways at the same time, some of them contradictory. But just as the world of thought will hereafter show the impress of Freud's work, so imaginative literature will reap an increasing harvest from the psychology which has brought it closest to the sources of human emotion.

FREUD AND CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY

BY GÉZA RÓHEIM (WORCESTER, MASS.)

In 1912 Freud published a series of articles in the journal *Imago*. In bookform these articles were translated into many languages. Totem and Taboo¹ is one of the representative works of a great genius. Freud learned the meaning of human behavior from his patients and in this work for the first time in a systematic way he applied this knowledge to the puzzling behavior of strange races and cultures. He discovered new and universal meaning in primitive incest taboos. A man gets into a state of panic at the sight of his mother-in-law, a brother must not speak to his sister, a father may not be in the house alone with his daughter. Among the *Akamba* a girl must avoid her father from her puberty to her marriage; before and after these periods there is no taboo against association between them. It was evident to Freud that these customs were protective measures erected against incestuous desires; no one would devise elaborate prohibitions against occurrences that could never eventuate.

The symptomatology of taboo customs in general is similar to the content of the obsessional neuroses. Its contagiousness betrays the common danger of temptation; its equal applicability to 'defilement' proves the underlying ambivalence. Both in obsessional neurosis and in taboo the nucleus of all prohibitions is the exclusion of permission to touch, the origin of the *delire de toucher*.

It is surprising to find that primitive man does not show simply hatred for his enemies but also the tendency to identify himself with them and to atone for the murder. Conversely the divine king is not solely the adored idol of his subjects; ritual gives them plenty of opportunity to abreact their hostility. The dead are not only mourned and revered, they are also

¹ Freud: *Totem and Taboo*. (Trans. by A. A. Brill.) New York: Moffatt, Yard & Co., 1918.

feared. A ghost is dangerous because it is a projection of unconscious guilt feelings. In magic, imagination is equivalent to reality; the dramatization of a wish intended to bring about its fulfilment. The magician acts like the infant who hallucinates a desired wish fulfilment. The principle that underlies the practice of magic is the omnipotence of thought.

The animistic phase in the evolution of mankind corresponds to narcissism, the period of the gods to infantile object relations, and that of science to acceptance of the reality principle and to exogamy. In taking the step from preanimism or animatism (Marett) to animism, man surrendered a part of his original omnipotence to the spirits. Spirits are the projected emotions of those who believe in them. Anthropologists who believe that religion is based on the belief in demons are probably right because the first emotions projected are hostile ones. Primitive dualism has something to do with the duality of conscious and unconscious although some aspects of the psyche seem more like the former, others more like the latter.

The fourth chapter of Totem and Taboo contains the theory of the primal horde. In the cases of infantile animal phobia observed by Freud, Ferenczi and other analysts the animal proved always to be a symbol of the father and the projection expressed the inherent ambivalence of the father-son relationship. We should therefore take primitive man literally when he says that the totem animal *is* his father or what amounts to the same thing, his ancestor. The second essential part of the theory is Robertson Smith's interpretation of sacrifice as a communion: the votaries are eating their god and identifying themselves with him by incorporating his flesh and blood. The sacrificed animal is identical with the god and the killing of the animal, severely tabooed for the individual, is a sacred act periodically performed by the community. The third pillar that supports the theoretical structure is the hypothetical primal horde (Darwin and Atkinson).

Human society originally consisted of the Cyclopean family, a large polygamous group dominated by one powerful male. The jealousy of this primal father excluded from the group

all males who could threaten his supremacy. The young males hovered on the fringe of the group and when age weakened the primal father one of the sons strong enough to kill him eventually took his place and his women. According to Atkinson the transition to a different type of organization may have been effected through the love of the mother who prevailed upon the father to tolerate the presence of his son, or of the youngest son in the horde. According to Freud it took place through the totem-communion and the introjection of the father. The sons united in a group, killed the father, ate him, and after having incorporated him they affected a compromise, regulating society in such a manner as partially to forbid themselves the fulfilment of their own desires.

The fundamental taboos of totemism and exogamy are based on guilty feelings of the sons for parricide and are analogous to commonly observed 'post-mortem obedience'. The vanquished father was victorious in death, and the evolution of religion was based on a longing for reconciliation with the father. The increasing power of authority both in reality and in fantasy of divine kings and exalted divinities was built upon human feelings of guilt. The rebellious sentiments of the sons also were given an outlet in religion. From time to time the divine king was killed by his subjects and son-gods, or at least appeared beside them on Olympus. Adonis, Attis, Osiris are sons and lovers of their mothers, but they are killed or castrated by representatives of the father. Mithras the hero-son who kills the father-bull is alone responsible for the dead. In the Christian religion the Son of God suffers punishment for the primeval sin of all sons and thus becomes the bearer of the sins of the world.

Freud finds implicit in this scheme of human evolution the existence of a group psyche from which derive human guilt feelings for a deed performed by their remote ancestors, and he believes that this assumption is expressed or implied in all attempts to apply psychology to anthropology (*Völkerpsychologie*). Clinical analysis shows that individual neurotics are suffering for their fantasies not for their actions. It might

be that we are dealing with a similar phenomenon in the group. It was Freud's opinion that in the course of human evolution inhibitions progressively increased and the deeds of the ancestors became the fantasies of their descendents.

This fundamental constructive contribution of Freud to anthropology and to an understanding of culture in general has two aspects, and the purely psychological aspect should be differentiated from the psychologico-historical or evolutionary aspect. Incest and other taboos, ambivalent rites, animism and magic are purely psychological phenomena and assume only processes that take place in the individuals who practise these customs. The primal horde, totemism and religion however, Freud explains on the assumption of a collective psyche and attempts to ascertain the psychological history of mankind. A series of Freud's contributions fall into the second category. They represent the psychological and historical approach. All more or less derive from Totem and Taboo and deal with the broad aspects of cultural development.

In *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*² Freud analyzes the characteristic behavior of crowds. The irrational behavior of a group can be compared to that of savages or children or of individual adults when swayed by a powerful emotion. A crowd is held together by the libidinal tie to the leader who represents the primal father. In analyzing such organized groups as the Army or the Catholic Church, Freud comes to the conclusion that they depend on the fiction, the illusion that all members of the organization are equally beloved sons of the great father; they are 'brethren in Christ'. The brutal behavior of German army sergeants in the World War made it very difficult to maintain this illusion and was one of the influences leading to the collapse of that organization. The death of the leader releases anxiety and results in panic. The most primitive form of relationship to one's environment is by identification; from there the developing psyche takes the next step to object libidinous relationship. The study

² Freud: *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*. (Trans. by James Strachey.) Vienna: Int. Ps. Verlag, 1922.

of melancholia has shown how regression takes place and how the lost love object is introjected into the ego. Freud introduced the concept of the ego ideal as representing the parental imagoes in personality structure. The tie that unites the group or the crowd is the common ego ideal (the leader) and the reaction formation aspect of sibling rivalry.

Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego could not have been written before Totem and Taboo. The next book in this series was *The Future of an Illusion*,³ followed in 1930 by *Civilization and its Discontents*.⁴ While Freud's earlier writings were theoretical visions of the past, *The Future of an Illusion*, and *Civilization and its Discontents* are concerned with the present and the future. The psychological structure of contemporary culture and religion are discussed in both books. Culture has made a steadily increasing conquest of nature but it has not made much progress in regulating human affairs. Real progress in regulating human relations would eliminate frustrations and aggressions. This is probably merely the fantasy of a golden age.

What can be done or what has been done to make the burden of mankind bearable? The question is not illusory because the human psyche has actually been undergoing modifications since the time our primeval ancestors became human. The direction of this trend is an increasing internalization of environmental antagonisms. Beside the prohibitive superego, culture also gives its bearers the narcissistic gratification of a common ego ideal. A common ego ideal and an institutionalized system of illusions constitute a religion. Man can never gain complete mastery over nature; religion helps him to overcome this source of anxiety and salves the wound to his narcissism. A persistence in adult life of infantile feelings, memories, attitudes, peoples the world with supernatural beings who are various disguises for the parents. Religion claims to be above criticism because its content is not an error; it is a wish fulfil-

³ Freud: *The Future of an Illusion*. London: Hogarth Press, 1928.

⁴ Freud: *Civilization and Its Discontents*. (Trans. by Joan Riviere.) New York: Jonathan Cape & Harrison Smith, 1930.

ment, an illusion. Freud believes that mankind will eventually outgrow this infantile neurosis and take the next step towards the dominance of the ego and the acceptance of reality.

In *Civilization and its Discontents* Freud discusses the problem of happiness. While everyone desires happiness, it seems however, that this striving is in opposition to reality. Happiness is a transitory experience: pent needs have been gratified; a tension is temporarily discharged. It is far easier to be unhappy. Suffering comes from the frailties of the body, from disappointments in the outer world and in ones relations to other human beings. Protection against these dangers may be sought in the gratification of all desires, in withdrawal from the world, in work, in intoxication and mania which give one a certain independence of the outer world. The psychotic goes further still; he withdraws completely from the world and clings to his delusions. If he shares these with a group they may eventually help him to find the way back to reality. Religions are the mass delusions of mankind. The difficulties that arise from the weakness of the body and from the bludgeonings of chance can obviously never be eliminated.

The surprising fact however is that to a large extent our troubles arise from our own institutions—are of our own making. Many are inclined to blame civilization for this unhappiness. In truth we must pay a price for every step in our conquest of environment. Without railways and ships we would not have occasion to feel the pangs of separation, when those whom we love go to far countries. We have reduced mortality in children but we have imposed on them the greatest moderation in begetting others. The span of life is increased but the joy in living diminished.

Culture in a sense is a fairy tale come true. Through his inventions man has himself become godlike, but he is a god with artificial limbs. Another outstanding feature of culture is the value it places on orderliness and cleanliness. We know through psychoanalysis that these character traits in the individual are sublimations of anal-erotic instinct gratifications. Culture is built on renunciation of such instinctual gratifica-

tions and this 'cultural privation' is precisely the cause of the antagonism against civilization. The evolution of culture is a special process comparable to growth of an individual to maturity.

Freud traced the steps in this maturing process of mankind. The disappearance of sexual periodicity in our remote ancestors induced the male to keep the female always near him, and the female was inclined to follow the male because of the need for protection for her helpless young. While in this prehuman phase the will of the female and the young was restricted by male dominance, in the totemic phase restrictions mutually imposed on each other by the members of the group replaced the will of the all powerful father. Eros unites the family. In its aim-inhibited form the family is still the basis of civilization; but only in its aim inhibited aspect because culture demands the withdrawal of cathexis from the narrow sphere of direct sexual gratification in order to spread it over the broader sphere of work and society. The sexual life of civilized man is seriously impaired. It is a function in process of becoming atrophied.

Civilization makes quite unnatural demands on the individual. He should love his neighbor as himself; he is told he should even love his enemy. Fundamentally the two admonitions mean the same thing. It is difficult for human beings to love each other because they are not just gentle lovable creatures but beings in whom powerful aggressions are part of their original instinctual endowment. Civilization tries to cope with these aggressions by identifications, aim inhibited love relations and by creating scapegoats among other groups or nations. In the individual the hostile and destructive impulses were curbed by the evolution of the superego. Fate appears as substitute for the parents and disappointments and failure in reality increase the severity of the superego. Authority can be appeased by renouncing the gratification of desires but internalized authority (conscience) can never be pacified because it wages an unrelenting warfare not against the deed but against the wish. The price of progress in civilization is paid by forfeiting

happiness through a heightening of the sense of guilt. Thwarted instinctual gratification increases the sense of guilt by increasing aggression against the love object as a source of frustration. When an instinctual trend undergoes repression its erotic components are transformed into symptoms and its aggressive components into a sense of guilt. The aim of the individual to attain happiness and of society to unify human beings need not coincide. The community evolves additional superegos of its own due to the influence of some strong personality and based on feelings of guilt (Jesus). The trouble is that the ethical standard set by the cultural superego is far too high for the individual. Freud disclaimed the rôle of a prophet. He had no consolation to offer although he knew it was just such consolation that everyone seeks.

A common feature of these contributions of Freud is that they deal with the broader aspects of culture and that a considerable emphasis is placed on the genetic point of view. In a number of Freud's papers he applied the psychoanalytic method of interpretation to customs, beliefs and myths. Ceremonial defloration is explained as a means of deflecting the hostility of the virgin from the husband, and the medicine man or relative who performs the first coitus is a substitute for the father.⁵ In the paper on the choice between three caskets in the Merchant of Venice⁶ Freud shows that it is really a man's choice between three women. The three women, the Fates, are really three forms of the mother, the one who gives life, the second who is a companion through life, and the third, Atropos, speechless and inevitable Death disguised as a mother and the antithesis of the goddess of love, Aphrodite.

Another paper of this type explains the medieval belief of a pact with the devil.⁷ It is derived from the story of a painter who after a period of depression following his father's death makes a pact with the devil promising to give himself to the

⁵ Freud: *The Taboo of Virginity*. Coll. Papers IV, 1925, p. 217.

⁶ Freud: *The Theme of the Three Caskets*. Coll. Papers IV, p. 244.

⁷ Freud: *A Neurosis of Demoniical Possession in the Seventeenth Century*. Coll. Papers IV, p. 436.

devil as his true born son. The gift he expects in return is proficiency in his art. The devil is a substitute for the father he has lost. In his fantasy the devil appears with a woman's breast; a projection of the poet's own feminine feeling towards the father.

The emotions we call uncanny ⁸ (*Das Unheimliche*) have to do with animism and the disappearance of the borderline between the animate and inanimate. The feeling is called forth by the return of seemingly discarded infantile beliefs and repressed complexes (castration complex).

A short paper on poetic fantasy is in general application also valid for the whole field of mythology.⁹ The daydreams of a poet are modified by secondary mechanisms to a point where they become generally acceptable and we can identify ourselves with them thus obtaining a permissible outlet for our own daydreams.

When a great chief in a primitive tribe dies, the mourners chant his deeds in a dirge: the feasts he gave, the battles he fought, or whatever his exploits might have been. A very great chief has died and we here relate some of his achievements, some of the battles he has fought.

To the writer the answer to the question—what has Freud done for anthropology—is: *everything*. One may have his doubts about the collective unconscious, or the primal horde but this is not the point. We knew before Freud that in demons and gods the believer mirrored himself, that man created gods after his own image; yet we could not trace this connection and we did not know how this process took place and why. Anthropology has always admitted that human behavior and culture must ultimately be explained by psychology but before Freud there was no psychology that could meet these demands. We knew that primitive tribes had curious customs and taboos but no one would have thought of correlating these with a dynamic process, a conflict in the psyche of the people who practised them. Psychoanalysis has opened

⁸ Freud: *The Uncanny*. Coll. Papers IV, p. 368.

⁹ Freud: *The Relation of the Poet to Day-Dreaming*. Coll. Papers IV, p. 173.

new fields of research. Before Freud no anthropologist understood the importance of the infantile period of development, of sexuality, of the interrelations between the individual and society, of dreams or even of the emotional life and ideals of human beings.

Without tracing Freud's influence in the writings of anthropologists it is this writer's conviction that most of the new viewpoints Freud has given have come to stay; that they are truly *ære perennius*.

No mention has been made of Freud's latest book, *Moses and Monotheism*, because emphasizing as it does the collective unconscious far beyond the scope outlined in *Totem and Taboo*, it must first stand the test of criticism. Perhaps it is as futile to contend that Moses was an Egyptian as it would be to discuss the nationality of any other mythological personage. For many centuries the mythological Moses has been the great ideal of Israel.

And there hath not arisen a prophet since in Israel like unto Moses, whom the Lord knew face to face (Deut. 34:10).

After thousands of years we would paraphrase this text and say:

And there hath arisen in Israel a prophet far greater than Moses who knew Mankind face to face.

THE PROBLEM OF ART IN FREUD'S WRITINGS

BY RICHARD STERBA (DETROIT)

With the passing of Sigmund Freud, it becomes our task carefully to examine the great wealth which he has left and faithfully and productively to cultivate it. But it is impossible for us to perform this part of our work of mourning without a feeling of profound admiration for the multifarious character of his extraordinary creative capacities. No aspect of the human mind and its activities has been left untouched; and even if only once the searchlight of his genius has been thrown in passing, its powerful beam has always been directed upon the most essential points of the field in question. Depth and enlightenment are to be found in every sentence.

The ensuing pages are a work of compilation such as falls to a follower and part contemporary of Freud. A full and complete presentation of his psychoanalytic observations on art and artists is not to be found as such in Freud's works. In examining his papers from the standpoint of the enlightenment they contain regarding the problems of art and the artist, one encounters two sources which stand in a complementary relationship to each other. One source is a number of different papers on the theory of the neuroses, and in introductory presentations of psychoanalysis in which are to be found scattered remarks and observations about art and artists. The disclosures, the investigations and parallels which to a certain extent are only marginal remarks in these papers devoted to other themes are, as far as the theoretical problem of the psychology of art is concerned, of more value and profit than those deriving from the other, direct sources of information, papers in which artists and works of art are submitted to analysis. Among these are: *Delusion and Dream based on Jensen's Gradiwa*, *Leonardo da Vinci: A Psychosexual Study of an Infantile Reminiscence*, *The Moses of Michelangelo*, *A Childhood Recollection from Dichtung und Wahrheit*. The essential general value of these

papers lies not so much in their wealth of disclosure concerning the psychological problems of art; nor, indeed, is it their original aim to shed light on such problems. The goal of these papers is very much more to demonstrate that the range of validity of psychoanalysis extends far beyond the field of dreams and neurosis, and to demonstrate too that our highest cultural activities and accomplishments also have their roots deeply implanted in the unconscious whence they draw their dynamic force. To read these papers is both fascinating and profitable because the general accessibility of the subject of art makes it much easier to follow the author's processes of thinking and investigation. One learns also from these papers in a particularly effective way the characteristics of the technique of psychoanalysis; how psychoanalysis is able to draw the most profoundly convincing and decisive conclusions from what Freud calls the 'refuse', by which he means details which are in general laid aside and neglected. The above-mentioned complementary relationship between the two sources of information consists then in the theoretical enlightenment about art and the artist to be found in papers devoted to the psychoanalytic theory of neurosis, while in those papers devoted to an examination of specific objects of art and artists we are given insight into more general analytic theories and methods.

In Freud's paper *Das Interesse an der Psychoanalyse*¹ there is a paragraph entitled, *Das Kunstwissenschaftliche Interesse*; there is another more detailed contribution to the psychological problem of the work of art in The Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis at the end of the twenty-third lecture, entitled, The Paths of Symptom Formation. A presentation of Freud's contribution to the psychology of art should begin with a résumé of these two sources.

The practice of art is an activity whose aim is to assuage unappeased wishes. This aim is achieved not only from the standpoint of the creator but also from that of the person enjoying the creation. At the basis of artistic creation we find

¹ In Ges. Schr. IV.

the same instinctual forces which are effective as components of intrapsychic conflicts—those same conflicts which drive the individual into neurosis and compel society to build up its great institutions, religions and other group formations. The work of art is therefore the product of psychic forces which are in opposition to each other, such as desire and inner prohibition. It represents a reconciliation between these conflicting forces and has therefore the character of a compromise, as have also those psychopathological formations—errors, dreams and neurotic symptoms—which are well known. The fundamental dynamic force at the root of a work of art is an unfulfilled wish of the artist; just as in dreams and fantasies, the work of art represents this wish as fulfilled.

Psychoanalysis has taught us to recognize the enormous importance of the gratification which the individual obtains through fantasies and daydreams. Everyone has daydreams and the ego of the normal adult admits this kind of satisfaction to some extent. In daydreams one imagines desires and wishes, mostly of an erotic and egotistic nature, as fulfilled, thus enjoying the gratification of the imaginary fulfilment. In certain cases, and under certain conditions where there is a marked increase of instinctual tension or an intense frustration in real life, these fantasies are enormously extended. In the wish content of fantasies, however, there is always some fraction of long-forgotten wishes from childhood; if the ability of the individual to obtain gratification in the world of reality is not very great and he is thus not capable of enduring the high tension of his instinctual needs, there is the danger of regression to early childhood wishes and of these being in a large measure reawakened, which is the preliminary step towards neurosis. It depends therefore on psycho-economic conditions, that is to say on the quantities of libidinal energy, whether such an individual develops a neurosis or not. Should the dammed-up instinctual energies become overwhelmingly powerful and the individual continue to be incapable of attaining gratification, these energies will turn and stream backwards along the course of the libido development to those early stages at which they

were once able to obtain full satisfaction. Analysis calls these outstanding points in the course of development of the libido, fixations. Objects and erotogenic zones which at one time in early childhood had brought about intense psychosexual gratification, are loaded anew with psychic cathexis. But from early childhood the psychic organization of the individual has undergone through the establishment of cultural barriers such as morals, disgust, shame, such transformation that conscious gratification in those early regions of pleasure experience is later on impossible. To the external frustration, after the regression of the libido, is added also an inner frustration and this inner frustration necessitates the exclusion from consciousness of the offending psychic impulses, a process which we call repression. The psychic impulses which are excluded from reality, and the representations and ideas belonging to them, are obliged after their repression to follow other paths of discharge than those impulses which are freely admitted to consciousness. If they become overwhelmingly powerful they are able in spite of the repression to break through into consciousness and to obtain satisfaction in the form of substitute gratifications and actions. But these are regarded by the conscious personality as foreign bodies not belonging to the ego, and their existence is painful to the individual. We call these substitute formations and actions, neurotic symptoms.

It will be apparent from what we have said that the psychic condition of the daydreamer is labile; for such an individual there is the danger that with an increase of instinctual demands the libido will regress to infantile positions, a process which the ego is not able to tolerate. The inevitable result is then repression, followed by symptom formation. The psychic condition in which the individual cannot discharge his libidinal energy through satisfaction in real objects, but gains, or tries to gain gratification through fantasy, is called after C. G. Jung, 'introversion'. The introverted individual stands between the normal and the neurotic.

The artist is an introvert. Since he is unable to satisfy his overpowering instinctual needs in the world of reality, he is

obliged to turn away from the real world to the realm of fantasy thus taking the way which leads to neurosis. But it is here that the creative process sets in, enabling him through discharge of instinctual energy and the effect of the work of art on the outside world to save himself from neurosis and to regain contact with reality. He is able through the creation of a work of art to obtain sufficient gratification of his intense childhood wishes which he represents as fulfilled in his creation. Through this work of art the artist obtains a far greater gratification than through the hallucinatory representations in fantasy or daydreams because the work of art, although modelled from fantasy, is formed of a material corresponding to the real outside world. His particular method of representation, possible to the artist on account of his talent, enables him in a certain measure to find a way back from fantasy to reality, obtaining in this roundabout way a means of gratifying actual wishes and of achieving success for which, in a direct way, his forces would never have been adequate. For the artist therefore the work of art signifies on the one hand, deliverance from neurosis through the instinctual gratification which it brings him and, on the other hand, the possibility of real success which would have been denied him had he not found the device, represented by the work of art, for satisfying his instinctual wishes. Both gratification of instinctual wishes by the work of art and the ensuing success in the real world make it possible for the artist to escape from neurosis because the dynamic result is a considerable decrease of tension in the psyche.

Artistic production is directly connected with daydreaming and fantasy. We have already mentioned that the daydream represents not only the satisfaction of actual wishes but also of early childhood wishes whose existence the individual neither remembers nor wishes to remember, since their fulfilment would be in contradiction to the norms which have in the meantime been established in his conscious personality. But these unfulfilled wishes which have become unconscious have still retained their dynamic force and a continuous expenditure of energy is required to hold them in repression, while they,

on the other hand, take advantage of every opportunity to force their way through to consciousness and to motor expression. They succeed particularly well in cases where a wish from the ego, that is, a wish admitted by the conscious personality but refused by reality, is still active in the psychic apparatus. The infantile wishes then combine with this actual wish and supply with psychic energy the fantasy built out of the actual wish, modifying the fantasy in such a way that they can obtain satisfaction at the same time as the actual wish. A thorough psychoanalytic examination therefore discloses in the fantasy admitted by the ego, the fulfilment of old, repressed childhood wishes. Just as a dream allies itself with unresolved experiences of the day preceding the dream, analysis recognizes that in the hallucinatory wish fulfilment of the dream picture a forbidden wish of earliest childhood has allied itself with an actual experience, achieving gratification at the same time. So we find also that in the daydream an actual and an infantile wish obtain their common satisfaction through the fantasy. The satisfaction of the infantile wish occurs unconsciously and it needs an analysis of the dream, as of the daydream, to prove the presence of the infantile wish in the manifest picture.

If the work of art springs from a daydream, we must expect that in it too, besides the actual causative material, there are also infantile unconscious wishes which will be represented therein as fulfilled. Analysis maintains that the immense dynamic effect of the work of art, the satisfaction which it brings not only to the artist but also to the spectator, is produced through the fulfilment of the repressed infantile wishes; that the latent part, as Freud calls it, of the pleasure of art is in the opinion of psychoanalysis far greater than the manifest and æsthetic part. This opinion gave analysis the task of proving the presence of infantile wishes in the work of art, and it has fulfilled this task. As early as *The Interpretation of Dreams*, Freud proved that the profound emotional effect of Sophocles' *Tragedy of Œdipus* is caused by the peculiar specific content of the drama, which brings about the fulfilment of an unconscious wish common to all mankind, but which represents also

the carrying out of the punishment which every individual has feared as a consequence of this very wish and, in the hidden depths of the unconscious, still does. In his *Interpretation of Dreams* Freud has shown too that this same latent content is expressed in Shakespeare's *Hamlet*.

The disclosure of the fact that unfulfilled wishes, originating in the unconscious, are satisfied in the work of art, and that it is possible through analysis of the work of art to discover these; that, furthermore, the enjoyment of the work of art derives principally from the satisfaction of these infantile wishes, is Freud's most important contribution to the psychology of the work of art.

Since repressed infantile wishes succeed in obtaining satisfaction through the work of art, it must logically be possible to find connections between the experiences the artist has had during his life, especially the impressions of early childhood, and his artistic creations. These connections are actually to be found not only in the subject matter but also in the artist's specific method of creation.

As a classic example of an analytical discovery of the connections between creation and infantile experience we may take Freud's famous paper on Leonardo da Vinci. In this contribution, Freud proceeds from a single childhood memory communicated by Leonardo, and attempts to explain the picture of St. Anna, the Virgin Mary, and the Christ child, an unconscious puzzle picture. In general, Freud uses poetry as a paradigmatic basis for his investigations in the field of the psychology of art because, of all the material employed to form the work of art, poetry stands nearest to the dream and the fantasy, those all-important objects of psychological research. It may be also that the art of poetry lay nearest to Freud's own creative expression.

Since the work of art represents the fulfilment of intense unconscious infantile wishes, the artist's own ego must necessarily be at the center of the work of art as in the case of dreams and fantasy. The elaboration however which the daydream has to undergo if it is to be transformed into a work of art,

about which we shall have more to say later, must very often be abolished by dissolving displacements, removing distortions and condensations, sometimes by combining two personages in order to recognize the chief character in the 'hero' of the work of art who is the representation of the creator himself. But in the hallucinatory fulfilment of infantile wishes lies also the source of the pleasure of enjoyment of the work of art, that is to say, the secret of its effect on others, since these infantile wishes are common to all human beings. They are the same wishes from which our dreams originate, the same from which myths—those 'secular dreams of mankind'—are formed, the same wishes which mankind combats by means of its great institutions, the most important of which are religion and the moral laws. Banned by culture, suppressed and repudiated by education, these wishes are repressed by the ego and kept back from consciousness. But to a great extent they retain their psychic energy and try unceasingly to force their way through to consciousness. Under certain conditions consciousness actually does admit their fulfilment. To this order of fulfilment belong the dream, the fantasy and the work of art. The dynamic effect of the work of art upon those who enjoy it consists in the fact that through the hallucinatory participation in the artist's infantile fantasy, the wishes of the person enjoying the work of art are at the same time also satisfied, the reason being that such wishes are common to us all. Through this social act of wish fulfilment, the work of art differs from the dream and the fantasy. Dream and fantasy are, even as the work of art, wish fulfilments of a hallucinatory character, but the gratification which dreams and fantasies bring about serves only for the individual producing them and if communicated leaves others quite cold, or has the effect of repelling them. 'The essential "*ars poetica*" lies in the technique by which our feeling of repulsion is overcome, and this has certainly to do with those barriers erected between every individual and all others.'² With this statement which may be said to extend over every

² Freud: *The Relation of the Poet to Day-Dreaming*. Coll. Papers IV, p. 183.

kind of artistic production, the problem of the work of art has to be considered as one of group psychology. The possibility offered by the work of art of an identification with the hallucinatory wish fulfilment—on the basis of kindred wishes—one can even say, the urge of the work of art to this identification, must be considered as a condition of the work of art.

The next subject of investigation will therefore be the technique used by the artist to overcome the refusal of others to participate in his own individual fantasies. Freud points out three technical methods by means of which the artist can make his daydreams enjoyable to others. First by the transformation of the fantasy; second by the elaboration of its content in such a way as to represent the fantasy, and third by the effect of æsthetic principles in this elaboration.

The original daydream before being transformed into the work of art has to be stripped of all that is egotistical and egocentric. For this purpose, everything personal must be removed from the daydream; all that could be considered repulsive in the wishes represented by the work of art has to be tempered in order completely to conceal its origin in forbidden sources. This transformation of the daydream may be compared to the distortion that occurs in dreams. In dream representation also, all that is repulsive is tempered and made unrecognizable by allusions, so that it can get past the censorship of the superego and enter the consciousness of the dreamer.

The discovery of the original fantasy through the abolishment of the distortion and the further discovery of the unconscious wishes at the basis of this fantasy are possible in analysis because of the technical knowledge acquired during the investigation of dreams and other psychological formations. Thus analysis makes possible the recognition of the *latent content* of the work of art. The distortion of the original fantasy and its basic infantile wishes is the result of the critical influence of the superego, not only of the artist, but also of society. This social superego is much severer and more inexorable in its demands than the superego of the individual, the former admitting only what others are permitted to know,

the latter paying no attention to others who are unable to discover its intentions. The distortions of the work of art must therefore, on account of the social superego, be a great deal more extensive than in the case of the daydream. It will be apparent after what we have said that the work of art has to be considered as the result of a psychic compromise, since it mediates between the demands of the unconscious wishes and the demands of the social conscience.

The second means of abolishing the barriers between one's own and other people's egos, is the artist's mysterious faculty of being able to form a certain material so that the fantasy expressed therein appears as a new kind of reality—an image of reality. Such images of reality are highly valued by mankind for reasons which will be explained later. The esteem earned by the work of art for representing a new kind of reality makes it possible for the fantasy at the origin of the creation to be sanctioned and used as a source of pleasure.

This imitation of reality which plays such an important part in the formation of the material, does not take place only because of the necessity for submission to the demands of the reality principle in order to succeed as it were in bribing those who enjoy the work of art. The imitation of reality in itself represents a primitive kind of mastery of reality which is made possible by an exchange of psychic for actual reality. Frazer has called this, 'mistaking an ideal connection for a real one', and the technique of such mastery, magic. The foundation of this magical technique resides in the pleasure principle; it originates in a very early phase of psychic development at which the individual still looks upon himself as omnipotent because wishes are experienced at this period as if their fulfilment in reality were achieved by the mere act of wishing. We call this the stage of 'omnipotence of thought'. The magic creation of a pseudo reality, in which not the laws of the outside world but conscious and unconscious wishes are the determining factors, signifies a regression to this phase of the omnipotence of thought. The early childhood tendencies of this period of omnipotence of thought are preserved in all

of us and the pseudo reality of the work of art brings them a profound satisfaction.

If one makes a comparison between those parts of the work of art formed under the laws of reality and those formed under the pleasure principle, one will find that the influence of the latter is markedly the greater. The original fantasy, particularly in its unconscious aspects, is formed according to the pleasure principle. The formation of the material as an image of reality takes place under the influence of the reality principle, but it is this very creation of a pseudo reality with its magic significance which is able to bring satisfaction to psychic tendencies that, being extremely primitive, are so entirely dominated by the pleasure principle that they are normally held back from consciousness. The mutual permeation of the fields of domination of the pleasure and reality principles led Freud to call art *a kind of reconciliation between the two principles in mental functioning*.

Even as magic tendencies are to be found at the basis of the work of art, so are kindred magic tendencies to be found at the basis of children's play. And like the child at play, the artist also creates a world of fantasy in the likeness of reality which he takes in all seriousness and loads with enormous quantities of affective energy. Those who enjoy the work of art can permit themselves an extensive identification with the represented work because the alternating influence of their belief in the reality of the work of art and their consciousness that it is only play affords them this possibility. The release of quantities of affective energy through the work of art is brought about through this fluctuating mixture of delusion and admission that 'it is only play' which creates an atmosphere enabling various cathexes to escape to some extent the control of the censor, just as in dreams our conscience consoles us when we say to ourselves: 'it is only a dream'. Language expresses the parallel between the play of artists and that of children in the use of the word 'play' to denote theatrical performance and musical activities.

As the third and last means of abolishing the barriers between

the ego of the artist and the egos of other people, Freud specifies the æsthetic features of the work of art. During the formation of the material, the artist follows certain laws of beauty, whose investigation belongs to the field of æsthetics. These æsthetic features in the work of art are particularly suited to incite those who enjoy it to identification, and it is to a great extent these æsthetic qualities through which the work of art becomes a social phenomenon. The deeper effect of the æsthetic qualities is more comprehensible through the principle of æsthetic assistance or enhancement, first discovered by the German philosopher, G. Th. Fechner³. Freud, in his famous contribution, *Wit and Its Relation to the Unconscious*, explains in detail this principle and its share in the effect of wit and jokes. He calls it the 'forepleasure principle' and shows that a process giving rise to pleasure is also able to release other sources of pleasure which have been until this time repressed owing to their forbidden nature if they are linked up with the first process. In wit these combined processes bring about a far deeper pleasure than the apparently innocent technical wit creation can give by itself. The technique of wit, the use of puns, strange and funny combinations and the like, seduce us to the enjoyment of sadistic or obscene tendencies, whose expression would repel us were it not combined with the enjoyment of the skilful technical creation of the joke itself. Freud calls the pleasure of the technical side of wit the *forepleasure* through which the deeper and forbidden pleasure, forbidden until now because of its aggressive or obscene nature, is released. The æsthetic side of the work of art has a similar forepleasure effect; it seduces the individual into the enjoyment of forbidden instinctual wish gratification without his even becoming conscious of the original sources of his pleasure. But at the same time the effect of the æsthetic side of the work of art is considerably overestimated. It is valued as if the entire quantity of pleasure caused by the work of art were brought about by the æsthetic features, while actually the real sources of pleasure

³ Cf. his *Vorschule der Aesthetik*, 1897.

remain for the most part unconscious. The amount of pleasure radiating from these unconscious sources is automatically ascribed to the processes which bring about pleasure consciously, that is, to the æsthetic features of the work of art. The result of this is the overestimation of the æsthetic side. Exactly the same thing occurs in the case of the joke: the clever construction of the latter is overestimated and is regarded wrongly as the main source of the pleasure effect. Actually the gratification of unconscious tendencies, either obscene or aggressive, is released through the forepleasure which arises from the technical construction of the joke.

With the description of the effect of the mechanism of forepleasure in the work of art discovered by Freud, we come to the end of our subject. Freud's findings in the field of the psychology of art are, as we have seen, principally concerned with the psychodynamics of the art form, and with the conditions, possibilities and mechanisms achieving these dynamic results. The wealth of contributions based on Freud's findings which have been made by others is in itself both tribute and witness to the manifold discoveries and ways that the genius of this great thinker has opened up in the field of the psychology of art.

CRIMINOLOGY AND PSYCHOANALYSIS

BY ATWELL WESTWICK¹ (SANTA BARBARA)

I am powerless to express adequately my gratitude for the opportunity which makes it possible for me to pay my tribute to one of the greatest minds and noblest characters of all time.

Confining my remarks to criminology in relation to psychoanalysis, I should be quite happy with this limitation were I not aware that the restriction operates to make the simplification of a tremendously complex subject more apparent than real.

Criminology dealing as it does with crime, criminals and criminal justice, includes the detection of crime, and the apprehension, prosecution, conviction, custody, and treatment of offenders although the term 'penology' frequently refers only to custody and treatment (1).

Lawyers and judges tell us in the language of the Penal Code that a crime is 'an act committed or omitted in violation of a law forbidding or commanding it, and to which is annexed upon conviction . . . the punishment of death, imprisonment, fine, removal from office, or disqualification to hold office' (2). The sociologist on the other hand makes it clear that a crime is merely an act, a bit of human behavior, which is believed at a particular time and place to be harmful by a group of people strong enough to persuade the legislature to proscribe it as criminal (3).

From either of the foregoing views, crime is ever a changing concept. That is why an act criminal in California may not be criminal in New York, and vice versa; why an act not criminal in Europe may be criminal in the United States, and vice versa; why an act criminal yesterday is not criminal today, and why an act which is not criminal today may be criminal tomorrow.

In any event, the adult person who commits an act pro-

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scribed by the criminal law of a given jurisdiction is known as a criminal. If the offense involved carries with it the penalty of county jail imprisonment, he is a 'misdemeanant'; if the penalty is death or penitentiary imprisonment, he is a 'felon'.

In recent times there has been a decided trend towards classifying young offenders not as criminals but as delinquents. Since delinquency is nearly always the forerunner of crime, criminology is vitally, if not primarily, concerned with youthful offenders.

The discoveries of Sigmund Freud, which for the sake of convenience we call psychoanalysis, conclusively demonstrate that crime and delinquency are essentially synonymous terms which cover respectively the very human but proscribed behavior both of chronological adults and of children up to the age of twenty-one years, but that man, fundamentally, is simply a 'child with a little larger growth'. Freud's discoveries demonstrate as well that crime and delinquency are symptoms only of personal or social maladjustments, just as pain and fever are symptoms of disease; that crime, if we wish to approach and deal with it effectively, sensibly and humanely, can no longer be regarded as a theological or a metaphysical or a juridical abstraction as it has been for centuries, but must be seen for what it really is—the expression in social life of the physical and social environments playing upon a personality which is essentially abnormal or unusual by reason of heredity, disease or simple development. These discoveries also demonstrate that the causes of crime and delinquency can in a high percentage of cases be discovered and removed by the application of proper techniques; that all offenders, regardless of the particular offense committed, if they must be confined at all, should be confined indefinitely until it is safe to release them just as we confine the dangerously insane, the feeble-minded, or those who suffer from contagious disease; that it is sheer imbecility to imprison a person for one year or five years or thirty years, or any other period of time, depending alone upon the nature of the offense committed, and then dump him back upon society at the end of his term in worse condition than when he was first committed without having discovered or

done anything about the forces that have impelled him to misbehave or taught him anything about those forces or about himself. Freud's discoveries also demonstrate that while parole, probation and the juvenile court are really great and promising, though recent, innovations in the field of criminology, their effectiveness in dealing with criminal and delinquent activity is seriously curtailed and hampered by the failure of those who administer them to grasp the true significance of what fundamentally underlies and motivates human behavior and the true significance of the utter necessity of a comprehensive program of preventive therapy.

These and other vital considerations make it apparent that new outlooks and orientations in criminology and a fundamental overhauling of our whole traditional penal system, are an imperative necessity (4). This necessity has long been recognized by the greatest of lawyers and jurists.

Blackstone, the oracle of traditional law, says in his Fourth Book:

'A multitude of sanguinary laws (besides the doubt that may be entertained about the right of making them) do likewise prove a manifested defect either in the wisdom of the legislative or the strength of the executive power. It is a kind of quackery in government and argues a want of solid skill to apply the same universal remedy to every case of difficulty. It is, it must be owned, much easier to extirpate than to amend mankind, yet the magistrate must be esteemed both a weak and a cruel surgeon who cuts off every limb, which through ignorance or indolence he will not attempt to cure.'

Justice Cardoza, when Chief Justice of the New York Court of Appeals, said:

'I have faith none the less, that a century or less from now, our descendants will look back upon the penal system of today with the same surprise and horror that fill our minds when we are told that only about a century ago one hundred and sixty crimes were visited under the English Law with the punishment of death and that in 1801 a child of thirteen was hanged at Tyburn for the larceny of a spoon.' (5)

Chief Justice Taft told the American Bar Association in 1923: 'The administration of our criminal law is a disgrace to civilization'.

The law no longer as it once did charges dogs and cats, even worms, with offenses, putting into operation elaborate machinery for their trial, condemnation and execution. These are now acknowledged to be irresponsible agents making responses true to their individual natures and respective environments. But in the State of New Jersey as late as 1828, a boy of thirteen was hanged for an offense he committed at the age of twelve!

Fifty years ago there were no children's courts anywhere. Until they came into existence, the child was considered to be a miniature adult and was punished as such. Within certain limits we no longer do that. At long last it seems to be generally conceded that young children are not entirely responsible for their acts; yet thousands of adults possess neither the intelligence nor the emotional stability of the concededly irresponsible child. Feeble-mindedness under the law (except idiocy) is no excuse for crime! Many irresponsible imbeciles and morons, and untold numbers of unfortunates who are driven blindly to their misconduct by irresistible unconscious forces, are held to strict accountability and are frequently executed in the name of punishment.

Traditional administration of criminal justice, unfortunately, is still dominated by the idea that the law is an inflexible body of rules which by punishing offenses, places a highly desirable and necessary emphasis upon principles of retaliation, retribution, atonement, expiation and determent. This is a direct survival from the days of barbarism, or perhaps it indicates that our conscious righteous selves are skin deep only and that our true vindictive natures are revealed by the merest scratch. Obstinate the race clings to rationalizations for expressions of its cruelty. Punishing offenders, in addition, gratifies a craving in the crowd and in those who inflict punishment, for atonement through vicarious suffering.

Theories of crime and punishment have always borne a close relationship to prevailing states of cultural development and

to the religious and philosophical ideas of the times. The less cultured the age, the more cruel the punishment, and the more crude the rationalization. That seems to be the rule. But however ingenious and inhuman the penalties, the number of offenders seems never to have decreased and centuries of punishment, except for the savage satisfaction of vindictiveness, have accomplished nothing for the human race (6).

Retribution, retaliation, and expiation were historically the first principles upon which society proceeded against offenders (7). Primitive man reacted almost instinctively to injuries and imposed upon the offender such punishment as he could and such as was suggested by his sense of injury. He believed the criminal committed offenses because the devil possessed him and he thought the tribe would suffer unless the offender was punished. So he endeavored to drive out the devil for the purpose of repudiating the offense and placating the gods (8). He was more consistent about punishment than his latest descendants.

The *lex talionis* developed at an early date. It was never better stated than in the Mosaic law: 'Thou shalt give life for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, foot for foot, burning for burning, wound for wound, and stripe for stripe'.

The next development after many centuries in which the primary effort was deterrence was a period of repression of crime by intimidation and torture. The philosophy and religion of the times played important rôles in this era. An abstract or metaphysical interpretation of the universe supplanted the older theological idea and in the development of Christian theology arose the doctrine of 'free will' and responsibility. The principle of the *lex talionis* was gradually modified in favor of a general scheme of corporal punishment, involving terrible penalties such as tearing asunder, impalement on stakes, roasting alive, branding, whipping, squeezing, amputation of the feet, hands, ears or nose, pulling out the tongue, gouging out the eyes, disembowelment, and so on. The law, such as there was of it in this 'Pre-Classical Period' of criminology, fixed minimum penalties only and left it to

individual judges to add such additional punishment as they pleased. The exercise of this tyrannical power by judges over the course of the years led to such horrible abuses that the 'Classical School of Criminology' arose as a protest (9).

Thought then turned somewhat to the idea of reformation. The rise to the Classical School is closely associated with the name of Beccaria who published his book, *Crimes and Punishment*, shortly before the American Revolution. The classicists, saturated with the political philosophy of the eighteenth century, insisted that legislators, not judges, should define the crimes and fix the punishment. They did not attack the medieval idea that man is a 'free moral agent', and therefore entirely responsible for his acts. They insisted that the same punishment should be visited indiscriminately upon every person who committed the same act, regardless of circumstance, age, mental or emotional condition (10). Since the classicists, crimes have been defined by legislators who prescribe a minimum and maximum punishment for each offense, making it discretionary with the judge in each case to vary the penalty between the two extremes. In 1917 this power was taken away from California judges by the Indeterminate Sentence Law and vested in a body of laymen known as the Board of Prison Terms and Paroles.

In time, naturally, society saw that it must exclude from this system of fixed punishment those persons who by reason of youth, insanity, idiocy, and the like, were patently incapable of exercising 'free will'. At last there began to develop recognition of extenuating circumstances in the offender himself (11).

Next developed the 'Positive School of Criminology' led by Caesar Lombroso whose first work appeared some time after our Civil War and somewhat more than one hundred years after Beccaria. While many of the ideas of Lombroso are untenable today, he nevertheless advanced anthropological and psychiatric explanations for criminality and substituted science for philosophy and theology in the field of criminology (12).

Following Lombroso there then developed many one-sided

attempts to explain criminal behavior—such as the pathological, with emphases upon epilepsy, or 'neurasthenia', or 'psychopathic states'. There were advocates of 'degeneracy'. Anthropologico-sociologic causes were advanced as well as purely socialistic theories. Goring insisted that the criminal is a 'defective personality'. Bonger, on the other hand, saw only economic forces in the production of criminal activity. More recently, there has been a great revival of emphasis on the psychiatric point of view on causation of crime. There was some merit in each of these explanations but it soon became clear that neither singly nor together, did they yield satisfactory interpretations because they had access only to the most superficial layers of the mind to the almost complete exclusion of the complex mass of unconscious motivation.

It remained for Sigmund Freud to provide an approach which not only combined with discrimination what is valid in these many interpretations, but which evolved also a scientific discipline dealing with the psychological, dynamic forces within the human being whether the manifestation of these forces be socially acceptable like literary and artistic expression, or whether it be mental disease or criminal behavior (14).

Psychoanalysis is the first branch of knowledge which undertook to investigate and learn how the individual functions by probing the deeper motive powers of human action. Psychology and classical psychiatry before Freud had not a very clear concept of the individual personality, and remained rather abstract philosophical and speculative systems at best. They failed to discover the fundamentally basic fact, uncovered by Freud, that a given human personality is not a homogeneous unit. They confined themselves almost exclusively to the thin, upper, superficial 'layer of rationalization'—the conscious ego. This Freud disclosed is but the smallest fraction of the psychic apparatus, a floating surface upon the great reservoir of unconscious drives.

Much criminal behavior is so utterly irrational, so deeply rooted in the unconscious, that without psychoanalysis its meaning and its causes and the corrective possibilities involved

are entirely beyond the ken and reach of judges, probation officers, social workers, teachers, wardens, prison directors, psychologists, 'mental testers', and large numbers of clinical psychiatrists (15).

The publications, particularly, of Alexander and Staub (14), Alexander and Healy (17), Healy and Bronner (19), and August Aichorn (21), my own experience as an analysand, my work as judge of the Superior and Juvenile Courts at Santa Barbara, and especially the diagnostic and therapeutic work done at my request with offenders by Dr. Gilbert V. Hamilton of Santa Barbara, and Dr. Ernst Simmel of Los Angeles—convince me of the utter necessity for the recognition in criminology of the power and meaning of the unconscious. That is the first essential step in the mastery of the dynamic and compelling forces that make for misbehavior. When we recognize this fact, the reformation of our stupid, brutal penal system will become inevitable.

Society continues, however, to punish most of its offenders although nothing is more conclusive than the utter futility of this practice. Corporal punishment for countless generations, in every conceivable form was the usual method employed by the race to punish not only the criminal but the neurotic and the insane. Because of its utter failure as a check upon crime, society in the nineteenth century at last began its great experiment with the modern prison (16). There had been prisons before this time, of course, but only for political offenders or places of detention pending trial. In the United States, about 1790, there was substituted for corporal punishment, the Pennsylvania or Separate System of imprisonment. Here the chief aim of incarceration was penitence. Hence the name 'penitentiary'. The prisoner, until dead or insane, or until he had served his time, was held in a solitary cell night and day, in utter idleness, without the slightest opportunity to communicate with a single soul, except the warden and the chaplain.

Later, in the first quarter of the nineteenth century, the

Auburn or Silent System was developed. Its supporters enthusiastically urged the value of work in silent association by day with solitary confinement by night. The Auburn System served admirably the object of social revenge, but it failed as dismally as the Pennsylvania System to either reform or deter the criminal, or protect society.

Eventually, around 1850, developed the Elmira System based upon the idea of classifying offenders according to behavior with efforts at improvement during confinement. The aim appeared of treating the prisoner rather than treating the crime, of protecting society by reforming the offender.

The gradual diffusion of this principle brought into existence, around the beginning of the twentieth century, parole, the indeterminate sentence, probation and the juvenile court. But there is nowhere any really wise application of the resources of psychoanalysis to the problem of reformation and rehabilitation. There is no true appreciation in criminology of the significance of the unconscious.

Frank Sykes, Prison Director and Chairman of the Board of Prison Terms and Paroles, summed up the accomplishments of current prison life in California a short while ago. He said:

'Our prisons of today are breaking more men than they are making. The entire scheme of criminal rehabilitation must be adjusted to modern scientific thought—with institutions built and equipped accordingly. Until this is done, there can be no real solution of our prison problems, and the public will continue to witness a spectacle of overcrowded, overgrown institutions, where all types of human defectives are herded together in indiscriminate confusion. You might as well place in a cage tigers and lambs, doves and wolves, hogs and race horses—feed them all grain and expect them to fly when released.'

This is an appalling situation. It points unerringly to the necessity for new orientations and new outlooks in reference to the meaningfulness of misbehavior. The fact is inescapable that there is much more to the origins of crime and delin-

quency than appears when only the conscious self is considered and consequently only the superficialities of causation tapped. The knowledge of the human personality which the psychoanalytic method gives, shows that those behavior tendencies which make people suitable for community life are acquired during the individual's early developmental period and that the inherited, instinctual drives and impulses originally possess no qualities whatever that guarantee social behavior.

Psychoanalysis has not only shown that social life is based upon acquired restrictions of erotic and destructive drives but that these restrictions operate upon what is termed 'the reality principle' (17). While the child tends to gratify its every need and to avoid pain, the adult learns to postpone or renounce gratification and to endure discomfort and even pain in order to gain more important future satisfactions. This makes for the complicated balance between gratification and renunciation which we call 'social behavior'. In this balance there is a constant interplay between personality and sociological factors. Many types of personalities under stress of social situations drift into criminal careers; but the world is full of other personalities whose emotional need for misbehavior is so deep, whose unconscious tensions are so great that they indulge in criminal activity whether external circumstances are good or bad. Stealing, for example, quite apart from any rational aim of material gain, often expresses revenge or offers symbolic compensations for emotional deprivations. Crimes of violence, involving the greatest risks, are frequently nothing but demonstrations of aggressiveness, masculinity and toughness that cover up unconscious feelings of weakness and insecurity and supplant them with feelings of bravery and self-reliance (18). Emotional conflicts in the neurotic result in symbolic gratifications of unsatisfied urges. In the criminal they lead to overt acts. Many offenders, however, act out their neurotic conflicts in real life. Some literally pound for admission at the prison gates. Their overstrict consciences have generated feelings of guilt and they provoke and seek punishment to neutralize those

feelings. Others are creatures of compulsion driven by forces described by Freud involving mental mechanisms of transference and 'repetition compulsion'. Cut off from gratification of normal love needs in childhood, thwarted and deprived, they unconsciously reënact early conflicts and find substitute satisfaction in criminal acts. The offense, the trial, the judge, the prison, the punishment, are to them all symbolic. The dreams of prisoners often reveal that the prison means to the unconscious protection and shelter. Symbolically they return to mother. What a paradox it is that the penalties and the punishments we impose are frequently nothing but rewards to the offender's unconscious needs for whose sake he compulsively repeats his criminal act.

Freud's discoveries, in short, have given crime a new significance. We now see crime as much a response to inner drives and outer stimuli as is any other kind of human conduct. In common with all human actions, crime is one variety of self-expression. Crime and delinquency are only a part of the offender's total activity. The labels by which offenses are designated—burglary, robbery, larceny and the like—reveal nothing of what the offender is expressing in his act; nor does calling him 'delinquent' or 'criminal' or 'antisocial' give meaning to his conduct which though not acceptable as social behavior must originate in the desires, wishes or urges that are fundamental in all human nature. The great instinctual driving forces, with their deep emotional content, are universal, fundamental desires for ego and affectional satisfaction. There are desires for recognition, for security, for adequacy. There are urges 'for accomplishment satisfying to one's self, for new experiences and adventures, for outlets for physical and mental energies, for ownership of possessions, for having, seeing, and doing'. There are wishes for all sorts of affectional response. There is normally, with increasing age, 'the urge of self-assertion, showing itself, for example, in desire for emancipation from childhood and family restriction—the desire for independence and self-direction' (19). Interferences with these

fundamental wishes are felt 'as thwartings and deprivations causing keen dissatisfaction' which are met or balanced by substitutive satisfactions. Often these substitutes take the form of crime or delinquency when the individual has been unable, by reason of faulty habit formation or training to find socially acceptable substitutive satisfactions (20).

We know definitely that the punishment of such individuals is so much waste motion. The whole purpose of modern criminology including prisons and other institutions, being the protection of society, the best way to accomplish this objective is to reform the criminal or, if he cannot be reformed, to keep him confined. The way to reform is to educate, and the way to educate is to psychoanalyze. For those already delinquent, society, when it becomes better informed, will insist upon psychoanalytic clinics and hospitals, with prison-farms, colonies, and the like—built, equipped and conducted in the modern spirit. That great numbers of persons will have to be confined for the duration of their lives in one type of institution or another (many in purely custodial places) goes without saying. But it is just as certain that a significantly high percentage of offenders definitely can be healed and saved if society will go to the expense and take the time and trouble to do it.

We must eventually adopt attitudes that are intelligent, sensible, and humane. Jesus said, 'He that is without sin among you, let him first cast a stone . . .!'. Solomon's prayer was: 'Give, therefore, thy servant an understanding heart to judge thy people'. The Arabs say: 'Not even Allah condemns a man until he is dead!'. The adoption of attitudes that are intelligent and humane will eventually make it possible for us to place primary emphasis upon preventive measures.

In the field of physical disease, doctors have long since recognized the compelling necessity of a comprehensive program of preventive therapy. They are not committed to the policy of doing nothing until children, already infected with syphilis, smallpox, diphtheria, typhoid, or other disease, are

brought to them for doubtful or impossible cures. Can we not, in our well nigh hopeless and overwhelming struggle with the problems of delinquency and crime, profit by medical experience with the problems of health and disease? Will we not, eventually, terminate the senseless policy of sitting idly by until misbehavior occurs, often with irreparable damage, then dumping the delinquent into the juvenile court or reformatory and dumping the criminal into prison? That the carrying out of this suggestion would involve expensive and comprehensive education in psychoanalytic concepts and techniques for parents, teachers, social workers, judges, probation officers, and all others who presume to deal with the problems of misbehavior is a no more valid objection than might be raised against education in any other important field or phase of human endeavor.

When we shall have succeeded in committing society to such a program, when we see it launched definitely upon the venture, as in time it surely will be—then shall we have erected an appropriate memorial to Sigmund Freud.

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FREUD'S INFLUENCE ON AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGY

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Historical

In discussing Freud's influence on general and experimental psychology in America we need go no further back than 1909, the date of Freud's visit to the United States. It is true that before this time some American psychologists had studied Freud's writings in German and that the rudimentary ideas of psychoanalysis had been presented in a few seminars and lecture courses. As early as 1906, in the first issue of the *Journal of Abnormal Psychology*, J. J. Putnam had published an article on the psychoanalytic treatment of hysteria. This journal circulated widely among academic psychologists. However, except for a handful of people Freud was unknown and without influence in American psychology until his addresses of 1909 had been published in the *American Journal of Psychology* the ensuing year. That Freud was enthusiastically received is indicated by his own account:

'The introduction of psychoanalysis into North America took place under particularly glorious auspices. In the autumn of 1909, Jung and myself were invited by President Stanley Hall, of Clark University, to take part in the celebration of the twentieth anniversary of the opening of Clark University, by giving some lectures in German. We found, to our great astonishment, that the unprejudiced men of that small but respected pedagogic-philosophical university knew

From the Psychology Laboratory of the University of Kansas and the Menninger Clinic.

In this exposition I have drawn heavily on three previous papers: *Freud and the Scientific Method*, *Phil. of Sci.*, 1934, I, pp. 323-337; *Psychoanalysis, Topological Psychology, and Experimental Psychopathology*, *This QUARTERLY*, 1937, VI, pp. 227-237; *The Position of Psychoanalysis in the Science of Psychology*, *J. Abn. & Soc. Psychology*, 1940, XXXV, pp. 29-44, which contain references to the appropriate literature.

all the psychoanalytic writings and had honored them in their lectures to their students. Thus, even in prudish America one could, at least in academic circles, discuss freely and treat scientifically all those things that are regarded as offensive in life. The five lectures that I improvised at Worcester then appeared in English in the *American Journal of Psychology*; later on, they were printed in German under the title, *Über Psychoanalyse.*' (From *The History of the Psychoanalytic Movement.*)

It is well to keep this in mind because the subsequent attitudes of American psychologists as a group were not nearly so receptive and cordial. But American psychologists can claim with pride that they, more than the psychiatrists or the neurologists took an early interest in the new depth psychology.

The subsequent history of Freud's influence on American psychology can be roughly and arbitrarily divided into three periods. In the first of these from about 1910 to 1920 the American psychologist was interested in learning what freudian psychology was about and in writing expositions of it for his colleagues. From around 1920 to 1930, under the influence of behaviorism and somewhat later of gestalt psychology, he was mainly interested in disproving psychoanalysis, or in showing how great its limitations were. During this time Freud was chiefly damned with faint praise or praised with at times none-too-faint damns. From around 1930 to the present some of the chief tenets and theories of psychoanalysis have gradually worked their way into the body of general and experimental psychology.

Let us review these three phases briefly, keeping in mind that the division is arbitrary and that among individual psychologists one may find strong adherents through the period of critical rejection and vehement critics both in the period of receptive exposition and at the present.

During the decade following the publication of Freud's lectures there is to be found a gradual persistent increase in articles on psychoanalysis in the technical journals of academic psychology. Psychologists were undoubtedly alert to the sig-

nificance of the new discoveries. The American Journal of Psychology between 1910 and 1920 carried over twenty papers, summaries, and reviews on psychoanalysis. It would be misleading to state that there was neither critique nor polemic in this material; but the tone by and large was constructive. The psychologists wished to learn about Freud or they wished to teach their colleagues about him. The general feeling seems to have been that Freud's contributions were something which might enrich both the content and the methodology of general psychology. This development is perhaps best epitomized in E. B. Holt's important work, *The Freudian Wish and Its Place in Ethics*, which was published in 1915.

The academic psychologists were more favorable to Freud than the psychiatrists during this period for historical reasons. The psychiatrist had, or thought he had, a scientific approach in the somatogenic viewpoint. He was still very enthusiastic about the possibility of treating mental illness medically; besides he did not have much time to read the new and complacency-disturbing literature. The psychologist was not nearly so sure of himself. When experimental psychology was established in the nineteenth century, great things had been expected of it. This high promise was patently unfulfilled. The psychologist had discovered something about the structure of adult human consciousness, he had made important contributions to sensory physiology and discovered a few laws about learning, but he had no sure and systematic ideas about the sources of human motivation. At first he thought Freud would furnish these. But the psychologist who was most destined to influence American psychology in the twenties misread Freud badly. John B. Watson published his *Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviorist* in 1919. The next decade of American psychology was concerned with the battle of behaviorism. Before it was over, gestalt psychology was also in the fray. These two movements promised a broader and more vital general psychology to the disillusioned psychologists. They were championed by professors who had academic prestige. It was small wonder that American psychologists failed

to continue their study of Freud during the 1920's. But they could not afford to neglect him completely, so they continued their critical writings, but these were confined chiefly to his earliest papers.

Behaviorism appealed to the American psychologists of the 1920's because it was nontheoretical, based on experiment, and more closely related to biology than to philosophy. Watson and his many followers, despite certain slight methodological deviations, demanded first that psychology assemble facts without theory and secondly that it study behavior rather than consciousness. We now see quite clearly that behaviorism was based on theory but a very naïve epistemological theory and that a denial of consciousness solves no problems. But the general acceptance of behaviorism made it difficult for the American psychologist to accept psychoanalysis, in which theory played so large a rôle and which was concerned with the analysis of mental states as well as of behavior. The popularization of gestalt psychology which occurred somewhat later to a large extent overcame this difficulty.¹

For the most however, psychologists unable to ignore Freud, presented his doctrines incorrectly and in an inadequate fashion and naïvely criticized them on impertinent grounds; or to 'disprove psychoanalysis scientifically' they set up experiments which could not be crucial because they were based on an incorrect understanding of freudian tenets. Freud's influence (or perhaps the lack of it) on academic psychology during this decade can best be judged by a survey of the textbook literature. For various reasons (chiefly narcissistic and financial) the ambition to write a general introduction to psychology is particularly strong in psychologists. A fair number of such texts appear every year. I have not by any means looked into all of those which appeared during the 1920's but I have made a cursory examination of quite a few of them. This examination shows (1) that Freud always appears in the index; (2) that psychoanalysis is usually presented in five or six pages; (3) that

¹ I have tried to show this relationship in more detail in a separate paper. Cf. Brown, *op. cit.*, This QUARTERLY.

the presentation is most often based on the writings before 1905; and (4) that Freud's service in calling attention to the importance of sex is almost invariably appreciated but his explanation of everything on the basis of sex is invariably deplored. Whether such presentations can be taken to indicate any meaningful influence or not is questionable. They do show that psychologists of this time were not averse to dealing with major theories outside their own immediate field without any further scholarly background than the reading of each others' outdated books. But the mere fact that Freud was not ignored in their writings has in itself been influential, and not all the texts were equally bad in their presentations. Some, like McDougall's were better and others like L. W. Cole's were very much worse. Probably the books which best epitomize this decade for our purposes are the polemics against psychoanalysis. Knight Dunlap's *Mysticism, Freudianism, and the Scientific Method* and Wohlgemuth's *A Critical Examination of Psychoanalysis* are examples of those which seem outdated today.

During this decade, besides their influence, or lack of it, on general psychology, Freud's theories stimulated a certain amount of experimental criticism. Most of these earlier experiments were based on as inadequate an understanding of psychoanalysis as were the general presentations. For this reason they add little further to scientific knowledge. Questionnaire studies showed definitely that boys scarcely ever remembered castration threats from their fathers or memory experiments indicated that unpleasant experiences were consciously retained (not repressed) and the freudian theory was thus 'disproved'. As we shall indicate shortly there has been a great improvement in both the textual presentations and the experimental criticism of psychoanalytic concepts in the last ten years. To a certain extent even these more recent works have been influenced by the earlier writings and experiments, and so we may conclude that Freud had a considerable influence on American psychology even during the 1920's. The 1930's are still near enough to us to be treated as the present.

The Present Influence

In the late 1920's and early 1930's gestalt psychology replaced behaviorism as the chief bone of academic contention in psychological circles. Gestalt psychology is based on postulates much more easily reconcilable with psychoanalysis than with behaviorism. Gestalt psychologists from the first insisted on the importance of constructed theory and while critical of the misuse of introspection did not attempt to solve the problem of consciousness by denying it. Furthermore leaders of the gestalt movement, in their lectures and their writings, gave both a more adequate presentation and more adequate criticisms of psychoanalysis than had the behaviorists. As gestalt psychology began to intrigue more and more academicians the naïve behaviorism of Watson was realized to be practically as sterile as the introspectionism it attacked. Moreover the psychology of the Titchenerian structuralists which was concerned with the investigation of a nonexistent entity known as the 'normal adult mind' had reached a new low ebb of popularity. There was a growing interest on the part of both teachers and students in genetic, child, social and abnormal psychology. All of these factors led to a situation where a renewed and more sophisticated interest in psychoanalysis on the part of psychologists was inevitable.

During the past decade Freud's influence has been greater than ever before. This should not be taken to mean that psychoanalysis is no longer controversial in academic psychology. Even in the most recent times, with the exception of some psychologists who have become professional lay analysts, it is impossible to find an outstanding psychologist who may be called freudian in the sense that the term is applied to the members of the psychoanalytic societies. But the time is definitely past when psychoanalysis is dismissed with a sneer because it is 'based on a theory of instincts' or is 'pure mysticism' or deduces 'everything from sex'.

The influence of Freud in contemporary psychology is both direct (certain of his postulates are rather widely accepted in

general psychology and have become starting points for experimental investigation) and indirect (the endeavors of Freud and the analysts have forced psychologists to modify the subject matter of their books in general psychology and have changed the nature of the problems of experimental psychology). We shall discuss the indirect influences first.

If one compares a good recent text book such as Boring, Langfeld, and Weld's *Introduction to Psychology* with any of those written before the advent of psychoanalysis it is necessary to look twice before one is certain that these two books are dealing with the same science. More than one-half of the older text will be devoted to the study of sensation and perception, another three-eighths to the study of learning and remembering, and about an eighth to the study of personality, social conduct, and motivation. The topics will be treated in this order. The hypothetical 'normal adult mind' will furnish the examples for these behaviors. The book of Boring, Langfeld, and Weld (and I choose it as a respectable, conservative, and 'factual' text) reverses the order completely and nearly reverses the emphasis. Social behavior, personality, and motivation come first and are most stressed. In the very first paragraph occurs the statement, 'much of man's conduct is determined by motives of which he is not aware'. Such a change in the form and content of texts in general psychology is certainly, even if only indirectly, due to the influence of psychoanalysis.

Not only in the general texts but in the more specific texts in child psychology, genetic psychology, social psychology and particularly abnormal psychology is the indirect influence of psychoanalysis discernible. In all of these fields problems of motivation, emotion, and growth predominate so that the chief problems studied are the problems with which psychoanalysis deals. And these are the courses which in recent times have become the most frequently elected and possess the greatest student interest in the American universities. How much of this change can be directly attributed to Freud is of course uncertain. These changes follow to a certain extent from the same dynamic historical forces which made the development of

psychoanalysis itself inevitable. Certainly the growing interest in social psychology stems from the discontents in modern civilization which led Freud to write his later social philosophical works. But whether because of Freud or alongside with Freud's own development, the interests of academic psychologists tend more and more to merge with those of psychoanalysts. The fields of research of academic psychologists show a parallel development so that Freud's indirect influence is to be found here also. Examination of the files of Psychological Abstracts which reports all recent experimentation shows an increasing emphasis on motivation, emotion, and growth with a decreasing emphasis on sensation and perception during the last decade. In many ways these indirect influences of Freud may be more important than the direct influences in that they may promise more from future investigation.

Freud's direct influence on general and experimental psychology has grown considerably in the most recent years. Most psychologists are inclined to accept the fact of the unconscious motivation of some, if not of all, behaviors. Although Freud did not discover this fact he, more than anyone else, established its scientific validity, and though the majority of psychologists still refuse to look on the basic urges as instinctual in nature, the very great importance of the libidinal and aggressive urges is denied by but few of them. Infantile sexuality, if in a somewhat modified form in many hands, has become a basic postulate of child and genetic psychology. The theory of psychosexual genesis, although not accepted in all of its implications, is to be found in most textbooks and the ensuing critique is milder and based on a better understanding of the theory than formerly. The dream theory and the psychopathology of everyday life are being more and more reasonably considered. The conflict resolving mechanisms have had the greatest direct influence on academic psychology. Projection, introjection, regression, reaction-formation and displacement are used as glibly by psychologists as by psychoanalysts and on the whole in the correct analytic meaning.

Freud's direct influence has recently extended to the field of experimental psychology. We have already seen that the experimental work of ten years ago was directed at disproving the freudian hypothesis with inadequate experimental tools. In this it naturally 'succeeded'. Since then there have been many more adequate experimental tests of freudian hypotheses and of these most have corroborated freudian theory. Experiments have been undertaken on both human and animal subjects at many of the universities and research institutes² with results which support Freud's clinical findings. Most of the experiments so far reported have been concerned with proving or disproving freudian postulates rather than with using psychoanalytic knowledge as a start towards new fact finding. There are indications however that this next step may soon be taken. Of all the modern experimental approaches to the psychology of action and affection that of Professor Kurt Lewin has deservedly received the most attention. Lewin realizes his indebtedness to Freud and his recent work gives promise of really discovering something about motivational psychology through experiment.

The Future

At the present time Freud's influence on academic psychology is very great and there is every indication that with the years it will grow to be even greater. Psychology is becoming systematized in that it is dealing with true psychological problems, with nearly all psychological problems, and with vital problems. We owe more thanks to Sigmund Freud for this development than to any one man. Whether or not Freud has been the most influential force in modern academic psychology is beside the point. If by scientific psychology we mean the science which studies the total integrated behavior of the human organism, it is becoming increasingly clear that psychoanalysis is the

² Most notably at the Harvard Psychoclinic, the Institute for Human Relations at Yale, Johns Hopkins University, the Universities of Michigan, Iowa, Kansas, the Worcester State Hospital and the Menninger Clinic.

major contribution to scientific psychology made in our time. And this leads us to the question of the future influence of Freud on psychology.

Freud and psychoanalysis were given a cordial reception in 1909 but shortly thereafter there was a definite schism established between psychoanalysis and academic psychology. Recent events lead us to believe that this rift is being overcome. But it would be foolish to pretend that academic psychologists and psychoanalysts see eye-to-eye on all psychological problems. In fact the antagonism between them is still so strong, it is remarkable that Freud's influence in academic psychology has been so great.

This antagonism has been made even more severe by the failure of psychoanalysis to make headway in the universities and the resulting necessity for the establishment of separate psychoanalytic institutes. The psychoanalyst suffers from lack of adequate training in the logic and methodology of experimental science. The psychologist suffers from lack of adequate training in psychoanalysis. Psychoanalysis lacks the research facilities which characterize the first-rate universities and academic psychology is being deprived of the fertilization it so badly needs from the vital and pertinent problems raised by psychoanalysis. This results in an academic psychology which continues precise but needlessly sterile and a psychoanalysis which is vital but needlessly vague. There are increasing signs of collaboration between psychoanalysts and academic psychologists however and the time may not be far away when psychologists working in the universities will invite psychoanalysts as colleagues to introduce psychoanalysis into the curricula. When this is done we may expect scientific psychology to advance rapidly. In this advance Freud's influence may well fulfil the promise of its auspicious start in 1909.

THE PREOEDIPAL PHASE OF THE LIBIDO DEVELOPMENT

BY RUTH MACK BRUNSWICK (NEW YORK)

The material published here is the result of work begun in the summer of 1930 in collaboration with Freud. The starting point was a case of delusional jealousy which I had previously analyzed and published and which inadvertently had revealed a wealth of unsuspected information concerning a period hitherto unknown, antedating the œdipus complex and consequently termed preœdipal. The written record of this collaboration is a manuscript which consists of my notes, typed after discussions with Freud, and Freud's own marginal comments, ideas and suggestions.

We are accustomed to the postulate that the roots of neurotic illness are to be found in the œdipus complex of the individual. The normal man or woman has emerged from his infantile sexuality, of which the œdipus complex is the pinnacle, and has abandoned the love object of this period, whereas the neurotic has remained fixed to the œdipal love object.

Thus originally Freud postulated the etiology of the neuroses; but in his work on female sexuality¹ first published in 1931, he limits the rôle of the œdipus complex in women and attributes great importance to the preœdipal² period in the formation of neurotic illness. Indeed, he says that so far as women are concerned, he is obliged to retract the statement that the œdipus complex contains the nucleus of the neuroses.

When we attempt to examine the origins and precursors of the œdipus complex, we encounter among analysts an opposition not unlike the earlier opposition of the outside world to

¹ Freud: *Über die weibliche Sexualität*. Ges. Schr. XII, p. 120.

² To the best of my knowledge, the term *preœdipal* was first used by Freud in 1931 in this work, p. 126, and by this author in *The Analysis of a Case of Paranoia*. J. of Nerv. and Ment. Dis., LXX, 1929, p. 177.

the œdipus complex itself. The use of the term 'preœdipal sexuality' seems to arouse a certain loyalty to the œdipus complex as if its validity were being threatened. Evidently we have had sufficient difficulty in acknowledging the full importance of the œdipus complex: insult seems added to injury when we are asked to go beyond it. The admission of the importance of the œdipus complex constitutes in a sense the main distinction between the analyst and the outside world which of course has always been reluctant to accept sexuality in the children, particularly adult, genital sexuality as it is revealed in the œdipus complex. A different situation arose with the establishment of the other great complex of childhood, the castration complex. Its very nature created another fate for it. It has remained generally unknown except to analysts and has indeed proved to be the rock upon which the adherence of certain analysts to psychoanalysis has shattered. There is no doubt that the castration complex is much more foreign to our conscious mode of thought than the œdipus complex; yet if we are free to observe it, its expression in early childhood equals in directness that of the œdipus complex itself.

The importance of the castration complex in the development as well as in the relinquishment of the œdipus complex has long since become clear. However, we must now add that all these conceptions are strictly applicable only to the male child. It was assumed that the girl's development did not differ radically from that of the boy, but in the course of the last decade we have seen that male and female development, while closely resembling one another, in no sense run parallel.

The present work is a preliminary attempt to correlate our knowledge of the sexes, and to describe that earliest level of the libido development which extends from birth to the formation of the œdipus complex.

Unfortunately, correlation and precision demand the restatement of much that is known or indeed obvious. Sometimes the new formulation differs by only a nuance from the old; but frequently it is exactly this nuance which is significant. For these reasons, I ask the indulgence of the reader throughout a

frequently banal and tiresome repetition of many self-evident facts of psychoanalytic theory.

A second apology concerns the apparently schematic character of this work. Only at the end have I ventured to apply the theoretical insight hereby acquired to one or two clinical problems. Yet I need hardly state that clinical observations alone were responsible for what becomes, in such a brief presentation, merely a diagram of early development.

Let us define our terms at once. Under *œdipus complex* we understand not only the positive attachment of the child to the parent of the opposite sex, but above all the situation of the *triangle*: the child positively attached to the one parent and in rivalry with the other. The *preœdipal* phase, on the other hand, is for both sexes that earliest period of attachment to the first love object, the mother, before the advent of the father as a rival. It is the period during which an exclusive relation exists between mother and child. Other individuals are of course present in the outside world, especially the father who is an object of affection and admiration, as well as of annoyance when he interferes with the mother's preoccupation with the child. But he is not yet a rival, nor is the strong bond between mother and child split up, as it is destined to be, amongst the various other individuals in the environment. The only person who shares the mother-child relation is the nurse, and she merges ordinarily, though not invariably, into the mother figure.

Examination of the early phase of exclusive mother attachment is beset with difficulties. First of all, this period is the most ancient, the most archaic, and the most foreign to our usual mode of thought. Second, it is overlaid with material from other phases, and is therefore not readily discernable. Third, it is the period of greatest inarticulateness, so that even direct nursery observations are not easy to make. And finally, the forces of repression have mutilated and indeed often destroyed to the point of making unrecognizable much of this very epoch which contains the roots of all later development.

The complicated chronological relations of the *preœdipal*

phase, œdipus complex, and castration complex vary both according to the sex of the child and, individually, according to the time and incidence of traumata, childish observations of the primal scene, the perception of the sexual difference, the birth of another child, etc. In the boy, the preœdipal mother attachment is apparently of much shorter duration than in the girl, merging very early into the œdipus complex. This in turn is followed by the castration complex on the basis of which the œdipus complex is destroyed. It is otherwise with the girl. Here too the preœdipal mother attachment develops into something surprisingly like the œdipus complex of the boy, with the mother as love object and the father as rival.³ As we shall see, this active œdipus complex of the girl also is destroyed by the discovery of castration although for reasons which differ radically from those of the boy. But out of the castration complex and the ruins of this primitive œdipus complex, there now develops the positive, or passive, œdipus complex of the little girl in which the father is the new love object and the mother the rival.

Thus we see that the little girl traverses a long and complicated route before entering the œdipus complex. Indeed, during the examination of the preœdipal phenomena we become uncertain as to the comparative importance of preœdipal and œdipal phenomena in feminine development.

At the beginning of her sexual life the little girl is to all intents and purposes a little boy. Her relation to her first love object, the mother, is precisely that of the boy, with similarly conflicting passive and active libidinal strivings. But unlike the boy, the girl must relinquish this love and transfer it to the father, a difficult process which we now know to be at times only partially achieved. Once in the œdipus complex, the normal woman tends to remain there; the œdipus complex of the woman undergoes no such widespread destruction as that of the man. On the contrary, it remains and forms the normal basis of the erotic life of the woman. The resistance of the

³ This situation is described by Jeanne Lampl-de Groot in *Zur Entwicklungsgeschichte des Oedipuskomplexes der Frau*, Int. Ztschr. Ps., XIII, No. 3, 1927.

female œdipus complex to the powers of destruction accounts for the differences in structure of the male and female superego.

It is evident that the sexual development of the woman in contrast to that of the man is complicated by the fact that the woman must give up her first love object, the mother, and transfer her libido to the father, whereas the boy, in passing from the præcédipal to the œdipal stage, makes no change of object. But the woman has not only two love objects: she possesses also two sexual organs, the clitoris and the vagina, whereas again the boy has only one. A possible parallel between the love object and the sexual organ will be sought later. We can, however, now make the following statement: that although the woman is obliged to give up one sexual object for another, and one sexual organ likewise for another, the boy is faced with the almost equally arduous task of changing, not love objects or sexual organs, but his own attitude to the original love object, the mother. That is to say, the originally passive male is obliged to develop that full degree of activity toward the woman which is the token of his psychic health.

The phenomena of the præcédipal phase should be described in their own terms and not in the terms of the œdipus complex. Inasmuch as the præcédipal phase extends from the beginning of life to the formation of the œdipus complex, it is obvious that the discovery of the sexual difference ordinarily falls within its scope, especially in the case of the girl, in whom the præcédipal phase is so much more extensive than that of the boy. Previous to this discovery the child makes personal but not sexual differentiation between the individuals of its immediate world. It must be remembered that until approximately three years of age, the pregenital zones outweigh the genital in importance. Similarly the boy, judging others by himself, takes for granted the universal possession of the penis, like the mouth, the anus, etc. The girl who has not yet discovered the existence of the penis believes her sexual constitution to be universal.

Three great pairs of antitheses exist throughout the entire libido development, mingling, overlapping, and combining, never wholly coinciding, and ultimately replacing one another.

Infancy and childhood are characterized by the first two, and adolescence by the third. These are (1) *active-passive* (2) *phallic-castrated* (3) *masculine-feminine*. Schematically, but schematically only, these follow upon one another, each characteristic of a given stage of development. We shall attempt to define each stage within its own terms rather than in the terms of a later stage.

The first great pair of antitheses, *active-passive*, governs the beginning of life. That the infant is largely passive is evident; often it must be taught even to breathe and to suckle. One is tempted to state that development consists largely in the super-vention of activity over a prior passivity. One is restrained from any such generalization by the fact that not only do we know almost nothing of the essential nature of passivity and of activity, or of their relation to one another, but in addition, it is a matter of speculation whether passivity is converted into activity, or whether certain developmental strivings are specifically active and others passive, and whether in the course of development the active strivings increase in number and intensity and therefore occupy more place. What we do see, and what we are able in some measure to trace at least descriptively and perhaps dynamically, is a constantly growing activity on the part of the child. It learns to sit instead of being held; it reaches out for its own bottle instead of merely receiving it, etc. What we learn is that each bit of activity is based to some extent on an identification with the active mother, an identification which provides a form for the activity inherent in the child who does for and to itself what the mother has done for it, playing the rôles of both mother and child in the manner typical of childhood. Indeed, the child plays the rôle of the mother not only toward itself but also toward other children, animals, and toys, and ultimately and above all toward the mother herself.

The active-passive phase is prephallic, what Jones calls deuterophallic. As I have remarked before, the child takes for granted the likeness of its own sexual organization to that of others, and the genital is a matter of no greater concern than

the other erogenous zones, notably, at this early age, the mouth. Thus the sex of the child is immaterial; and it is to be noted that the rôle of the mother, at this time prior to sexual differentiation, is not feminine but active.

A new epoch begins with the discovery of castration which establishes the sway of the second pair of antitheses, *phallic-castrated*. This still does not coincide with masculine and feminine although by taking cognizance of the presence or absence of the exclusively phallic genital it more nearly approaches the final pair than does its predecessor. However the lack of the phallus is at first considered individual or accidental, in no sense irremediable. With the exception of the clitoris, the female genital, including the vagina, is still essentially unknown. We are all familiar with the reactions of the child to the discovery of castration. We know that the boy does not immediately question the sex of the most important person in his environment, the mother. On the contrary, he takes it for granted that she at least is phallic. Thus castration as an irretrievable fact affecting all females is not immediately accepted by the child. With the final recognition of the mother's castration and the possibility of his own at the hands of the father, the œdipus complex of the little boy is destroyed.

But whereas the normal male gives up the mother and saves himself from castration, the neurotic faces two possibilities: first, he represses but fails to give up his love for the mother; and, second, frequently in combination with the first possibility, he accepts in fantasy castration by the father, gives it a libidinal significance, and takes the father as a love object. This we call the negative or passive œdipus complex.

I should like to offer a suggestion made by Freud in our early discussions of these problems. The terms 'active' and 'passive' œdipus complex are more comprehensive and accurate in their application to both sexes than the usual positive and negative œdipus complex. According to this new terminology, the pre-œdipal sexuality of the girl becomes her active œdipus complex with the mother as its object. Her passive œdipus complex has the father as its object. For the boy, the active œdipus com-

plex denotes what we ordinarily call the positive œdipus complex with the mother as the object. His passive œdipus complex which we ordinarily term the negative œdipus complex has as its object the father, and is a neurotic phenomenon when occurring to any marked extent. However I shall retain the older terminology here because of the otherwise inevitable confusion between the terms preœdipal and œdipal.

The man in the passive œdipus complex so closely resembles the woman in her œdipal attachment to the father that it seems as if our new understanding of female development should aid us in our examination of the problems of the neurotic man. Freud suggests that on the basis of this new concept of early female sexuality, the preœdipal phase of the boy should be thoroughly investigated.⁴ The present work is an attempt in this direction. I should like to add that it has been necessary to repeat much of the material contained in Freud's two papers on female sexuality because those findings form the background essential both to the study of the corresponding development of the boy, and to the further examination of these phom  na in the girl.

Let us now return to the first position of the child in which it is passive to the active mother. Normal development demands that activity supervene over passivity. Whether the passivity remains, is given up, or is converted, we do not know. Clinically it appears to give place to activity. The degree to which this occurs is immensely variable. The process is more vigorous in boys than in girls and the actual quantity of activity is undoubtedly greater. The early character of the child depends largely upon the relative proportions of activity and passivity.

It is apparent that the child's earliest activity is, in its outward form at least, a copy of the mother. This is the most fundamental and primitive kind of identification, dependent for its existence solely upon the replacement of passivity by activity and consequently of mother attachment by mother identification, irrespective of any other emotional bond.

⁴ Freud: *ibid.* p. 132.

One might state that a young child's inability to produce an adequate activity is one of the earliest abnormalities. Passivity then predominates. But what besides constitutional elements interferes with the normal production of activity at this early age? Observations in the nursery have proved useful here. Briefly one may state that every successful act of identification with the mother makes the mother less necessary to the child. As she becomes less necessary, the restrictions and demands which she is obliged to make are increasingly resented. The child which has just succeeded in the difficult task of reliving actively what it has until now passively experienced—and here the repetition compulsion acquires its full significance—is particularly on the defensive in regard to this freshly acquired activity. It is a newly won libidinal position which the child guards zealously. Any activity on the part of the mother is likely to be resented. Therefore unless the mother accepts a more or less passive rôle, she becomes at best superfluous. The child reacts to her very presence with a kind of primitive, defensive aggression which is a by-product and protection of its activity as well as the defense against its original, barely overcome passivity. The pull of any earlier libidinal position is profound; every step of development is hard-won, and bound therefore to be defended. True aggression inevitably arises when the mother is obliged to hamper this budding activity either by forbidding or compelling certain acts. It is apparent that the resultant aggression derived from the original activity is now directed specifically against the mother who at this time is vested with the authority to restrict, prohibit and command, according to the requirements of the situation and by virtue of the fact that, until her subsequent depreciation because of her castration, she is not only active, phallic, but *omnipotent*.

This is perhaps the simplest of the various ways in which aggression arises. In reality we have to deal with far more ominous situations. Early narcissistic injuries on the part of the mother enormously increase the child's hostility. Conspicuous among these injuries which I shall not attempt to enumerate in detail are weaning, the birth of a brother or

sister, the relation between father and mother, the sexual rejection of the child of either sex by the mother; and finally, the depreciation of the mother as the result of her castration. On the basis of these injuries a conflict ensues which demands that the aggression toward the mother be repressed. But in as much as every new activity is associated with the repressed hostility, a large amount of normal activity must often be forfeited to insure the success of the repression. An individual hampered in his development ordinarily regresses; when further activity as demanded by development is blocked, a deeper regression to a still earlier, more passive, level takes place. We know that the interest in the genital and the discovery of the sexual difference coincide with a biological 'push' which occurs at about the end of the third year of life when the phallic period begins. The organic awakening of the phallic genital leads to the great period of infantile sexual activity. The libidinal desires of the child toward the mother, both passive and more especially active, become intense. They are accompanied by phallic masturbation with the clitoris as the executive organ of the girl. The boy seems to pass with relative ease out of his predominantly passive, preœdipal attachment to the mother into the characteristically active, normal œdipus complex. The corresponding phase in the little girl is of course still preœdipal. While the genital libido is at its height the castration of the mother is perceived and finally acknowledged with all its implications. Under the threat of castration by the father, the boy abandons the mother as his love object and turns his activity to the formation of his superego and his sublimations, aided undoubtedly by a mildly contemptuous attitude toward the castrated sex, and by the fact that, possessing the phallus himself, he has far less need of it in his love object than the little girl has. Not the mother's castration, but the threat to the boy's own penis results in the destruction of the male œdipus complex.

It is otherwise with the little girl. Here the mother's castration means not only the depreciation of the love object and the possibility of the girl's own castration as in the case of the boy;

the mother's castration is above all the doom of the girl's hopes of ever acquiring possession of a penis. The girl abandons the mother as a love object with far more embitterment and finality than the boy. She seeks to transfer her libido to the father, a transference beset by difficulties arising from the tenacity of the active and passive prædipal mother attachment. In the normal girl it is essentially the passive strivings which in the identification with the castrated mother, are successfully transferred to the father in the œdipal phase, and in adult life to the husband. The active strivings are sublimated at this time and only much later find their real scope in the relation of the woman to her own child, in her final and complete identification with the active mother.

Here I should like to call attention to one small clinical observation. Between the girl's attachment to the mother and the attachment to the father there may sometimes be observed a brief interregnum resembling the latency period. One might call it a prædipal latency period. It is a kind of suspension of the libido which has been detached from the mother and has not yet found its connection with the father. It is to be found or at least to be observed especially in girls with a somewhat retarded libido development, in whom the attachment to the mother has persisted beyond the usual length of time. It precedes the fresh wave of sexuality of the passive or positive œdipus complex.

The final pair of antitheses, *masculine-feminine*, comes at puberty. In the boy, the flood of virile libido brings with it for the first time the desire to penetrate the newly discovered vagina. A new relation to the woman is established which however has its roots in those remnants of the œdipus complex which have not been destroyed. These vary in quality and quantity. A healthy amount of activity towards the mother in the prædipal and œdipal phases is of immeasurable value to the ultimate relation of the man to the woman.

In the adolescent girl the wave of passive libido, libido, that is to say with passive aim called forth by the menses and the awakening of the vagina, is directed toward the father in an

intensification of the œdipal libido position which we may now call feminine.

So much for the investigation of the course of our three pairs of antitheses. We now return to our starting point in an attempt to examine that major phenomenon of the preœdipal period, the exclusive mother-child relationship. The relation of the child to the mother is obviously the fundament of its psychic life, the basis and prototype of all later love relationships. We may examine it from two points of view: first, in relation to the zones involved: oral, anal, and genital; and second, from that other angle of the libido development which we have been considering: first and foremost, at this early time, from the active-passive point of view, and, later, from the phallic-castrated.

I should like to say a word here about the concept of the phallic mother, a concept familiar to us from the fantasies of neurotics, psychotics and both normal and abnormal children. Whereas both the active and the castrated mother exist in point of fact, the phallic mother is pure fantasy, a childish hypothesis elaborated after the discovery of the penis and the possibility of its loss or absence in the female. It is a hypothesis made to insure the mother's possession of the penis, and as such probably arises at the moment when the child becomes uncertain that the mother does indeed possess it. Previously, in the active-passive phase, it seems more than probable that the executive organ of the active mother is the breast; the idea of the penis is then projected back upon the active mother after the importance of the phallus has been recognized. Thus it is a fantasy of regressive, compensatory nature. We shall continue to use the term 'phallic mother', first because of the prevalence of the idea in the neuroses and psychoses, and second because whether the idea is primary or regressive, the term is one which best designates the all-powerful mother, the mother who is capable of everything and who possesses every valuable attribute.

At this early age the only possible contact with the child is a physical one; therefore probably nothing equals in importance the physical care of the infant by the mother or nurse. The

entire infantile psychic life runs parallel to this care. The child's rôle is mainly passive, becoming active only in direct response to certain stimuli. The body as a whole, with the erogenous zones in particular, including the skin which plays so important a part at this time, must necessarily be cleansed and handled. We know that well-managed physical care is a source of intense pleasure to the infant and, equally, that rough or unexpected handling has a traumatic effect. It would appear that the first attachment to the mother which is so passive in nature, derives its strength and tenacity in great part from her physical care, and of course above all from her feeding of the child. There is no doubt about the sexual nature of the child's response. Only because at this very early age the genital plays so small a part does the mother-child relationship seem so innocent; then, too, the nature of infantile love is aimless and diffuse, appearing 'harmless'. Pleasure is obtained from innumerable sources; the child's appetite for it is random and without a particular goal, one reason perhaps, why that appetite remains unsatiated.

We have said that development brings with it increasing activity; so we may expect to find, as is indeed the case, that the child attempts to repeat actively every detail of physical care which it has experienced passively. Here, too, I am obliged to omit concrete examples with one important exception: the mother in the course of bathing and caring for the child is obliged to touch its genitals. A new bit of activity appears when the child, instead of allowing its genitals to be touched by the mother and experiencing pleasurable sensations from this passive experience, touches its own genitals not to wash them but purely for the sake of those pleasurable sensations with which it has become familiar from the mother's care. Here we have the first basis in fact for infantile masturbation, the first experience of which that masturbation is the voluntary repetition. The child's earliest phallic fantasy is undoubtedly one of playing the rôle of the mother towards itself by touching its genitals and eliciting thereby the same pleasurable sensations originally called forth by the mother. Thus the mother's

physical care of the genitals has constituted a true seduction, and is so viewed by the child. The blame incurred by the mother is doubled when later she forbids what she has herself provoked: phallic masturbation. Observations of young children, as well as of a certain primitive type of adult in the course of analysis, make it appear probable that the passive genital aim persists long after the mother's rôle has been largely taken over by the child. Despite a great display of activity, the child at the beginning of the phallic phase still primarily wishes to have its genitals touched by the mother.

When the statement is made that the physical care of the child by the mother constitutes the basis in fact for infantile masturbation, the significance of the primal scene as the sexual stimulus which frequently initiates the masturbation is in no way diminished or disregarded. The point is that the mother's physical care provides the pattern according to which the child can then react to the stimulus of the primal scene.

It is easier to discern the phallic phase than the oral and anal phases. The true oral phase is traversed while the infant is still too inarticulate to afford us much material. The anal stage, beginning at approximately two years of age, is more expressive. Here *giving* is initiated in contradistinction to the earlier and more passive *receiving*. The active giving has of course been present in some measure from the very first day of life, as manifested by spontaneous defæcation or urination. In the phallic phase the active attitude takes the lead. In the regression which usually follows the acceptance of castration of the woman at the end of the phallic phase, it is possible to observe both oral and anal phases quite clearly because of our greater similarity to an older child as well as its own increased articulateness.

We have said that the physical care of the child provides the basis for infantile masturbation, with its oral, anal, and phallic fantasies, and its interchanging passive and active rôles. But as has also been stated, there is something else with which we are accustomed to associate infantile masturbation, and that is the primal scene. So long as the exclusive mother-child rela-

tion obtains, the relations of the parents are of minor interest to the child. But the moment the active œdipus complex of the boy or girl is formed, the relations between the parents become the object of intense and jealous interest. We know that the child takes every opportunity to observe the sexual life of the parents and that when the opportunity is lacking some substitute is found even if only in fantasy. We have always asked ourselves how the child is able to understand the sexual relations of the parents. The answer may be found in the early physical relation of the child to the mother.

We frequently observe that not only does the child identify itself with the rival father in its love of the mother; it also identifies the father with itself. What does the father do with the mother? The child's answer is that he undoubtedly performs those acts which have been the source of intense pleasure to the child itself: in the oral fantasy, for example, the mother suckles the father. Now while suckling is in part active, every human act being mixed, it is nevertheless originally largely passive, doubtless because it occurs at a time of life when the child is overwhelmingly passive. It must be remembered that there is as yet no sexual difference between the parents. Thus in the fantasy of the oral relation of the parents, the rôle of the father is in part passive. A passive father rôle sounds contradictory to the point of absurdity. But the child's capacity for projecting its own desires upon others should be borne in mind, as well as the fact that active and passive at this time are not associated with the sexual distinction in as much as the latter does not yet exist. The counterpart of the passive fantasy of being suckled is the active oral fantasy of suckling. Here the mother is suckled by the child, or by the father.⁵ One must never lose sight of the fact that every passive fantasy acquires its active counterpart, and that this play of interchanging rôles is one of the chief characteristics of childhood. I recall one particularly infantile patient whose sole

⁵ In order to avoid undue confusion on the part of the reader, it should be remembered that suckling is always a transitive verb, although it is frequently used in the opposite sense with a resultant confusion typical of this early phase.

conscious masturbation fantasy was suckling her doll. Just beneath this manifest fantasy in which the mother rôle is dominant was the fantasy of nursing at the mother's breast.

We are aware of the importance of the child's bowel training and how easily it may become traumatic. We speak of the anal-sadistic level of development, and note that the awakening of the anal zone corresponds in point of time to the production of intense aggressive impulses in an individual who has by this time become more capable of expression than he had been during the oral phase. In the nursery one can observe that during the anal period any stimulation of the anal zone (or in the course of an adult analysis, any stimulation of anal mechanisms or material) may cause a violent outburst of rage. There is an etiological connection between anal stimulation and the production of anger. The enemas so frequent in childhood have all the appearance of rape; the child reacts with a tempestuous although helpless outburst of rage which can only be likened to orgasm. Rage appears to be the true motor expression of anal erotism, the anal equivalent of genital orgasm.⁶

In the phallic phase, the original passive desire of the child is to be masturbated by the mother. This passive wish is also ascribed by the child to the father, according to the mechanism described in the suckling fantasy. By the time the active wish to touch the mother's genital is formed, inhibiting influences and prohibitions have usually become sufficiently strong to limit the child in fact though not in fantasy, and not even always in fact to a wish to see the mother's genital. Consequently the most usual coitus concept or equivalent of the phallic phase, in which the vagina is still unknown and the need of penetration not yet formed, is the mutual touching of the genitals. This is indeed what children often do among themselves when attempting to imitate the coitus of the parents.

Thus we see that while the parental coitus is incorporated into the œdipal fantasy life of the child and into its masturbation, nevertheless the understanding and interest which the

⁶ Freud: *ibid.* p. 134.

child brings to the parental coitus are based on the child's own prædipal physical experiences with the mother and its resultant desires. The biological factor obviously outweighs all others; animals are able to perform the sexual act without any apparent learning process. Undoubtedly at puberty forces come into play which enable the individual to have sexual relations regardless of his prior observations or experiences. But what has always surprised us is not the adolescent's capacity for sexual intercourse, but the amazing understanding which the three or four-year-old child shows for the sexual relations of its parents. This understanding becomes less mysterious if we consider not only inherited and instinctual knowledge, but also the actual physical experiences of the child at the hands of the mother or nurse.

I should now like to describe chronologically and in relation to one another the two great wishes of childhood: the wish for a baby, and the wish for a penis. The original, asexual, 'harmless' wish for a baby arises very early, is based wholly on the primitive identification of the child of either sex with the active mother, and in the absence of a true object relation to the mother is neither passive nor active. The child wants everything the omnipoent and all-possessing mother has in order to do everything the mother does; and a mother is above all the possessor of a baby. In the anal phase with its new concept of giving and receiving and of increasing object relation to the mother, the wish for a baby acquires a second root: both boy and girl then desire a baby from the mother. This originally passive wish like every other acquires an active form: the wish to present the mother with a baby. The boy gives up the passive baby wish when his activity predominates. As his œdipus complex develops, a father identification replaces the earlier identification with the active mother. The girl, on the other hand, gives up her active baby wish when she accepts her own castration and consequent inability to impregnate the mother; the passive wish however is retained and is normally transferred from the mother to the father where as we know it assumes the greatest importance. Normality demands that the

boy give up his passive wish for a child, and the girl her active wish.

It may be tentatively stated that three types of infantile activity exist. The first, familiar type is the activity of the all-providing mother, seen in the child's earliest identification with the mother. The second, also familiar and much later type arises from the identification with the œdipal father. This type the girl is incapable of achieving in full, try as she may. (These attempts and failures are best known to us from the homosexual relations of women and their rivalry with men.) The little boy with temporary developmental rather than irremediable anatomical inadequacies, and therefore in possession of a full potential father identification, actually achieves an adequate father rôle toward the mother which he relinquishes only under the œdipal threat of castration by the father.

But there exists a third, unfamiliar type of activity in the young child of either sex, apparently inherent in the individual and independent of identification mechanisms. Our ignorance of the nature of activity makes description difficult and we are obliged to resort to analogy. The young page in an opera, a part almost always taken by women, personifies this type of activity and is characteristic of the uncastrated or rather sexually undifferentiated child. Recently a female patient with a strong mother attachment remarked: 'It isn't that I want to be a man. I think I really want to be a little boy'. The favorite childhood fantasy of this girl was to be a page to royalty.

The activity required for the father identification doubtless utilizes every preëxisting form and then adds the final stamp of masculinity. This ultimate and all-inclusive type of activity is never fully achieved by the girl.

The active wish for a penis of the little girl arises with the observation of the difference between the sexes and the determination to have what the boy has. This original basis is narcissistic. An object root is formed when the little girl realizes that without the penis she is unable to win the mother. Normally the relinquishment of the active penis wish

and of the attachment to the mother coincide. Contrary to our earlier ideas, the penis wish is not exchanged for the baby wish which, as we have seen, has indeed long preceded it. In the course of normal development the impossible is given up and the possible retained. The little girl concentrates her energy on the permissible and legitimate desire for a baby. The active penis wish, the wish for the full and permanent possession of a penis, makes way for the passive penis wish, the wish to receive the penis from the man in coitus. Out of this as the little girl knows, she will receive a child. Thus the two wishes finally unite. Originally narcissistic, both wishes next find transient root in the mother relation before finally and permanently attaching themselves to the father. ←

Let us now examine the phallic masturbation of the little girl, so much less familiar to us than that of the boy. It is a surprising fact that many adult women are unacquainted with both masturbation and orgasm. It is perhaps not correct to call these women frigid; they are responsive in coitus and their pleasure, though difficult to describe, is undeniable. But it is diffuse rather than specific, and it lacks the high, sharp curve typical of true orgasm.

We know that the clitoris is the executive organ of the infantile sexuality of the girl. We know too that the first object of this sexuality is the mother. One of the greatest differences between the sexes is the enormous extent to which infantile sexuality is repressed in the girl. Except in profound neurotic states, no man resorts to any similar repression of his infantile sexuality. The little girl's repression frequently results in a severe limitation of her entire sexuality, with permanent psychic injury. Freud has explained the female distaste for masturbation on the basis of the castration trauma: every act of masturbation reveals anew to the little girl the physical fact of her own castration. Girls seem to give up the use of the hands in masturbation earlier and more frequently than boys, although the same phenomenon is of course to be found in boys. Masturbation is then accomplished by pressure of the thighs.

The use of the hands reveals with too much tactile accuracy the actual nature of the little girl's genital, and is consequently discarded.

Undoubtedly castration is the narcissistic basis for the repression of masturbation in women. But there is another reason. We have seen that the relinquishment of the first love object of the girl is accompanied by tremendous embitterment. While the little boy acquires what we have come to consider the normal male contempt for women, the little girl, incapable of such contempt because of her own identical nature, frees herself from the mother with a degree of hostility far greater than any comparable hostility in the boy. The mother and the phallic masturbation of the girl are so intimately connected that it seems reasonable to believe that the loss of one is somehow connected with the loss of the other. While the clitoris is undoubtedly used during the positive œdipus complex because the child is obliged to utilize whatever means it possesses, it remains true that the original and, one might say, more appropriate object of the clitoris activity is the mother. Therefore, although the little girl later uses her clitoris in masturbation with passive œdipal fantasies, its original rôle has been lost, in other words, repressed with the original object. We are all familiar with those difficult cases where masturbation has been repressed so vigorously and at such an early age that its recovery in the course of analysis seems almost impossible. These women may nevertheless present strong father fixation, expressed in diverse œdipal fantasies which however, are unaccompanied by any physical masturbatory activity. I recall one especially instructive case of a woman with a strong father attachment and no ascertainable physical masturbation whatsoever. Her analysis showed that she had been deeply attached to a nurse who had been dismissed when the patient was two years old. The patient had immediately shifted her love of the nurse to her father to whom she became inordinately attached. But masturbation so thoroughly repressed at the age of two years was only recovered at the end of an extensive and successful analysis, in the course of which it became clear that its repression coin-

cided precisely with the repression of the attachment to the mother, or in this case mother substitute.

The vagina as we know derives its sensitivity primarily from the clitoris and secondarily from the anus. It has become a question whether, as heretofore stated, the vagina is always, or even usually, a 'silent organ' until adolescence. It now seems probable that an early vaginal sensitivity of anal origin frequently exists. A marked degree of anal sensitivity seems to favor the development of early vaginal sensations, probably because the anus like the vagina is a receptive organ and as such transfers its passive sensitivity to the vagina much more readily than does the active clitoris. Needless to say even when such vaginal sensitivity exists, its rôle is decidedly minor and secondary to that of the clitoris as the organ of the infantile sexuality. A correlation of the periods of clitoris and vaginal sensitivity, with the age of the little girl when she gives up the mother and attaches herself to the father should throw valuable light on the relation between the nature of the sexual organ and its love object.

As we know, not every little girl gives up masturbation along with her attachment to the mother. The reasons for the continuance of masturbation are manifold and need not be entered into here. But it is important to note that the repression of masturbation in girls does in reality frequently coincide with the relinquishment of the mother as the love object. When one remembers how difficult it is to penetrate the repressions which surround the little girl's first love object, one arrives at a clue in the equally difficult search for the lost sexuality of some women.

We know that the exclusive mother-child relationship is doomed to extinction. Many factors militate against it, the most potent perhaps its primitive, archaic nature. Ambivalence and passivity characterize every primitive relation and ultimately destroy it. Hostility and rebellion prevail when the passive pull is too strong, or when outside factors hamper the desired activity.

The œdipal attitude of the small boy frequently affords us

insight into his preœdipal attitude. An unduly strong, persistent œdipus complex combined with exceptional difficulty in giving it up, even at the risk of castration by the father, almost always signifies the existence of obstacles in the production of the normal œdipal activity. Either there has been too much aggression against the mother for any of the reasons familiar to us, or for reasons unknown the passive bond has been too strong. In these cases the little boy clings stubbornly to his active œdipal relation which he has attained with such difficulty. The clinical picture is that of a profound mother fixation at the œdipal level, but closer study reveals that much of the fixation is passive instead of active, and preœdipal instead of œdipal.

We have already investigated the fate of the girl's relation to the mother, and have seen that the frustrations of the preœdipal period provide the foundation for the jealousy and antagonism manifested by the girl in the normal œdipus complex. In addition to the fact that these earliest levels of development are most threatened with change, repression, and extinction, there are definite grudges which the child bears the mother which are usually the outcome of traumatic external events. In our consideration of the causes of aggression against the mother these grudges have already been mentioned. But in addition to being an early source of aggression against the mother, they play a further rôle in the final dissolution of the mother attachment.

Weaning is doubtless the first major interference in the relationship between mother and child. It is probably true that no matter how early weaning occurs, the infant reacts emotionally not only to the loss of food which can be compensated for in other ways, but to the loss of the breast itself. The disappointment in the mother at this early time constitutes a latent weakness in the relationship, a weakness which later traumata successively reactivate.

We know that an ensuing pregnancy ordinarily so changes the mother's milk that weaning becomes necessary. Later, the birth of a brother or sister further occupies the mother who

in fantasy at least has up to now been the exclusive possession of the child. The jealousy and hostility at first directed towards the newborn brother or sister are later referred back to the mother who is of course responsible for the presence of the intruder. The rôle of the father now begins to be perceived and related to the birth of the younger brother or sister. Competition with the father proves futile to the child of either sex; thus its sexual rejection by the mother is inevitable.

It will be recalled that the mother who by means of her physical care of the child has stimulated or indeed initiated its phallic activity, now attempts to forbid the infantile masturbation which she herself has provoked and of which she is the object. We are all familiar with the more or less traumatic reactions of the child to any attempt on the part of the mother to suppress masturbation, whether accompanied by the usual castration threats or not. Almost invariably it is the mother who expresses the threat of castration; but despite this practical fact it is the father who, out of some biological necessity, becomes the castrator of the boy while the mother retains this power over the girl. The castration of the girl by the father seems, like so many things, to be merely a second edition of the original castration by the mother.

The hostile reaction of the child to the threat of castration is well known. But there is another reaction due doubtless to the child's own guilty fear of the dangers of masturbation. The child, fearing masturbation and nevertheless unable to give it up, forms an unspoken pact with the forbidding mother or nurse. These are the children who cannot go to sleep unless the mother is with them, whose life is made miserable by the nurse's day off. They cling to the mother or nurse in the hope that hereby the dreaded consequences of masturbation will be averted. They rebel at being forbidden to masturbate but they are grateful for the aid given in the struggle against masturbation. It is obvious in these cases that the relinquishment of masturbation at the mother's demand has resulted in an undue degree of regressive, passive dependence upon the mother.

But not only does the mother reject and neglect the child

and forbid its masturbation. Her culminating crime is her depreciation as a love object due to her castration. To this castration the normal boy reacts with a degree of contempt which, modified, persists throughout his later attitude toward women.

We have already seen that the little girl reacts far more traumatically than the boy to the mother's castration. On the one hand the mother has failed to provide the girl with an adequate genital; on the other hand the girl is obliged to admit that this omission is doubtless due to the mother's own lack of a penis. The mother who is held responsible for the sexual inadequacy, simultaneously ceases to be a love object because of her inferiority. When the girl becomes to a greater or lesser degree reconciled to her own lack of a penis, she determines to take as her love object an individual whose possession of the penis is assured and for whose love it may even be worth while to undergo or, in reality, to accept castration. Castration by the father acquires a libidinal value and a virtue is made out of a necessity. Here the girl identifies herself with the castrated mother; and this indeed is her rôle throughout the passive œdipus complex.

It is impossible to trace the influence of the preœdipal phase on later development without a full and detailed description of the entire infantile sexuality. Let us therefore consider briefly one or two clinical pictures in which preœdipal influences are particularly striking.

The first patient in whom the preœdipal sexuality revealed itself unmistakably was the paranoid woman to whom I have repeatedly referred. The remarkable aspect of this case is the total absence of the normal œdipus complex. The traumatic seduction had so fixed the patient to her first homosexual love object that all further development was blocked. The poverty of psychic growth produced a simple, childlike individual, in whom preœdipal attitudes and mechanisms, normally overshadowed by the complications of the œdipus complex were outstanding. I judged this case to be extremely rare, dependent for its existence on the unusual nature and circumstances of the trauma.

But the insight gained in this analysis and applied to other patients demonstrated that the difference was merely one of degree, and further that no particular trauma such as seduction is essential for the production of this clinical picture which instead of being exceptional has proved to be extraordinarily common. The undeveloped, primitive woman with scant heterosexuality and a childish, unquestioning attachment to the mother, presents herself almost regularly to a woman analyst. This type of individual does not consult the male analyst because of a total lack of contact with the man. The degree to which a woman is successful in giving up her first love object and concentrating her libido upon the father determines her entire later life. Between the exclusive attachment to the mother on the one hand and the complete transfer of the libido to the father on the other hand, the innumerable gradations of normal and abnormal development are to be found. It might almost be said that partial success is the rule rather than the exception, so great is the proportion of women whose libido has remained fixed to the mother.

The preœdipal phase of the male, despite its comparative brevity, is perhaps less dramatic than the woman's, but equally far-reaching. It results in what we have come to consider the typical neurosis of the man: his passive attachment to the father in the so called negative œdipus complex. In this presentation I am obliged to confine myself to those observations which have led me to believe that the submissive attitude of the man to the father has its origin in the preœdipal phase. The consideration of other important etiological factors, such as masochism, is necessarily omitted.

We have seen how closely the little girl in her active preœdipal attachment to the mother resembles the little boy in his active œdipus complex. We now see that the boy in the negative or passive œdipus complex closely resembles the little girl in her passive, positive œdipal relation to the father. Unable to achieve the full activity of the male in the father identification, the girl falls back upon her identification with the active mother. Under the influence of castration, she shifts her passivity from the mother to the father. But the boy too

may come upon obstacles in his œdipal father identification. The first of these is the presence of what I should like to call the 'nuclear passivity' of the child, that original passivity of wide constitutional variation with which it is born into the world. Somehow, either as the result of a strong tendency to regress, or because of the presence of an unknown point of fixation at the preœdipal level, or because of some constitutional inability to overcome the primary inertia, the development of activity is impaired. An additional hindrance is undue aggression toward the mother. The external causes of hostility are manifold, but in addition certain human beings probably possess, actually or potentially, a greater number of aggressive impulses than the normal. When activity is thus impaired at its origin it seems highly probable that traces of this impairment, like those somatic evidences of injury to the germ plasm itself, become evident somewhere in the course of later development.

During the active œdipus complex of the boy, aggression toward the mother may manifest itself as sadistic love. But a fundamental hostility seriously interferes with the full formation of normal œdipal love, and persisting ambivalence further undermines the relation. These individuals are sensitized to traumata, and the œdipal rejection and disappointment frequently result in a regression to the earlier mother attachment which as we know belongs to the active-passive rather than the phallic-castrated level. This regression makes it possible for the neurotic boy to avoid the entire topic of castration. Inability to accept the castration of the mother is in itself a usual cause of regression. Under these circumstances only phallic individuals are acceptable as love objects. In this clinical picture of manifest male homosexuality, the influence of the preœdipal phase is unmistakable.

But the main neurotic type which results from preœdipal fixation is that of the man with a passive œdipus complex. Under the stress of the maternal castration, the little boy has identified himself with the mother and has taken the father as his love object. We have described the manner in which the girl shifts her passivity from the mother to the father, and have

seen that the neurotic boy pursues a similar course. But the boy who because of the mother's castration has shifted his passivity from the mother to the father has not gained by the transaction. His possession of the phallus is further threatened by his love of the father. The various methods of solving this dilemma are reflected in the innumerable clinical manifestations of the neuroses. A paranoid psychosis may result when the love of the father is so strong as to become intolerable. Sometimes, on the other hand, the individual succeeds in shifting his passivity from the father back to its original object, the mother, thus avoiding the paranoid sphere of the father. In these cases a neurosis results which is characterized throughout life by a pendulum-like swing from one parent to the other. Where these individuals have succeeded in more or less permanently attaching themselves to the mother, a so called 'mother-fixation' results. It has always been assumed that these individuals could not relinquish their œdipal object. But closer examination reveals that the mother who cannot be given up is the phallic mother, and that the relationship is dominated not by the usual active œdipal love but by an attachment which is to a large extent preœdipal and passive. Because of the primitive nature of this passive, tenacious attachment to the mother, an intensely ambivalent relationship between the man and his mother substitute results. His passivity and his dependence upon the phallic mother are resented and rebelled against by his entire masculinity. Here it is evident that the persistence of the preœdipal passivity has led to a malformation of the œdipus complex itself, and has played a major rôle perhaps in the genesis and certainly in the maintenance of the passive love of the man for his father.

While I am inclined to believe that unresolved, unassimilated passivity is in large measure responsible for these abnormalities of development, there exists also a primitive activity whose nature and possible pathogenic rôle has not yet been studied.

It is axiomatic that the difficulties of investigation and the tentativeness of our findings vary inversely with the age of the child under examination. This axiom is my excuse for the fragmentary nature of this work.

